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ABSTRACT 
This thesis defends the position that the Eastern Orthodoxy has the potential to develop, 
on the basis of its core concepts and doctrines, a new political theology that is participatory, 
personalist and universalist. This participatory political theology, as I name it, endorses 
modern democracy and the values of civic engagement. It enhances the process of 
democracy-building and consolidation in the SEE countries through cultivating the ethos of 
participation and concern with the common good among and the recognition of the dignity 
and freedom of the person.  
This political-theological model is developed while analyzing critically the traditional 
models of church-state relations (the symphonia model corresponding to the medieval empire 
and the Christian nation model corresponding to the nation-state) as being instrumentalized to 
serve the political goals of non-democratic regimes. The participatory political-theological 
model is seen as corresponding to the conditions of the constitutional democratic state.  
The research is justified by the fact the Eastern Orthodoxy has been a dominant religious-
cultural force in the European South East for centuries, thus playing a significant role in the 
process of creation of the medieval and modern statehood of the SEE countries. The analysis 
employs comparative constitutional perspectives on democratic transition and consolidation in 
the SEE region with the theoretical approaches of political theology and Eastern Orthodox 
theology. 
The conceptual basis for the political-theological synthesis is found in the concept and 
doctrines of the Eastern Orthodoxy (theosis and synergy, ecclesia and Eucharist, conciliarity 
and catholicity, economy and eschatology) which emphasize the participatory, personalist and 
communal dimensions of the Orthodox faith and practice. The paradigms of revealing the 
political-theological potential of these concepts are the Eucharistic ecclesiology and the 
concept of divine-human communion as defining the body of Orthodox theology.  
The thesis argues that with its ethos of openness and engagement the participatory 
political theology presupposes political systems that are democratic, inclusive, and 
participatory, respecting the rights and the dignity of the person.  The political theology 
developed here calls for a transformation and change of democratic systems towards better 
realization of their personalist and participatory commitments. In the context of the SEE 
countries the participatory political theology addresses the challenges posed by alternative 
authoritarian political theologies practiced in neighboring regions.  
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Introduction 
 
In the last decade, complex interactions between politics and religion are gaining 
higher visibility in the public sphere. In the globalizing world religion is far from being a 
private matter left to the conscious of a believer. Religion in modern societies continues to 
influence the political agenda and to play a significant role in the policy-making process.
1
 The 
societies in Southeastern Europe (SEE) experiencing a process of democratic transition and 
consolidation are not excluded from that tendency.
2
 
The issues of interaction between religion and politics in the course of democratic 
consolidation of SEE societies will be at the focus of this study. The political and social 
context to which the argument will refer to is that of countries with still fragile democratic 
institutions with heavy authoritarian legacy. Democratic achievements in the SEE countries 
are continuously exposed to radical changes, emerging populist movements and decline of 
social trust. Despite the seemingly irreversible belonging of some states to the Euro-Atlantic 
community (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania), the region as a whole continues to be an intersection 
of geopolitical interests and struggles (EU and NATO, Russia, Turkey). The relative progress 
and democratization in the SEE countries in the last decades is not irreversible given the 
interests and influence of authoritarian neighbor states and the fragility of the democratic 
institutions facing strong nationalist or populist movements, corruption and oligarchy at 
home.  
In this context, the traditional public role of Eastern Orthodoxy for the state-formation, 
nation-building and cultural development could be employed either in strengthening the 
forces of democratization and Europeanization in the SEE countries and the region, or in 
hampering this process. As far as religion provides a source of values and social 
commitments, as well as gives a sense of meaning and belonging to the larger community,
3
 it 
is important to be identified as an ally in enhancing pro-democratic tendencies in the society. 
                                                          
1
 Peter Berger, The Desecularisation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), 2;  
Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan ed., Political Theologies. Public Religions in a Post-secular World 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2006). 
2
 The region of Southeastern Europe (SEE), for the scope of this research, will be defined not in geographical 
terms only, but will include political, cultural and religious dimensions as well. For the purposes of this study 
expressions ‘the SEE region’, ‘the SEE countries’ and the similar will be used in the sense of including  
countries where Eastern Orthodoxy is a majority religion and in which it played an important role in the process 
of nation- and state-building (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia). These countries also 
share in common the Byzantine religious-cultural and political legacy.   
3
 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Anchor Books, 
1990), 133-134. 
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Regional Context and Problem Formulation 
As the history of the SEE region suggests, for the most part of the 19
th
 and the first 
decades of the 20
th
 century, Eastern Orthodoxy was able to influence the public sphere due to 
its institutionalized position as a traditional, official, national and established denomination. 
For instance, before the imposition of the communist regime in the late 1940s, the Orthodox 
churches, being in collaboration with the monarchs and the governments, ensured religious 
legitimacy to the ceremonies of elevation to political office, higher clergy served in public 
offices (as regents, members of the parliament, or ministers), church leadership was often 
consulted for the most important political decisions. Meanwhile, the churches took part in the 
social and cultural processes by means of compulsory religious education provided at the 
public schools. The societies were shaped according to the political-religious ideology 
provided by the Eastern Orthodoxy. Furthermore, the societies necessarily recognized 
Christian values and traditions as worthy of respect and preservation. In consequence, through 
all these diverse channels, Eastern Orthodoxy was able to influence, directly and indirectly, 
the larger socio-political context.  
After 1989, all countries in the region have adopted democratic constitutions based on 
the principles of the rule of law, popular sovereignty, separation of powers, and limited 
government, safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms, including the freedom of religion 
and the separation between church and state. In this context, the role of Eastern Orthodoxy in 
the public sphere and particularly in enhancing the democratic culture in SEE societies is 
changing. Most importantly, the channels of direct influence over the political and legislative 
process are not available and not considered legitimate anymore. If the organized and 
institutionalized religion aims at playing a role in the public sphere, it should consider options 
other than collaborating with temporary governing majorities. There are opportunities for the 
Orthodox churches to engage with activities in the civic sphere - raising public consciousness 
and awareness, cultivating values of participation and active citizenship, participating in an 
open public discourse, attracting support on behalf of civil society groups and organizations. 
These could be legitimate mechanisms of influencing the decision-making process the 
Orthodox Church recognizes the existing pluralism and diversity in the society. In more 
conceptual terms, Eastern Orthodoxy could be a valuable contributor to the public discourse 
to the extent it critically reimagines, reinterprets and develops its basic doctrines in line with 
the democratic values and principles of the civic culture. Whether Orthodox doctrines and 
11 
 
concepts have a democratic and participatory potential that could be delivered to the wider 
public will be studied in this research.  
For this new role to develop, the Orthodoxy has to reconsider its traditional political 
theology, shaped by traditional and early modern authoritarian and paternalist legacies and 
models in church–state relations. There should be growing recognition of the fact the 
historically shaped political-theological models, elaborated and sanctioned by the Church, 
remained imperfect accommodations to the existing political regimes. The present study will 
demonstrate that these models have not been fully consistent with the core values and 
concepts of the Orthodoxy. These political-theological models could not be interpreted as 
something inherently Orthodox, rather as specific and contextual accommodations to the 
existing political conditions. The ecclesiastic history suggests the Church has been reflexive 
in relation to the social and political conditions, that it has been actively present in the world, 
engaging with the socio-political processes rather than isolating itself from them. To remain 
faithful to its own traditions of social responsibility, the Church needs also to engage with the 
current issues of democracy, constitutional government and civil society.     
 In studying traditional political-theological doctrines and models in Eastern Christian 
context several stages could be identified. During the Byzantine period the concept of 
symphonia was elaborated. The concept mandates close cooperation, collaboration and mutual 
support between the church and the empire (the state) in ensuring the social and spiritual well-
being of the Christianized population. This concept and political-theological model continues 
to capture political imaginary in traditionally Orthodox countries and has been practiced with 
some modifications for centuries. From Byzantium this model of church-state relations was 
gradually accepted in other predominantly Orthodox medieval states (Bulgaria and Serbia) 
where it was practiced until the Ottoman Conquest. In the 19
th
 century after the formation of 
the nation-states in the SEE region, this model re-emerged in a slightly modified form.  
The next stage of development is connected to the elaboration of the concept of 
ethnarchy which had to accommodate Eastern Orthodoxy to the conditions of political 
dominance of a non-Christian empire, during the Ottoman period. It structured a model of 
interaction between the Orthodox ecclesiastic leadership and the Ottoman state making the 
Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople responsible for the organization and administration of 
the conquered Christian population. This interaction had to struggle with continuous tensions 
and conflicts with the hostile empire.  
A decisive stage in the modern political-theological development was the period of 
national liberation movements, revolutions and state-building in the 19
th
 century. During this 
12 
 
period, Eastern Orthodoxy became preoccupied with the nationalist ideology and church-state 
relations evolved towards the model of an established church (official state-supported national 
churches) that provided legitimacy to the newly founded monarchies. It employed a modified 
form of symphonia model, in which the relation between the church and the state was 
‘enriched’ with the concept of the nation. Thus the church was uniting and collaborating not 
only with the state, but also with the nation, understood in ethno-cultural terms. 
 All these models have corresponded to concrete socio-political realities. They have 
been developed and established in collaboration with the Church, primarily serving the 
legitimation of the political authority and recognition of certain ecclesiastic rights and 
privileges. Relating the political and the theological, these concepts and models of church-
state interaction could be labelled with the terms ‘imperial political theology’ (related to the 
symphonia concept) and ‘ethno-nationalist political theology’ (based on the concept of 
‘Christian nation’).  
Currently, the stage of development of Eastern Orthodox political theology is not yet 
completed. On the one side, the Orthodox political-theological imagination is often shaped by 
either the imperial or the nationalist model, both being outdated for contemporary political 
conditions of democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration of the SEE societies. In this 
sense, there is no correlation and correspondence between the traditional religious-political 
conceptualizations and the contemporary political processes. Moreover, the compatibility 
between Eastern Orthodoxy and western liberal democracy has been questioned in 
authoritative studies of politics and international relations.
4
 The effect is further multiplied, 
given that some Orthodox churches in the region still employ their nationalist political-
theological concepts. Taking into account the populist and nationalist tendencies in some 
countries, this form of political theology may be used for weakening the democratization 
process.  
On the other side, a powerful political-theological model is emerging in Russia that is 
openly authoritarian and paternalist in its concepts and practices, and it is used to legitimize 
Kremlin’s regime. Given the traditionally and historically good relations between the SEE 
states and Russia, and between the Orthodox churches from the region and the Russian 
Orthodox Church, open institutional channels exist for disseminating this authoritarian 
                                                          
4
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (N. Y.: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996). See also his earlier essay: Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ (Summer 1993) 
72 Foreign Affairs 3, 22-49. 
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political-theological model in the SEE region.
5
 This development, in turn, may challenge the 
incomplete democratic consolidation in the SEE countries.  
Yet, another process of framing a political-theological model with more participatory 
and democratic dimensions could be traced in the official statements of some Orthodox 
churches and particularly in some declarations, issued by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and 
pan-Orthodox councils and meetings. In my research, I will argue that such participatory 
political theology could be constructed and justified on the basis of the core Orthodox 
Christian concepts and that such a model may enhance the democratic consolidation and civic 
culture in the SEE societies.       
 
Methodology  
The methodology of the research is interdisciplinary linking constitutional and 
political theory (in respect to the concepts of democratic transition, consolidation and political 
theology) with aspects of the sociology of religion (in respect to the public presence and 
visibility of Eastern Orthodoxy) and religious studies (the meaning of Eastern Orthodox 
theological concepts). In elaborating the thesis, political theology will be employed both as a 
method of revealing correspondence and analogy between the theological and secular political 
concepts and as an object of study with respect to the political-theological models and 
doctrines that have been developed in the Eastern Orthodox context. The construction of the 
new participatory political theology will emerge from a genealogical study of theological and 
political-theological concepts starting with the scriptural perspectives, and then moving to the 
Byzantine symphonia model and Christian nation model.   
While the first part of the research will focus on contemporary issues of democratic 
consolidation and church-state relations, providing also the necessary historical background, 
the second part will engage with the political-theological doctrines, concepts and models. It is 
worthy of note, this study will engage with political theology in a more contemporary 
perspective not being fully dependent on Carl Schmitt’s themes and concepts.6 Recently 
published works on the relation between Eastern Orthodoxy and democracy have presented 
                                                          
5
 This model endorses centralized and authoritarian state leadership in the form of a modified symphonia model 
where the president is invested with superpowers and the patriarch enjoys rights and privileges of a high state 
official. See also the works of the ultra-conservative Russian scholar and propagandist Alexander Dugin, 
advocating Eurasianism, Alexander Dugin, The Foundations of Geopolitics (Moscow: Arctogaia, 2000). 
6
 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (transl. G. Schwab) (Chicago, 
IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology II. The Myth of the Closure of any 
Political Theology (transl. M. Hoelzl and G. Ward) (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008); Carl Schmitt, Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form (transl. G. L. Ulmen) (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 1-45. 
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approaches, themes and concepts that are important starting points for this study.
7
 In applying 
political theology as a method three different stages will be followed: a genealogical inquiry 
of a concept, analogy between the religious and political concepts and construction 
(architecture) of a systematic political-theological model.
8
        
The study of the problems of interaction between democracy and Eastern Orthodoxy 
could be justified in several directions: 1) democratic consolidation is not a completed task for 
the SEE societies and it is important to identify the forces and tendencies that may enhance or 
challenge the process – in this regard, Eastern Orthodoxy, being publicly visible, 
demographically significant and historically linked to the state, could play an important role 
in either direction; 2) religion in the SEE societies, despite the constitutional separation 
between church and state, is publicly present and recognized, interacting actively with 
political institution, social and cultural organizations; 3) the process of ethno-genesis and 
state-building in the last two centuries has been intertwined with the emergence of 
autonomous and autocephalous Orthodox churches; 4) the national Orthodox churches 
themselves have justified their existence and legitimacy with the emergence of the nation-
states, with the  mission of preserving the nationhood in times of political and social change, 
as well as with protecting cultural and spiritual traditions of the national community.  
Another more general precondition for studying the interaction between democracy 
and Eastern Orthodoxy is related to the fact the SEE region has experienced a different socio-
historical trajectory facing Western secularization and modernization only to a limited extend. 
A closer look to the history of the region reveals the countries in the SEE region have stayed 
in the periphery of the processes of Reformation and Counter-reformation, of Industrial 
Revolution, and Enlightenment in their standard forms. In this context, the interaction 
between the political and the theological spheres in SEE countries have produced rather 
different religious-political synthesis compared to the Western models. This is visible when 
the symphonia model and Christian nation model are compared to the church-state separation 
and secularization models. However, the foundation of the modern nation-states in the SEE 
region and the institution-building that followed generally corresponds to the conceptual and 
political-institutional patterns of the Western European societies. Consequently, in the SEE 
countries all basic institutional principles and structures are also present: written constitutions, 
                                                          
7
 Aristotle Papanikolaou, The Mystical as Political: Democracy and Non-Radical Orthodoxy (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2012);  
Pantelis Kalaitzidis, Orthodoxy and Political Theology (Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications, 
2012). 
8
 Paul Kahn, Political Theology. Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 122. 
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rule of law, popular sovereignty, separation of powers, human rights and political pluralism, 
elections and parliamentary democracy. This development, in turn, has led to accommodation 
between the traditional political-theological doctrines and models and the predominant 
political model which is an exemplar case for the adaptability of the Orthodoxy to different 
social conditions. 
 
Content 
The research will be developed in five main stages. First, the concept of democratic 
consolidation will be introduced and elaborated in comparative regional context, with specific 
inputs from different SEE countries. A particular emphasis will be placed on incompleteness 
of the consolidation and the weaknesses and fragility of democratic institutions, highlighting 
the importance of civic engagement as a precondition for a democratic and accountable 
government (Chapter one). Second, issues of contemporary public presence of Eastern 
Orthodoxy in the SEE region will be studied, providing some historical background 
information on tendencies and processes that shaped and influenced the contemporary 
situation. The analysis will be focused mainly on the trends and developments of the last 
century that shaped the models of church-state relations (the creation of independent nation-
states, the communist regimes and the democratization of the last two decades). Country-
specific cases of public engagement of the Orthodox churches will be discussed and different 
approaches (endorsing democracy or challenging the democratization) will be outlined 
(Chapter two). Third, the political-theological themes and concepts will be presented in 
reference to both Western and Eastern traditions. This will be done along with engaging with 
the political-theological studies of different scholars. Contemporary Eastern Orthodox 
perspectives (of Orthodox scholars and official statements of Orthodox churches) on 
democracy and political theology will be further analyzed (Chapter three). Forth, the 
political-theological models in the Eastern Orthodox tradition will be evaluated through the 
prism of their biblical foundations, Byzantine and post-Byzantine synthesis, and the modern 
nation-state ideology. At this stage a conceptualization of the two interconnected political-
theological models (symphonia model and Christian nation model) will be elaborated 
(Chapter four). This will serve as a point of departure for constructing the participatory 
political theology advocated here.  Fifth, the emergence and development of participatory 
political theology, as rooted in the core Orthodox theological concepts and remaining distinct 
from the Byzantine and nationalist models, will be studied. In this most constructivist part of 
the research, the basic values of the new political theology that relate to democratic 
16 
 
participation, will be highlighted (Chapter five). Theological concepts identified as underling 
and inspiring the new participatory political theology are theosis and synergy, ecclesia and 
Eucharist, conciliarity and catholicity, economy and eschatology. They correspond to and 
nurture the values of personalism, participation, and universalism that define the new political 
theology presented in this study. The general thesis would be that the emerging participatory 
political theology in Eastern Orthodox context may strengthen and enhance the process of 
democratic consolidation in SEE societies by supporting civic engagement and an inclusive 
socio-political framework that corresponds to its defining values and principles.         
What distinguishes this study from other recently published works on Eastern 
Orthodoxy and democracy
9
 is its more contextual approach taking into account the historical 
legacy of the SEE region, the incompleteness of democratic consolidation and the importance 
of civic engagement in strengthening democratic institutions. It also takes into account the 
rival political theology used to legitimize the authoritarian state in Russia. This study 
examines critically the political-theological models, recognizing the possibility for their 
political instrumentalization for legitimizing the socio-political establishment. It is also aware 
of the fact that liberal democracy has never been fully established in the SEE region, that it 
might never be fully embraced by these societies, and the opportunity to implement the 
participatory political theology to enhance democratic consolidation, may encounter different 
socio-political constrains (the viability of the liberal democratic project, the absence of well-
structured civil societies in the countries, the inconsistent public presence of the Orthodox 
churches). 
In contrast to the competing traditional and contemporary doctrines and models, the 
new participatory political theology, elaborated further, is offered as a conceptual approach 
better consistent to the core Orthodox Christian doctrines and open towards democratic values 
and practices.          
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Part I. Democratic Consolidation and Church-State Relations in South East 
Europe. Historical Trends and Contemporary Issues  
 
Chapter One. Democratic consolidation in Southeastern Europe: 
concept, context, experience 
 
Introduction  
Studying the interaction between democratic consolidation and Eastern Orthodoxy in 
the context of SEE societies through the prism of political theology requires first an 
exposition of the context in which this interaction takes place. The first chapter will focus 
more extensively on the elaboration of the concept of democratic consolidation and its 
regional contextualization, while the second will study different dimensions of church-state 
interaction in the region in a historical and institutional perspective. With their contextual, 
conceptual and empirical content the first two chapters are designed to serve as a basis for the 
theoretical work in the second part in developing a political-theological perspective that 
relates Eastern Orthodoxy to the wider liberal democratic and participatory framework.  
This chapter will analyze democratic consolidation in the region of Southeastern 
Europe as an on-going process and will highlight the importance of civic engagement and 
participation in maintaining the democratic governance in the SEE countries. Despite the 
membership of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania in the EU, and the prospects for accession of 
the Western Balkan countries, issues regarding consolidation of democratic institutions are 
still at stake. There are multiple factors which contribute to the weakened state of 
constitutional democracy in the countries while hampering their future political progress.    
A realistic view on the process of democratic transition and consolidation implies that 
backsliding from democratic politics may occur at any time. In the second half of the 20
th
 
century Western societies have developed adequate institutional remedies against such 
negative scenario. In these societies, deeply rooted democratic traditions support well-ordered 
institutions, relying on high levels of institutional and social trust.
10
 In developed Western 
democracies, political and social actors, as well as the general ethos of the public sphere, 
function in way to enhance and reinforce democratic traditions and institutions. Radical and 
populist movements exist, however, they are not powerful enough to erode and undermine the 
general functioning of well-established democratic institutions or effectively challenge the 
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democratic consensus in society. Unlike the Western democracies, political systems in the 
Central and Southeastern Europe are still threatened by long-lasting anti-democratic 
sentiments and practices. Though the political and social transformation from communist 
totalitarianism to liberal democracy might seem successful for the majority of the new EU 
member-states, there are processes that signal an increased concern in regard to the quality 
and sustainability of democratic institutions.  
The purpose of this first chapter is introductory – to present the concept of democratic 
consolidation, regional context and emerging challenges to the sustainable democratization of 
the SEE countries. In doing this, different stages in the process will be highlighted – 
beginning with institutional reforms and constitution-making in early 1990s; continuing with 
the analysis of problems of transition and consolidation; providing a contextual perspective of 
challenges to democratic consolidation in two countries - Bulgaria and Romania, sharing 
similarities in their political (democratic transition from dictatorship followed by membership 
in the EU) and religious (Eastern Orthodox) culture. To illustrate the trends in regard to 
democratic development, some comparative data will be provided. The significance of the 
process of civil society awakening and civic participation for maintaining democratic 
institutions will be highlighted.   
 
1. Democratic consolidation in South East Europe: the concept11  
1.1. Defining the concept 
In studying democratic consolidation, it is important to define the scope, meaning and 
content of the concept. In this respect two initial considerations apply. First, this concept is 
chosen because of its comprehensive, dynamic and multi-dimensional features linking all 
major preconditions for successful democracy-building: functioning rule of law, legitimate 
and representative political institutions, independent civil society and active civic 
participation, popular acceptance of democratic institutions and practices. Second, this multi-
dimensional concept allows for a study focused on complex interaction between Eastern 
Orthodoxy and democracy on institutional (church-state) and conceptual (political-
theological) level. Increased public presence of religion after the fall of communism and the 
historical linkage between the church and nation-states in the region, precondition the active 
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role Eastern Orthodoxy could play in contributing to the process of democratic consolidation 
through enhancing democratic values and practices of civic engagement and participation.       
Elaboration of the concept of democratic consolidation is related to political changes 
that occurred in the last quarter of the 20
th
 century with the democratization of Southern and 
Eastern Europe and Latin America. The concept is elaborated by political scientists Juan Linz 
and Alfred Stepan. As defined in their comparative study, democratic consolidation refers to a 
process leading given political system to a state where democracy becomes metaphorically 
‘the only game in town’. The definition also includes some important characteristics. 
Behaviorally, a democratic regime is consolidated when the leading national, social, 
economic, political, or institutional actors in order to achieve their objectives do not turn to 
support non-democratic policies or resort to violence to secede from the state. Attitudinally, a 
democratic regime is consolidated when significant majority of the public holds the belief that 
democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life 
in their society and when the support for anti-systemic/antidemocratic alternatives is 
insignificant or marginal. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when 
governmental and nongovernmental forces become subjected to, and habituated to, the 
resolution of conflict through specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the 
emerging democratic process. In short, with its consolidation, democracy becomes routinized 
and deeply internalized in the practices of social and political institutions, in the behavior of 
the people, as well as in their calculations for achieving success.
12
 
  Furthermore, a political system is considered consolidated democracy, when five other 
interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions are also present. First, conditions for the 
development of free and lively civil society should be present. Second, relatively autonomous 
and valued political society has to exist. Third, the rule of law should be implemented 
securing legal guarantees for individual rights and freedoms, independent associational life 
and protecting the principles, values and institutions of the limited constitutional government. 
Fourth, well-organized state bureaucracy with sufficient institutional capacity should exist, 
thus ensuring the governability and predictability of the social and political processes. Fifth, 
an institutionalized economic society must be functioning. It is understood as a set of socio-
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politically crafted and accepted norms, institutions, and regulations, useful in mediating 
between the state and the market.
13
 
These multiple aspects of the concept of democratic consolidation allow for evaluation 
of the role Eastern Orthodoxy (mediated through the political theology) could play at the 
different levels of a democratic system – from values and principles to civic engagement.  
 
1.2. Application of the concept and critique  
The degree of democratic consolidation in SEE region could be evaluated on the basis 
of different criteria. Authoritative scholarship distinguishes between well-functioning 
institutions of developed democracies and weak institutions of unconsolidated democracies. 
The latter could be recognized by the existence of wide-spread practices of clientelism, 
corruption, parallel networks of power, which replace or dominate over the official 
institutions. These unfair and undemocratic practices gain such significance that they may 
transform the democratic regime into a façade, covering the real nature of corrupted political 
process.
14
  
Another set of explanations of fragile democratic regimes in SEE societies is related to 
the lasting cultural legacies (weak democratic tradition; lack of receptivity to Western values; 
undeveloped institutional and political culture; hampered process of modernization of social 
and political structures) that characterize these societies for many decades. All these, it is 
argued, continue to slow down the advancement of democratic institutions and practices. 
Closely related to this explanation is the view that in SEE societies exist enduring popular 
psychological stereotypes (passivity, fatalism, voluntary submission to rulers, practices of 
dependency and cronyism) which predetermine the (low) degree of civic engagement in the 
public sphere.
15
  
These approaches might be useful in differentiating between SEE societies and 
Western democracies, though they remain incomplete and insufficient in explaining the 
difficulties in consolidating democracy in the region. There are present-day challenges to 
consolidation which are of higher importance compared to the cultural legacies or 
psychological stereotypes. One of the most serious problems SEE societies are facing is the 
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crisis of governability and the general weakness of state institutions. According to this 
understanding, failures in institutional performance are not predetermined by socio-cultural 
legacies; they result, instead, from weak institutional response to arising problems caused by 
lack of incentives, poor legislation, or insufficient funding.
16
 This could be described as a 
state-centered approach to the study of problems of democratization that focuses both on 
dysfunctionality of bureaucratic apparatuses and the role of well-organized opportunistic 
elites who deliberately manipulate institutional performance in their own benefit.
17
 This 
approach explains why the specific institutions that have been targeted and intentionally 
weakened during the initial phase of transition have been those responsible for wide 
redistribution of resources and exercising controlling functions (privatization agencies, public 
procurement, banking system, the judiciary). Hence, according to the state-centered approach, 
it is not the historical and cultural legacies, but the deliberate political action that strengthens 
or weakens institutions. Following this approach, it could be argued the SEE region is not 
predetermined to remain in the European periphery. In spite of its non-democratic legacy, 
strategic reforms could be undertaken to establish democratic, effective and accountable 
governance and limit the influence of opportunistic elites on the institutional structures.  
In applying the concept of democratic consolidation, it is worth addressing the critique 
of some scholars.
18
 The major criticism targets the claim of universality of transition and 
consolidation paradigm and its lack of concern for local and regional peculiarities. According 
to some critics, the concept does not take into account significant varieties of political culture, 
traditions, and social conditions in different regions that shape the process of major political 
changes. Hence, it is argued, it could not be defended that the process of political change in 
specific societies and regions outside Europe and North America will necessarily lead to 
acceptance of a liberal democratic system. In fact, the answer to this challenge is simple: the 
concept has no prescriptive normative meaning requiring the establishment of liberal 
democracy in the societies experiencing a transition from dictatorship to democratic regime. 
Rather it attempts conceptualization of recent democracy-building processes in different 
societies (Southern and Eastern Europe, South America) in the late 20
th
 century.  
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Democratic consolidation as a concept is challenged also by the representatives of the 
realist school of political thought emphasizing the importance of social and political 
preconditions before establishing of a democratic system.
19
 Among these necessary 
preconditions priority is often given to the rule of law and the well-functioning state. The 
realist school (sequentialism) suggests that only after preconditions for effective state-
building are established in a particular society, its political regime may be gradually changed 
into a democratic one. In this intellectual paradigm, stabilization of the state government has 
priority over democratization. If these preconditions are not established, continues the 
argument, rapid regime change and democratization of weak political institutions may give 
rise to different forms of extremism and populism. This, in turn, does not facilitate, but 
threatens the democracy-building. Following this line of argument, the conclusion it mandates 
is that regime change should be moderate, relying strongly on the will of well-minded and 
benevolent political leadership, not empowering citizens to participate actively in the political 
process.  
These arguments could be answered in several directions. The presumption that 
postponing democracy and governmental accountability will contribute in the end to the 
establishment of the rule of law and effective institutions awaiting future democratic process 
to begin, is rather misleading. An autocratic, unchecked government could hardly be 
successful in establishing the rule of law and initiating democratic change. As benevolent as 
autocracy might be, it remains a form of unlimited and potentially arbitrary rule.
20
 The 
resolution of tensions in society relying on physical force rather than debates or elections 
would be a constant threat. Hence, the need arises for the creation of procedures of checks and 
balances. Their role should not be underestimated and postponed for an imagined better 
period after the stabilization and solidification of state institutions. Otherwise, the opportunity 
to change the government without relying on revolutionary violence would remain a shallow 
option. This opportunity of a peaceful regime change is indeed the form of democracy 
considered to be Western and liberal.
21
          
Yet another group of arguments critical of the use of the concept of democratic 
consolidation stems from the assumption that democratization necessarily unfolds as a 
predictable, sequential process with the following stages: it begins with opening, a period of 
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political liberalization in the ruling dictatorial regime; which develops into breakthrough, 
most essentially defined by the collapse of the dictatorship and the emergence of new 
democratic institutional structure; followed by consolidation, a gradual and purposeful 
process in which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through 
institutional reforms, free and fair elections, strengthening of civil society, enhancing civic 
participation and ‘the overall habituation of the society to the new democratic “rules of the 
game”.22 These critical views have already been addressed to some extent by emphasizing 
that the concept does not have prescriptive and normative meaning and it is constructed on the 
basis of democratization experience in specific societies and regions in last decades. The 
concept does not presuppose that all or even a majority of countries experiencing political 
change will be successful in establishing a democratic system. As the recent history of 
CEE/SEE countries after 1989 suggests there is no strict sequence of stages in achieving 
democratic consolidation. There are obvious backslides and periods of democratic stagnation 
in some countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland) which questions the perspectives of 
democratic consolidation.  
Not having a prescriptive and normative meaning the concept of democratic 
consolidation is sufficiently dynamic and useable in a more nuanced way. It is suitable for 
presenting the experience of different countries and regions undergoing political liberalization 
and democratic change. Nothing in the concept implies that once societies have initiated 
democratic reforms they will necessarily progress towards consolidation of democratic 
institutions. Rather, it implies the outcome of democratization is never certain, it remains an 
open-ended process. Depending on specific conditions, it may lead towards better quality of 
democracy, or may provoke reactionary forces to regain control and eliminate political 
opposition. It is true, rapid political changes produce multiple and often unexpected socio-
political outcomes and democratic consolidation is only an option, sometimes very 
implausible one.  
For the scope and purpose of this study no further theoretical engagement with the 
concept of democratic transition and consolidation is necessary at this stage. In the following 
sections a general overview of the regional context of democracy-building (with its phases of 
political change, civic engagement and constitution-making) will be outlined.  
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2. Democratic consolidation in South East Europe: the context 
The process of regime change from totalitarianism to constitutional democracy started 
in the end of the 1980s with mass civic demonstrations, creation and involvement of civil 
society organization and dissident movements in the former communist countries. The scale 
and intensity of the civic involvement in the political changes of 1989 has been of such 
significance to be described as a ‘velvet revolution’, meaning a non-violent political change 
through mass civic mobilization.
23
 These civic upheavals have led to the overthrow of the 
communist regimes in the Central and South East Europe and to the first steps of democracy-
building: establishing political and civil society pluralism (guaranteeing freedom of speech, 
and freedoms of association and assembly), organizing general free elections and initiating a 
process of constitution-making. 
   
2.1. Democratic institution-building: constitution-making process after 1989 
Following the peaceful revolutions of 1989 the first institutional decisions have been 
directed to the dismantling of the party-state, providing legislative safeguards for political and 
civic association, assembly and participation, and ensuring the process of democratic 
institution-building. The inception of the constitution-making process was preceded by the 
political and civil mobilization and the appearance of the organized civil society (although 
very weak in the beginning) and the public sphere.  
In the beginning of the democratic transition decisive constitutional moments, to use 
Bruce Ackerman’s term, existed in each of the CEE states – in the beginning of 1990s citizens 
were preoccupied with fundamental constitutional issues of redefining the form of 
government, reevaluating the meaning, nature and scope of the public good, establishing the 
rule of law and safeguarding civil and political rights for all.
24
 
This foundational process was multifaceted. Some countries (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Check Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia) have adopted their democratic constitutions in the 
beginning of the democratic process. Thus, they have framed the on-going, though not fully 
grown, democratic process with the intention of securing political stability deemed necessary 
for the good performance of the newly created institutions. Others, like Poland and Hungary, 
have chosen more pragmatic approach to constitutional change - first adopting significant 
amendments in their old constitutions, directed at safeguarding the fundamental principles of 
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the modern constitutional state (rule of law, human rights, separation of powers, political 
pluralism, free market economy); then, after a period of several years of intensive institution-
building and democratic experience, allowing time to learn from practice and correct, national 
constitutional assemblies passed completely new constitutions which reflected national 
specifics in their road to freedom. 
In either case, the visible result from democratization process has been the creation of 
constitutional states that fit within the Ackerman’s understanding of ‘dualist constitutional 
democracy’ which distinguishes between normal politics (in which citizens and organized 
interest groups aim at influencing democratically elected representatives) and constitutional 
politics (in which citizens actively participate in the debate on fundamental principles of the 
social contract).
25
 Thus, in terms of constitutional politics, citizens in emerging new European 
democracies, after proper constitutional debate and argument, have deliberately decided to 
establish liberal democratic regimes. Moreover, in line with Ackerman’s concept, these 
societies have recognized the difference between the higher law of the constitution, enacted 
by ‘We, the People’ and the ordinary laws, adopted by the temporary political majority in a 
specific political moment.
26
 To safeguard the higher law of the constitution, these countries 
have accepted an institutionalizied and centralized form of constitutional review and 
adjudication through constitutional courts.  
It could be argued that CEE/SEE countries have experienced constitution-making 
process aimed at the creation of written constitutions as directly applicable supreme laws, not 
easily alterable by short-sighted political majorities or exposed to radical populist sentiments. 
From the point of view of the fully consolidated democratic system, newly established 
constitutional architecture yet had to be filled with authentic democratic content. The 
paramount political question has been how to create effective and efficient institutions that are 
able to cope with the challenges of the emerging democratic regimes. To balance between the 
need of effective constraints on political power (creating proper mechanisms of checks and 
balances) and yet allowing sufficient empowerment of institutions necessary to build and 
defend democracy, has been an important task before the framers in the constitutional 
assemblies.
27
 A closer look to the recent developments in the region highlights emerging 
challenges to the formally established constitutional democracies.  
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In the first years of the transition period, new democracies faced challenges in several 
directions: in accepting and functioning according to the democratic values and principles; in 
defining the democratic form of government and empowering new institutions and yet 
providing effective checks and balances against arbitrary rule; in creating vibrant and 
independent civil society and cultivating civic culture of participation and engagement; in 
limiting the presence and influence of the former communist nomenklatura in the public 
sphere and the political process. At the stage of constitution-making, constituent assemblies in 
the new democracies had to consider different alternatives before deciding on fundamental 
issues such as the form of government, the political and electoral system.
28
 Among the known 
and established republican political models in the liberal democracies (parliamentarism, semi-
presidentialism, presidentialism), the vast majority of the CEE countries have chosen to 
implement a modified form of parliamentary or semi-parliamentary government. An 
important characteristic of these hybrid parliamentarian systems is the constitutional role of 
the president of the republic attributed with specific functions becoming an important veto-
player,
29
 with regards to the executive and the legislative branch. The legitimacy and the role 
of the institution are further emphasized in some countries where presidents are directly 
popularly elected for a term of office longer than the parliaments (Bulgaria, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Romania).  
During the constitutional debates of the early 1990s, the general understanding has 
been that the exercise of constituent power should follow certain principles and limitations, in 
order to safeguard against arbitrary rule. In this context, the principle of popular sovereignty 
had to be moderated and exercised in conformity with other principles of constitutional 
democracy (rule of law, separation of powers, protection of human rights).
30
 Though the 
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people are considered the ultimate sovereign and the source of the political power, the 
exercise of their sovereignty, is not an arbitrary act, but is channeled through procedures and 
bound by principles.
31
 In this regard, substantive constraints to the exercise of the popular 
sovereignty have been found to emanate from different sources - binding international 
instruments on human rights, international political context endorsing democratic change, 
popular will to create democratic constitutional states.  
One of the challenges to democratic transition and constitution-making during the first 
years after 1989 has been connected to the place and the role in the process of the former 
communist elite. The foundational process of the new democratic polities has occurred in 
tension with the forces and actors of the old regime. In the beginning of the transition, the 
former communist elite were still powerful and played a significant role in directing the 
political change process in some CEE states. Participating in the process of regime change, 
the communist elite gained significant social and political capital that could be further used 
during the transition period. In some countries (Romania, Bulgaria) the former party elites 
secured dominant position in their economies (through the process of privatization
32
) as well 
as preserved their political influence. Several times in different countries from the region 
governments led by socialist had to step down after mass civic demonstrations in defense of 
the democratic values and principles against significant governmental abuses (e.g. Serbia -
1997 and 2000, Romania – 2014 and 2015, Bulgaria – 1997 and 2013, Hungary - 2010). This 
highlights the importance of civic engagement and mobilization in the CEE/ SEE region in 
maintaining the democratic political regime and consolidating democratic institutions.  
As the overview of the constitution-making process in CEE/SEE countries suggests, 
democratically adopted constitutions had to create the conditions of their own validity and 
popular acceptance. They represent a form of prospective social engineering relying for their 
performance on social and institutional conditions yet to be fully developed (e.g. active civil 
society and civic participation, independent judiciary, fair political representation, free market 
economy). None of these were present during the short-lived foundational moments of 
constitutional deliberation and decision-making. To be positively evaluated, new constitutions 
have been expected to fulfill democratic promises and deliver intended results, to secure space 
for a vibrant civil society to grow and develop. This account does not underestimate the 
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paradigm of liberal constitutionalism dominating the first years of democratic transition 
focused on ensuring effective checks and balances, limiting arbitrary government and 
protecting fundamental rights and freedoms.
33
 In fact, such liberal constitutions were 
important for fostering democratic growth and consolidation in CEE/SEE region. 
Nonetheless, they have to be complemented by further initiatives, polices and institutions 
enhancing social cohesion and civic engagement.  
  
2.2. Types of constitutionalism in CEE/SEE countries 
The process of democratic consolidation in the region could be studied through the 
prism of the types of constitutionalism that have spread across Central and Eastern Europe. 
The role of constitutional design for democratic growth in the CEE countries could not be 
underestimated. Constitutional scholars often focus on both substantive and procedural issues 
in regard to CEE constitutions. To be legitimate and popularly accepted a constitution should 
meet certain preconditions: it should be adopted by a qualified majority in the constituent 
assembly (and/or confirmed by majority of the citizens on a popular referendum) within a 
complex procedure ensuring a high degree of agreement among the population in regard to 
the basic values, principles, procedures and institutional structures; it should safeguard these 
substantive values and principles along with providing effective mechanisms of governing; it 
should be considered ‘respect-worthy’ on the basis of recognition and performance in a 
specific social and political context.
34
 
One of the primary objectives of the constitutional re-founding of the states has been 
to ensure public trust in and provide legitimacy of the legal and institutional systems lost 
during the dictatorship. Law and institutions had to be vindicated from their recent history of 
abuse and legitimation of injustice. The legal system had to be reinterpreted as embodying 
substantive values and principles (of freedom, justice, solidarity, rule of law), not as an 
instrument of arbitrary coercion. These principles have been considered an important 
safeguard against purely instrumental or merely facade character of laws experienced under 
communist dictatorship.
35
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To define constitutionalism in the region, different concepts could be employed. A 
major distinction between ‘radical-democratic’ and ‘institutionalist’ types is drawn in the 
constitutional scholarship.
36
 The radical-democratic type is considered to capture 
revolutionary spirit of great social transformations, thus embodying the genuine popular will. 
Not only does it create new institutional framework, but also provides an expression of 
popular hopes and incorporates social promises for a better political and social system. 
According the concept, people should remain the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts. This 
type of constitutionalism is safeguarded by powerful popularly elected assemblies, as well as 
through proportional representation, imperative mandate of the elected representatives and 
frequent use of referenda.  
In contrast, the institutionalist type of constitutionalism gives preference to the process 
of institution-building, procedures of institutional functioning, principles of separation of 
powers and checks and balances, instead of direct exercise of popular will. Within this 
framework, constitutional design is focused on the process of problem-solving and conflict-
resolution, rather than on substantive policy issues. The institutional type opens opportunities 
for normalization of politics through channeling popular sentiments into well-established 
rules and procedures of decision-making.  
In the region, after the period of intensive civic mobilization in the beginning of 
democratic transition, the constitutions that have been adopted are of the institutionalist type. 
In these supreme laws a variety of internal checks on direct popular decision-making is 
provided: indirect exercise of constituent power through distinct constitutional assemblies 
(Grand National Assembly in Bulgaria), constitution-making procedures requiring 
supermajorities, clear separation of powers provisions, free mandate of elected 
representatives, relatively rare use of direct democratic instruments (referenda, popular 
initiatives and agenda initiatives), entrenchment clauses regarding fundamental rights, 
mechanisms for constitutional review of legislative acts. These features have been 
contemplated as safeguarding the direction of the democratic political change.  
In the first years of democratization, it has been believed that adopting rigid 
constitutions that channel the popular will in more moderate forms (emphasizing 
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representation, rather than direct democracy) will serve better the transition towards liberal 
democracy. This has been seen as counterbalancing the risks of strong populist and nationalist 
movements in the first phase of the transition. In the last decade, however, this institutionalist 
and liberal model of constitutionalism in CEE/ SEE countries is changing. There is more 
frequent use of the forms of direct and participatory democracy (referenda, citizens initiatives, 
public consultation of legislation) that have been seen as ways of overcoming deficits of 
democratic representation. These forms of direct civic participation are often considered by 
the citizens as more reliable and efficient checks on the governmental power compared to the 
traditional institutional forms of representation and review. These mechanisms are presented 
as empowering active civil society groups to stand up in defense of democratic values and 
principles, to require governmental accountability, when the institutions are ‘captured’ by 
special corporatist interests.
37
        
In addition to the distinctions presented above, recent studies suggest that there has 
emerged a specific type of constitutionalism in some SEE countries (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Serbia) defined as ‘weak-state constitutionalism.’ 38  It has been described as allowing wider 
discrepancy between relatively well defined constitutional structures on paper and their weak 
performance in practice. This explanation is more adequate in the SEE context, compared to 
the simple institutionalist model, presented above. The concept of weak-state 
constitutionalism is multi-layered taking into account the role of human agency, institutional 
change and social context in the region. One of the persisting problems in the SEE 
constitutional systems is their inefficiency – formal observance of constitutional norms and 
procedures does not necessarily fulfill citizens’ expectations for good governance, 
accountable and efficient administration and advancement of polices in public benefit. 
Important institutions remain captured by the special interest groups (corporatist networks, 
oligarchies) and do not perform in the benefit of the citizens. This account of the existing 
social and political relations corresponds to the findings of political scientists who have 
argued that radical institutional reforms may, in the beginning, lead to ‘political mutations’ - 
new institutions remain weak and dysfunctional.
39
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2.4. Risks of early constitutionalization in CEE/ SEE countries 
In this introductory part on democratic consolidation in CEE/SEE societies 
constitutional paradigms and doctrines are used with caution given the specific contexts, 
political and social traditions as well as the deficiencies in their democratic development. In 
the political science literature discrepancies between the consolidated Western liberal 
democracies and the semi-consolidated and defective democratic regimes in the SEE 
countries have been highlighted.
40
  
The process of constitutionalization in the CEE/ SEE countries could be critically 
evaluated due to the fact it frames institutions that are not rooted in the social environment, 
democratic practices are not yet fully accepted, and nationalist and populist policies continue 
to attract significant support (recent developments in Hungary and Poland highlight the 
emerging challenges to the liberal constitutional model). There are open statements by key 
political leaders (e.g. Victor Orban in Hungary) defending the ideas that democracy could be 
illiberal, without proper checks and balances, relying exclusively on the strong popular 
mandate and the majority rule.
41
  
On the other hand, the process of constitutionalization at a too early stage of the 
democratic transition creates the risk of settling the most important political issues without 
proper political debate, thus eliminating or foreclosing significant political options. For 
instance, issues of transitional justice (persecuting perpetrators of political crimes, adopting 
effective disclosure and lustration legislation)
42
 have remained for more than a decade after 
1989 unresolved in some countries (Bulgaria, Romania). They adopted new constitutions in 
1991 without properly addressing the specific issues of transitional justice. Furthermore, these 
countries had to experience intensive political struggles in the beginning of the 2000s, in the 
course of negotiating their accession in the EU, in order to have some transitional justice 
legislation approved by their parliaments. Consecutively, important portions of this legislation 
have been challenged before the constitutional courts and repealed. Thus, issues of 
transitional justice have not been resolved in a predictable and sustainable way.   
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Another dimension of the process of the too early constitutionalization is having 
fundamental values and principles laid down in rigid constitutions which makes them appear 
as if already granted and stable, not corresponding to the popular demands for transitional 
justice, as well as not open for creative re-interpretation and renovation in the course of the 
gradual democratic development. There are risks, henceforth, that the overemphasis on 
constitutionalization and judicialization of politics
43
 may lead to stagnation of democracy, not 
to its further development and consolidation. In such context, judicialization may work in 
favor of the political establishment, petrifying the status quo and the role of post-communist 
elites who instrumentalize the weak democratic institutions in their own profit. 
Within the framework of rigid constitutions and judicialized politics, significant reforms 
are hard to achieve. Fragile democratic practices and poor institutional performance thus 
become entrenched in the constitutional system and yet remain formally legitimate. This, in 
turn, blocks active civic mobilization to achieve a meaningful political change. In times when 
radical political change is much needed, judicialized politics is not what the society deserves. 
More viable alternatives have to be explored. The concept of ‘reflexive politics’ could provide 
such an alternative approach. Reflexivity in politics insists on the possibilities of multiple 
actions and routes to social change, it questions the reduction of the political to the already 
established legal form and to the ‘one-size-fits-all’ reformist policies.44 Context specific 
adaptations and accommodations of political reforms have to be preferred to the imposition of 
top-down or center-periphery political measures.      
 
3. The liberal democratization in South East Europe reconsidered 
In the last two decades, the popular and scholarly explanations of the process of 
democratic transformation in CEE/SEE countries have been clearly dominated by the liberal 
paradigm of political change. The concepts and ideas of the rule of law and limited 
government, free market economy and open civil society have shaped the public discourse. 
Liberal concepts employed in explaining the process of political change have been conceived 
applicable and valid in all democratic states regardless of the national contexts. Later 
developments have proven that the formal reception of liberal values, principles, and 
institutions is not sufficient for making new democracies perform properly. Being more 
realistic about the regional context, Ralf Dahrendorf has provided a rather sobering view: 
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‘Democracy is more than elections. The creation of sustainable institutions and a spirit of 
active citizenship is the more difficult part of the process.’45  
In the first years of democratic transition, the modern liberal paradigm was adopted 
too uncritically, being viewed as an antithesis to the totalitarian regime. Paradoxically, in the 
SEE countries the liberal legal framework has been instrumentalized in stabilizing the post-
communist political establishment and in protecting its economic gains from the transition. 
Moreover, any attempt to question the allegiance and association of the political and 
economic elites with the former communist regime by adopting a special legislation for 
lustration and disclosure has been resisted with arguments driven from the rule of law and 
human rights principles. Any attempt to convict members of the former communist elites for 
heavy crimes (forced labor and mass murder in labor camps and other correctional 
institutions; torture and inhumane treatment on the basis of political and religious convictions; 
arbitrary detention and imprisonment) has been found by the courts inadmissible under the 
existing criminal procedure (due to the statute of limitations or absence of reliable evidences). 
Thus, the crimes of the communist party leaders have not been properly investigated; justice 
has been distributed only in few isolated cases. To some extent, the liberal constitutional 
framework embraced by the SEE countries has served as an excuse not to deal with the 
totalitarian legacy. Casting a veil of legality over the past, not engaging with issues of 
transitional justice, liberal constitutionalism has been used for maintaining the new balance of 
powers and for upholding the status quo. Thus, constitutionalism and jurisprudence in 
transitory post-communist countries do not completely follow the well-defined models of 
liberal constitutionalism in developed Western democracies. Given the specific context in the 
SEE region, attempting legal transfer of principles and institutions from the developed 
democracies could often lead to unexpected results.
46
      
By the end of the first decade of democratic change it has become clear that liberal 
concepts and principles are not self-fulfilling. Creating new liberal orthodoxy as well as the 
reception of liberal paradigms in academic literature and legislation has not been sufficient for 
their real life implementation. To the large extent, ongoing political and social processes 
diverted from these principles, thus leading to wide discrepancy between the written law, in 
formal conformity with continental European legal standards, and emerging social practices.
47
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The weakened state of civil society in SEE countries has further contributed for the 
insufficient enforcement of democratic principles and rules. For the most part of the period, 
the result has been favorable for the post-communist political and economic elites – they have 
been left free from effective public control, while using public resources in their own benefit. 
Only in key political moments – when corrupted governments have challenged the overall 
direction of Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries and/ or the democratic principles of the 
political system – significant civic mobilization and engagement with political issues has been 
provoked.    
Nowadays, more than two decades after the democratic transition has begun, 
democratic regimes in the SEE countries face serious weaknesses. Establishing liberal 
democracies in these societies is only a recent experiment with still inconclusive results, but 
already showing significant institutional deficiencies and dysfunctionalities. For the most 
parts of their history SEE societies had existed under non-democratic regimes. Predominant 
popular beliefs still struggle with accepting the liberal principles based on individual freedom, 
personal responsibility and initiative. Even nowadays, liberal values are shared only within 
thin social strata of people living in big cities, well-educated, well-paid professionals. The 
strong statist and populist sentiments continue to play an important role in the political 
choices of SEE societies. Popular expectations rather favor strong personalized leadership and 
demands for governmental intervention in order to maintain an expansive social and 
paternalist state. Consequently, the liberal political and constitutional project emphasizing 
limited government and individual liberty encounters difficulties in some societies. This 
context leaves mixed impression in regard to the viability of liberal democracy in some 
countries.  
Nevertheless, the fragility of the liberal democracy in the region does not necessarily 
mean it has to be replaced by alternative political regimes. What the alternatives might be – 
illiberal democratic regime focused on conservative traditions, national unity and religious 
beliefs; or more radical democratic regime emphasizing social cohesion and solidarity, social 
justice and social economy, direct participation of citizens in the decision-making, more 
deliberative forms of democracy. In this respect, with the rise of the left-wing parties 
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questioning the political establishment (in Greece, Spain, Italy) it is now visible that different 
accommodations of the democratic ideal are possible.
48
  
In the context of deepening economic and political crisis in some European societies, 
countries in the CEE/SEE region can easily experience ideological shifts away from the 
liberal model. Resolution of emerging social tensions is sought in different directions: in more 
nation-centered models of democracy (vs. the liberal model being too universalistic and 
abstract; vs. the supranational model being too distant, foreign, ‘cold’ and ineffective); in 
populist movements; in direct democracy and civic participation movements; in the call for 
more governmental intervention, regulation and protectionism in the national economics in 
order to secure social benefits and support for citizens threatened by social exclusion 
(henceforth, to preserve the European social model). Thus, alternatives are sought in both 
conservative right and radical left directions. While Southern Europe moves to the left 
(Greece, Italy, Spain), Northern and Central Europe become more conservative and nation-
centered (right-wing parties gain victories: National Front in France, Conservative Party in the 
UK, Law and Justice Party in Poland, Fidesz in Hungary; some right-wing movements gain 
popularity: anti-emigrant PEGIDA in Germany).   
Shifts from the liberal democratic model towards more nation-centered, tradition-
based and community-oriented political projects (Serbia, Hungary, Poland) may create further 
challenges to democratic consolidation in the region. These trends question the liberal 
consensus of the first two decades after 1989. Emerging populist political projects would 
either accept the constitutional framework of the democratic regime, thus conforming to the 
principles of the rule of law, human rights and equality before the law, or move towards 
authoritarian policies, demanding strong and centralized leadership, appealing to the nation 
(defined in ethno-cultural terms) and relying on traditional values for their legitimacy. The 
latter model would necessarily lead to social and political exclusion of certain groups, which 
would violate the basic principles of democratic citizenship.  
Notwithstanding the ideological and populist turn towards more nation-centered politics in 
some CEE/SEE countries, the majority of the citizens continue to conform to the liberal 
constitutional framework and to support the membership of the countries in EU and NATO 
seen as guarantors of democracy, human rights, national security and prosperity.  
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4. Challenges to democratic consolidation in South East Europe: a comparative overview 
4.1.  Comparative data and trends 
Studies of the process of democratic transition and consolidation suggest there are 
significant risks for some countries to stagnate in their democratic development. The visible 
outcome of this stagnation is the emergence of semi-democratic regimes.  Their typology is 
rich and multi-layered: semi-democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, formal 
democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy.49 
Countries experiencing these forms of hybrid political regimes are defined as entering the 
political ‘twilight zone’.50 Formally, in these countries some basic democratic characteristics 
are preserved – political pluralism, new democratic constitutions, semi-independent civil 
society, regular multi-party elections. However, serious democratic deficits are also present, 
including very low levels of public trust in the governmental institutions, absence of political 
and civic participation, high levels of corruption and organized crime, poor institutional 
performance, frequent abuse of electoral process. Some of the SEE countries, especially from 
the Western Balkans, still fall within this category. Others, like Bulgaria and Romania 
continue to struggle with these weaknesses even after joining the EU. 
In this respect, the SEE regional context provides a rich variety of country models and 
levels of democratic development. The EU membership of some countries as well as 
perspectives for joining of others triggers necessary institutional reforms in fulfillment of 
Copenhagen Criteria (rule of law, democracy, free market economy as preconditions for EU 
membership). This, in turn, contributes to democratic development. The end of the conflicts in 
the Western Balkans and the overthrow of the authoritarian regime in former Yugoslavia have 
facilitated some degree of stabilization and democratization of the whole region. Nonetheless, 
some challenges still remain present given that the democratic process is not one-directional 
and persisting problems threaten further democratization in Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo - countries with continuing ethnic tensions, high levels of political 
clientelism, corruption and oligarchic structures. 
In the last decade, it became clear that joining the EU is not the ultimate answer to 
completed democratic consolidation in the region. Some countries, despite their membership 
in the EU, continue to struggle with safeguarding the rule of law, ensuring the independence 
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of the judiciary and effective administration of justice, enhancing procedures of checks and 
balances between institutions, ensuring fair electoral process, civic participation and control – 
the most important features of constitutional government that had to be present before the EU 
accession of a single country. Providing expertise and support for overcoming these 
institutional deficiencies the EU has elaborated special Co-operation and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM) for two member-states from the region - Bulgaria and Romania. This 
monitoring mechanism highlights the deficiencies in the political and constitutional systems 
of these two countries. After nine years of CVM monitoring, there are still many problems 
with respect to the functionality and efficiency of their judicial systems and their institutional 
capacity to fight political corruption and organized crime.
51
 To compare with other countries 
from the region, Croatia has joined the EU in July 2013 without being included in the CVM 
monitoring thus showing better institutional capacity and better quality of the democratic 
process.  
Persisting institutional problems in some new member-states directly affect the 
process of democratic consolidation. On the other side, a critical evaluation of the CVM 
suggests the EU has limited capacity to push for institutional reforms in the new members. 
CVM is a soft policy instrument, relying on mutual trust and negotiation, as well as on the 
willingness of the national governments to implement strategic institutional reforms (which is 
not always the case).
52
 Moreover, CVM weaknesses are visible in cases where recommended 
and implemented measures turn out to produce results contrary to initial expectations due to 
the specific context and lack of incentives for reforms.  
The process of democratic consolidation in the region could be evaluated by means of 
different qualitative and quantitative methodologies. There are authoritative international 
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surveys that provide multi-dimensional data regarding the level of democratic development in 
various regions and single countries. For instance, 2015 Freedom House Report considers 
Bulgaria a free state and gives overall freedom rating of 2.0 for the country, with scores 2.0 
for both civil liberties and political rights categories (where 1.0 is the highest positive score 
indicating complete development and consolidation of democracy and 7.0 is the lowest 
negative score indicating stable authoritarian government).
53
 This represents a decline of 0.5 
for the last few years. In a comparative regional perspective, the majority of the CEE 
countries have received better results in both categories. In Southeastern Europe, the overall 
freedom rating of Romania, Greece and Serbia is 2.0, Montenegro receives 2.5 (still 
remaining ‘free state’), while Macedonia backslides to 3.5 rating, thus having the status of a 
partly free state.  
According to the Nations in Transit 2015 Report the EU member states from the SEE 
region receive lower democracy scores (compared to the CEE countries) - Bulgaria (scores 
3.29), Romania (3.46) and Croatia (3.68). These countries are considered semi-consolidated 
democracies along with non-member states Serbia (3.68), Montenegro (3.89), while 
Macedonia (4.07) dropped to the status of a hybrid regime (‘partly free’). After experiencing 
several consecutive years of democratic decline under Orban’s government, Hungary also 
moved to the status of semi-consolidated democracy (democracy score 3.18).
54
 Most notably, 
in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, these countries experience decline after joining the EU, 
thus illustrating the limited opportunities for direct EU influence over national political elites 
for institutional reforms.    
The analysis of the survey results provided by Freedom House experts emphasizes the 
fragility and vulnerability of democratic consolidation in Central and South East Europe. The 
2015 report while recognizing democratic achievements in the last decades, also underlies the 
deficiencies in democratic performance: ‘Nearly all the EU member states of Central and 
Southeastern Europe have consolidated their democratic institutions and created strong 
protections for civil society organizations and the media in the quarter-century since the fall 
of communism. Nevertheless, the average Nations in Transit democracy score of the countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 has declined by 0.25 points over the last decade. With 
Russia working actively to destabilize and demoralize democracies in the region, factors 
including the role of money in Central European politics, the pliability of judicial institutions, 
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and economically weakening media sectors all raise concerns about the durability of these 
countries’ gains.’55   
Another international survey Corruption Perception Index 2014, developed by 
Transparency International, ranks the countries from South East Europe in the lower category 
compared to the rest of the EU members from Central Europe. For instance, Bulgaria (ranked 
69 out of 175 countries), Romania (69), Greece (69), Serbia (78), Montenegro (76) and 
Macedonia (64) perform worse compared to Czech Republic (53), Poland (35), Slovakia 
(54).
56
 These data are important for the evaluation of the quality of performance of democratic 
institutions. Indirectly, it measures the degree of democratic consolidation, public trust in 
institutions and the establishment of the rule of law. In this respect, SEE countries are yet to 
develop fully democratic, inclusive and accountable political institutions. 
To have a more comprehensive picture, another authoritative survey - The WJP Rule 
of Law Index – also highlights the key factors (legal and institutional) conditioning democratic 
consolidation (establishing the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, access to justice, 
limited and accountable government). The performance of the SEE countries, compared to 
their CEE counterparts, is significantly lower. For instance, the global rank of Bulgaria is 45 
(from 102 countries overall) which is the lowest performance among the new EU members 
from the CEE/SEE region (in the categories limited and open government, corruption and 
efficient criminal justice system). Czech Republic (ranked 20), Poland (21), and Slovenia (28) 
perform better compared to Romania (32), Hungary (37), Greece (33), Croatia (35), which 
hold medium positions in the studied region Western Europe and North America.
57
 This 
discrepancy between the CEE and SEE countries indicates that democratic consolidation is 
not completed task for the countries of the SEE region. 
A very important test for the real progress towards consolidation of democracy in the 
region is the existence and development of independent and active civil society in each 
country. In the post-totalitarian context, the levels of civil society institutionalization and civic 
participation are relatively low. These levels have to be increased in order to ensure 
legitimacy and accountability of democratic institutions. In this respect, more than two 
decades after the beginning of the democratic process, civil society in the SEE countries 
remains not well institutionalized and not fully independent.  
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One of the authoritative comparative studies measuring the level of civil society 
development is the USAID Civil Society Organizations Sustainability Index.
58
 The overall 
picture is of still evolving sustainability of civic organizations in the SEE countries. This is 
particularly visible when compared with the performance of the CEE countries enjoying fully 
developed sustainability for their CSOs (with the notable exception of Hungary). Bulgaria 
gets 3.3 score (evolving sustainability), facing difficulties with organizational capacity and 
financial viability, as well as having problems concerning the implementation of the legal 
environment. The overall index for Croatia is 3.2, having problems with financial viability; 
Romania scores 3.6 with weaker performance in financial viability, legal environment and 
organizational capacity categories; Serbia gets 4.1 score, performing worst on financial 
viability, organizational capacity and public image categories; Macedonia receives 3.8 overall 
score. To compare these results with some CEE countries: Czech Republic gets 2.6 and falls 
within the sustainability enhanced category; Estonia performs better with 2.0; Hungary has 
experienced sharp decline in the last years dropping from 2.8 in 2010 to 3.4 in 2014 due to the 
governmental intervention in the civic sector. Other countries from the CEE region (Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia) fall within the enhanced sustainability category.        
In a comparative perspective, the SEE countries underperforms vis-à-vis CEE 
countries in a number of areas fundamental for democratic consolidation – the rule of law; 
effective protection of civil and political rights; limited, open and accountable government; 
civil society development. In terms of development trends, it remains unclear whether these 
conditions will provide incentives for civic engagement and commitment to institutional 
reforms strengthening democracy in each country or political conditions will further 
deteriorate. Consistent and critical evaluations of these deficiencies, properly addressed to the 
active civic groups, might provide incentives for positive change and development. 
Notwithstanding the low levels of public trust in democratic institutions, there is an 
opportunity for committed civic engagement which receives support on behalf of the EU and 
other international organizations and institutions (the Council of Europe, OSCE). If this 
opportunity is realized, there is a chance to change the negative trends and reshape the social 
and institutional environment.  
More than two decades after the beginning of democratization, it is visible that the 
formal adoption of democratic constitutions and legislation is only a precondition for 
establishing the rule of law and limited government. This constitutional framework has to be 
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complemented with efficient enforcement of the laws, sustainable democratic practices and 
civil society engagement and mobilization.  
 
4.2. Country-specific cases: Romania and Bulgaria 
Regional political context and tendencies play a significant role in limiting or fostering 
the process of democratic consolidation and democratic institution-building in a particular 
country. A brief country-specific overview of Romania and Bulgaria – two SEE countries 
with significant Eastern Orthodox majority - may be useful in highlighting the regional trends.   
 
4.2.1. Romania    
Despite the accession of the country to the EU in 2007, Romania faced subsequent 
institutional and political crises. In 2012 political debate was centered on the clash between 
the directly elected right-wing president and the socialist prime-minister. The governing 
parliamentary majority initiated an impeachment procedure against the president. In this 
political crisis all major constitutional institutions were involved thus suffering a significant 
loss in the public trust. On behalf of the EU, questions were raised in relation to the weakened 
democratic system, inefficient mechanism of checks and balances and the lack of respect to 
the rule of law. The overall evaluation of the events was critical, thus, highlighting the 
absence of progress in democratic consolidation after the EU membership. As the 
comparative data presented in the previous section indicate, there is consecutive decline in all 
major categories measuring the state of democracy and the rule of law after the country joins 
the EU accession.    
In 2014, the report under the CVM remained focused on the reform of judiciary, the 
need to uphold the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, 
the necessity to continue with effective fight against corruption and prevention of conflict of 
interests.
59
 The general conclusion has been that these problems need to be addressed with 
systematic and committed efforts in order to achieve significant improvements.  
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 Some positive signals of democratic growth could be seen in the cases of civic 
participation and mobilization addressing specific causes. A resent example is the presidential 
campaign in November 2014. After the government attempted to restrict active participation 
in the elections of Romanian citizens living abroad, mass civic demonstrations erupted. 
Active civic engagement caused the government to withdraw the contested administrative 
measures. This high level of civic mobilization in defense of the electoral rights has 
influenced the turn out and changed the result in favor of the reformist center-right 
presidential candidate. Thus, the Romanian civil society supported Klaus Iohannis, a member 
of the German minority and a Lutheran Christian, who has served as successful mayor of the 
Transylvanian city of Sibiu. The socialist candidate Victor Ponta - then prime-minister 
suspected for involvement in corruption activities - lost the elections.
60
 In these presidential 
elections nationalist and populist stereotypes have been overcome in favor of the clear 
political agenda for further modernization and democratization of the country. Iohannis’ 
unpredicted victory owes much to the active civic engagement in support of institutional 
reforms and deepening of the Euro-Atlantic integration of their country.  
In November 2015, mass civic demonstrations caused the socialist government led by 
Ponta to resign.
61
 Meanwhile, criminal investigations have been opened against members of 
the government (Ponta included).  
Romania is a good example of a SEE country overcoming its heavy post-communist 
legacy and undertaking strategic institutional reforms supported and defended by the active 
civil society.  
 
4.2.2. Bulgaria 
Bulgaria is a good storytelling case for the challenges to democratic consolidation that 
could be answered through increasing civic participation and engagement. In key moments of 
its recent development, civic mobilization and engagement in defense of the democratic and 
Euro-Atlantic political project of the country has changed the course of political events (mass 
civic demonstrations in 1997 and 2013 have caused corrupted governments to resign and have 
inspired significant political changes in support of democratic principles and politics).    
                                                          
60
 ‘Romania’s Elections: Transylvanian Surprise’, The Economist, 17 November 2014: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/11/romanias-elections-0 
61
 Alexandra Sims, ‘Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta resigns the day after mass protests over nightclub 
fire’, Independent Daily, Wednesday, 4 November 2015: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/victor-ponta-resigns-live-romanian-prime-minister-quits-day-
after-mass-protests-over-nightclub-fire-a6720486.html (last accessed 23 December 2015). 
43 
 
Despite the membership of the country in the EU, there are persistent challenges to 
democratic consolidation in Bulgaria. They could be described in several directions.
62
 Firstly, 
there are constitutional deficiencies leading to weak and inefficient institutions, which, in 
turn, are easily captured by oligarchic structures. Secondly, there are political deficiencies 
which proceed from the weak and corrupted political system not ensuring fair representation 
of different groups and interests in the society (in the last years cases of ‘corporate voting, 
conflict of interests and ‘vote-buying’ have increased’).63 Thirdly, there are challenges at the 
level of civil society arising from the weakness of the civic organizations and relatively low 
rates of civic engagement until recently. Having a limited number of active, self-organized 
and independent civil society actors leave politicians and governments without proper public 
scrutiny and accountability and allows abuses with power and public funds.
64
 The situation 
has been changing in the recent years and civic pressure and mobilization has made the 
government to reconsider some of its most contested decisions. 
Meanwhile, the existing low levels of public trust in all major political and judicial 
institutions are indicative for the problems with democratic consolidation. According to the 
recent polls, a majority of the citizens supports the democratic principles and values 
proclaimed in the constitution, or at least, there is no clear disagreement concerning these 
principles. However, the majority still remains dissatisfied with the performance of Bulgarian 
institutions and the low levels of law enforcement. This has remained the overall context even 
after the EU accession in 2007.  
This popular dissatisfaction could be explained with the higher expectations of almost 
immediate change of the living standards and of the institutional performance after the EU 
accession. The absence of strategic institutional reforms to overcome the persisting practices 
of corruption and political clientelism also contribute to the low levels of public trust. Though 
there have been significant changes in the governing majorities the public trust in institutions 
has remained at very low levels.  
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In the end of 2013, after a period of political and civic mobilization and 
demonstrations against wide-spread political corruption and oligarchic structures, only 14% of 
the Bulgarian citizens expressed satisfaction with the functioning of democratic institutions in 
the country.
 65
 After a period of interim government, early parliamentary elections and the 
formation of a new reformist center-right government, in the first half of 2015 the public trust 
in institutions is slightly improving, nonetheless remaining relatively low. In June 2015, the 
parliament is trusted by less than 10% of the citizens - this result remaining very similar for 
the last 5 years; the government is trusted by 20%. The judicial system receives consequently 
very low levels of public trust – below 10%, which is indicative for the problems with 
upholding the rule of law and enforcing the laws.
66
   
Most notable developments in the field of civil society are connected to the emergence 
of grass-root civic movements and civic engagement with public policy issues. Well-
recognized NGOs have formed thematic platforms, coalitions and civil society networks 
allowing them to exercise effective monitoring of the institutions and to influence the 
decision-making process. 
The 2013-2014 political and civic mobilization, being the largest after the overthrow 
of the reactionary socialist government in 1997, could be described as the ‘birth of Bulgarian 
civil society’.67 Protests challenged the deficiencies of the established political model, 
including the incompleteness of democratic consolidation in the country. The emerging civil 
society demanded more effective checks on the governmental power, proper administration of 
justice and more opportunities for civic participation in decision-making.
68
 Popular demands 
have revealed substantive expectations for organizing the common civic life on the basis of 
shared values and principles. It is noteworthy the protests mobilized citizens from very 
different social strata though the middle-class urban population clearly dominated. In the 
autumn of 2013 a strong and committed student movement joined the protesters occupying 
university buildings in Sofia and other big cities.
69
 According to the analysis in Nations in 
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Transit 2015 report ‘The 2013 protests galvanized civil society, and demonstrations continued 
into 2014. Most of the initial energy transformed into institutionalized political participation. 
Civic initiatives that emerged from the protests continued, and activists focused on drawing 
attention to the overlap between political and economic power.’70 This wave of active civic 
engagement has changed the course of Bulgarian politics, leading to early parliamentary 
elections and the formation of new governing majority with a clear reformist agenda.      
This evaluation marks an important development if compared to other studies 
undertaken in the preceding period.  For instance, the Civil Society Index 2008-2010 for 
Bulgaria is sub-titled ‘Citizen Actions without Engagement’, thus revealing relatively low 
level of civic participation and involvement, as well as lack of confidence in civil society 
organizations as agents of social change.
71
 Nowadays, there are positive signs of increasing 
civic self-organization and mobilization addressing the most persistent threats to democratic 
political system in the country.  
 
Conclusion 
The overview of the regional and country-specific contexts and experiences leave the 
question of the perspectives for democratic consolidation open to different interpretations. 
The viability of the liberal democratic project in SEE countries seems challenged by multiple 
factors: the authoritarian legacy, current governmental inefficiency, political corruption and 
organized crime, as well as by the regional geopolitical threats (authoritarian regimes in 
Russia and Turkey; weak dysfunctional states in the Western Balkans). The institutional 
capacity and performance in the SEE countries remains weak and unsatisfactory. The fragility 
of the democratic systems in the region should be recognized and properly addressed with 
adequate political and constitutional measures. 
  In this context, the process of democratic consolidation may evolve in different 
directions. Democracy in some SEE countries may erode and deteriorate, which may lead to a 
regime change towards semi-democratic model, or hybrid populist with authoritarian 
tendencies. If civil societies continue to emerge, self-organize and mobilize in support of 
democratic values and civic participation is enhanced, as well as popular demands for 
accountability and transparency of government are increased, the democratic system may be 
strengthened and some of the problems effectively addressed.       
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One of the positive incentives for further democratic development could be the process 
of closer EU integration and the implementation of EU standards in the fields of the rule of 
law and democracy. Notwithstanding that the EU is weakened from inside – due to the 
emergence of strong national-populist movements and Euro-skeptic governments in some 
countries (Hungary, Poland), over-bureaucratization, and absence of a strategic political 
vision for the future - its united space of freedom, security and justice is still attractive to 
millions of people in the SEE region and beyond (visible through the immigration waves and 
the expectation of the Western Balkan countries to find their way to full membership).  
Having a vibrant civil society and civic engagement is one of the important 
preconditions for the consolidation of democracy in the SEE countries. In their quest for 
meaning, values and identity a growing number of citizens seek answers beyond the scope of 
democratic procedures. One of the important sources of community ethos, solidarity, and 
shared values has always been the prevailing religion in the SEE region – the Eastern 
Orthodoxy. Given the historical significance of the Orthodox Church in the process of state- 
and nation-building, and its current public presence, the next chapters of the study will engage 
with the possibility to relate Eastern Orthodox concepts and doctrines to the wider civic and 
democratic values. This will be a political-theological study investigating the democratic and 
participatory potential of the core Orthodox doctrines.  
The leading hypothesis is that renovating its public image and public role in the SEE 
societies, the Eastern Orthodoxy could provide incentives for evolving democratization. 
Constantly calling for solidarity, justice, compassion, engagement in the public service, 
recognizing the dignity and uniqueness of the human person, actively cooperating with civil 
society organizations, the Eastern Christianity could recognize and endorse the civic 
participatory ethos much needed for the consolidation of democracy.   
Next chapter will focus in more details on the increased public visibility of Eastern 
Christianity in the SEE societies and the current models of church-state relations in the region. 
It will be demonstrated that the active public witness and engagement of the Orthodox Church 
remaining faithful to its core doctrines and values may enhance civic participation in general. 
In turn, this may lead to a better quality of democracy in the SEE societies. 
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Chapter Two. Church-state relations and the public presence of Orthodox 
churches: historical perspectives and contemporary issues 
 
Introduction   
The general claim of the first chapter has been that the consolidation of democracy in the 
SEE societies is not a completed process. It remains open for different influences – positive or 
negative and it could be modified in either direction. Countries in the region have struggled 
with the rise of populist, nationalist and Euro-skeptic political movements alongside the 
general political instability. Yet, some countries have made considerable democratic progress 
and have been invited to join the EU. 
In the SEE societies, the popular demands for more civic participation in the decision-
making go alongside statements on behalf of the national Orthodox churches for more just, 
responsible and participatory governance. It is part of the tradition of public presence of 
Orthodox churches in the region that the major political and social processes find their critical 
interpretation and reflection in the religious doctrines. Thus, without being the only decisive 
factor and not by means of direct political involvement, the public religious engagement on 
social and political issues, may either foster democratization, or undermine it, depending on 
the content of the values and public statements of the churches.  
This chapter will engage more extensively with the complex interaction between the 
modern democratic states in the region and the established national Orthodox churches with 
particular focus on the political-theological aspects of their relationship. Before going into the 
contemporary issues of church-state and church-politics relations, the relevant historical 
context will be presented. For elaborating a more conceptual view of these relations, it is 
important to reveal mainline historical trends and development of ideas, and then engage with 
current issues. Meanwhile, the analysis in this chapter will be instrumental in outlining the 
basic features of the political theology experienced in the last two centuries in Eastern 
Orthodox context – the ethno-nationalist political theology. Thus, the emergence of the new 
participatory political theology and its role in the public sphere will be more clearly 
articulated in the subsequent chapters and confronted to other political-theological models.      
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1. Democratic consolidation and the public presence of Eastern Orthodoxy in the SEE 
countries 
 Looking towards the present state of church-state relations in the SEE region, one should 
acknowledge common tendencies. Despite the historical legacy of having a strong alliance 
between the church and the state, nowadays, democratic constitutions in the SEE countries 
safeguard the separation between church and state as well as the freedom of religion and 
conscience (only Greece being an exception recognizing the Orthodox Church as an official 
state religion with certain privileges). Thus, the role of the Orthodox Church in the public 
sphere is changing compared to traditional models of state-supported national churches.  
Once being closely related to the political establishment, presently it is expected that the 
Church would influence the public sphere not by means of allying with the governing 
majorities, but through raising popular consciousness and awareness, engaging in civic causes 
and attracting support on behalf of civil society actors. This new role, however, is hard to play 
given the traditional alliance between the nation-state and the autocephalous national church. 
The Orthodox Church still faces the burden of its historical legacy and very often embraces 
the political-theological models of the past – either in the form of mutual support and 
cooperation with the state (symphonia doctrine), or in the form of a national state-supported 
church (or a specific blend between the two political theologies).  
The study of democratic consolidation and Eastern Orthodoxy in this chapter relies on a 
theoretical background. Recent scholarship of the process of secularization suggests there is a 
tendency towards increasing public presence of religion in the beginning of the new century. 
According to these studies, after the period of secular radicalism and anti-traditionalist 
movements of the 1960s in the Western societies, religion returns on the political agenda of 
modern societies.
72
 While the positive effects of the process of secularization cannot be 
underestimated – functional differentiation of various spheres in society released from the 
monopoly of the church and theology – this process should not necessarily result in 
privatization of religion and denial of its public function. However, the idea of the public 
presence of religion should take into account objective social limitations – generally, religious 
explanation of the world and social processes has disappeared from important social spheres, 
the religion itself has become less enchanted and attractive spiritual practice. From a social 
imperative less than a century ago, religion now is considered voluntary and optional.
73
 In this 
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regard, public presence of religion should respect the pluralism of views and beliefs that 
emerged in the last century and thus becoming a defining feature of modern secularized 
societies. As Charles Taylor has eloquently put it: ‘the change I want to define and trace is 
one that takes us from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to 
one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others… 
Belief in God is no longer axiomatic. There are alternatives’.74  
Notwithstanding that religion has become one among many other options of belief and 
social practice it remains an active and reflexive social experience. In this respect, a profound 
social and political transformation could not remain without proper interpretation and 
reflection within the dominant religious tradition. This is specifically the case with the 
Christian traditions perceived as having a mission in the world and as engaging with the world 
in order to transform it. Consequently, such a significant social and political process as 
democratization in South East Europe necessarily evokes reflection in the social teachings of 
the predominant Christian tradition in each society. This religious-political reflection and 
interaction with the society could be presented as following two ideal-typical models: 
accommodation of the predominant religion to the situation of religious pluralism, thus 
positively addressing demands and expectations of the society; or remaining isolated from and 
in opposition to the social changes thus defending the traditional moral and social order.
75
 A 
third option also exists and should not be underestimated – remaining faithful to the core 
teachings of the religious tradition, while engaging with the new social order and institutions, 
in order to transform them. In the course of the study, these different models of religious-
political interaction will be further highlighted.  
Public presence of religion has different dimensions in the modern democratic societies. 
Current political debates on ethical issues (gay rights, abortion, bio-ethics, and euthanasia) 
provoke major religious traditions and denominations in mostly secularized societies to 
become visible in the public sphere. This development has made some scholars of 
secularization to reconsider their earlier claims on the exclusion of religion from participation 
in the public discourse. In his resent works, Jürgen Habermas, who has been known for 
defending the role of reason and rationality in the discursive communication in the public 
sphere, reserves a special place and recognizes the value of public religious input in ongoing 
political debates. By admitting that the process of secularization of the state and the secular 
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legitimation of politics does not necessarily lead to secularization of civil society, Habermas 
offers a challenging conclusion. In a civil society, unlike the public sphere of politics and 
governance, comprehensive religious doctrines could be freely expressed (here Habermas 
follows John Rawls).
76
 Insofar religious communities play a significant role in the civil 
society and the public sphere, the concept of discursive politics would have to admit the 
public argumentation by religious citizens. Moreover, he holds, religious sources of values, 
meaning and motivation continue to be vital in the contemporary ‘post-secular’ social and 
political conditions. Yet, in order to be able to inform and nourish political principles such as 
solidarity and equal respect among citizens, religious concepts and traditions should be 
translated into ‘universally accessible language’. Thus, mediated through the universal 
notions and concepts, religious values and concepts could be accepted and recognized by non-
religious citizens and used by democratic institutions.
77
  
In the last two decades, the secularization paradigm is reconsidered. The concepts of 
‘deprivatization of religion’ and ‘post-secularism’ are now gaining much attention among 
social scholars.
78
 In the Habermas’ interpretation, the term ‘post-secular’ encompasses at least 
three meanings: continuing public presence of religion in secular societies; admitting 
functional contribution of religious communities in sustaining and reproducing popular 
motives and attitudes; an active political interaction between believing and unbelieving 
citizens.
79
  
It is noteworthy, that the public presence of religious communities could be defended 
within the framework that recognizes the necessity of church-state separation as a 
precondition of the modern liberal democracy. This separation, in Chantal Mouffe’s 
interpretation, does not entail a requirement for complete privatization of religion and its 
exclusion from the public sphere. The form of strict separation between church and state is 
grounded on the modern political idea that only the state is recognized as having the 
legitimate monopoly on coercive power, which could be used in defense of common interests 
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of the people and society, not in the benefit of a particular religious community. Only in this 
context, the state-church separation thesis could be defended. It should not be expanded to 
include complete separation between religion and politics, religion and civil society. Rather, 
defends Mouffe, political contestation should remain open for religious presence and 
argumentation, as far as constitutional principles and limits are respected. More importantly, 
there is recognition, in Mouffe’s account, that in some cases political struggles for a more just 
society have been informed and supported by the participation of religious communities in 
them.
80
           
In analyzing the public presence of religion and the constitutional requirements on church-
state separation, a concept elaborated by the political scientist Alfred Stepan could be 
employed. The concept is defined as ‘twin tolerations’ and embraces two meanings.81 First, it 
requires that the religious institutions should not have a privileged constitutional and legal 
status, nor should they have the right to enforce their convictions as a mandatory public 
policy. Second, the concept relates to the public exercise of the freedom of religion, 
individually or in community. It presupposes the opportunity to disseminate publicly religious 
convictions as long as they do not infringe human rights of others, or violate democracy and 
the law.
82
 The ‘twin tolerations’ concept could be particularly useful in the analysis of church-
state relations in the contemporary context in SEE countries. 
In presenting the church-state/church-politics interactions, the general assumption will be 
that pluralism (political, social, religious) is an irreversible and irreducible social reality, 
which should be respected by the Orthodox Church. The Church is able to participate actively 
in the public discourse on the condition it accepts and respects fundamental rights. The 
Church could ground its voluntary participation in a pluralist society on the theological notion 
of ‘otherness’, as developed by Orthodox scholars (most notably John Zizioulas), thus 
accentuating the personalist and relational aspects of the human being.
83
  
Regarding the public presence and witness of the Church, Emmanuel Clapsis’ view 
expresses an authentic Christian perspective: ‘the Church must resist simultaneously its 
relocation in the private sphere and the temptation to be identified voluntarily with the power 
of government or of market forces. It must recognize its place in “civil society”, the social 
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realm that links the private and the public spheres of life.’84 Clapsis maintains that the 
Orthodox doctrines, views and values (the eschatological dimension, the sanctity of the 
human persons, the significance of the communion, the universal dimension of the Christian 
gospel) demand active engagement of the Church in the public sphere and its contribution to 
the public good. He is convinced that the religion ‘can be a source of inspiration and 
empowerment to movements of social and political transformation … it can defend religious 
freedom, human rights, and the very right of a democratic civil society to exist against an 
absolutist, authoritarian state.’85                 
Questions regarding the modes of church-state relations, and of the participation of 
institutionalized religion and religious communities in the public discourse, remain important 
for both developed and new democracies in Europe. With their official statements on 
important political and social questions, with their ability to generate support in the civil 
society and raise awareness within communities, Christian churches continue to shape the 
contemporary democratic politics. In a regional perspective, the SEE societies have 
experienced intense secularization in the last century which has changed the modes of the 
public presence and engagement of the Christian churches in these societies. Contemporary 
forms of the public presence of the churches should be viewed in the light of the historical 
involvement of the national Orthodox churches in the modern state- and nation-building in the 
region.  
For a comprehensive evaluation of the complex church-state/church-politics interactions 
historical context will be highlighted. Depending on the specific period (medieval, early 
modern, authoritarian/totalitarian and democratic transition and consolidation) the content and 
the intensity of these interactions have been different. This presentation, however, would be a 
rather selective interpretation of historical events and processes and by no means will be 
exhaustive or complete. Its primary goal is to illustrate tendencies and common perceptions in 
the church-state/ church-politics interaction in the region that could be later interpreted in 
political-theological terms.      
 
2. State-  and nation-building in the SEE region and Eastern Christianity: an overview 
To understand the role of Eastern Orthodoxy in the process of democratic consolidation in 
South East Europe, it is also necessary to have a brief overview of the process of state- and 
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nation-building in the region. The Orthodox Church has been an important player in this 
process for centuries, though changing its institutional role and its means of influence. As a 
general observation, it could be maintained that the emergence of the nation-states in the 
region is closely related to the history of the national Orthodox churches - it is virtually 
impossible to analyze the former without referring to the latter. The movements for 
independence and autocephaly of the national Orthodox churches have found their logic in the 
equation of religious unity with political unity and national identity (Orthodoxy – Nation – 
Nation-state).
86
 Merging modern nationalism with historic romanticism and religious 
symbolism in the 19
th
 century was decisive for the success of national liberation movements 
and the foundation of the first nation-states in the region. Consequently, church-state relations 
that emerged in these countries have been influenced by this syncretic religious-nationalist 
political ideology.  
The models of church-state relations in in the nation-states in the region could be further 
presented in three different categories entailing both substantive and procedural dimensions.
87
 
The first form may be defined as ‘nationalism’ in which the connection or even equation 
between the religious self-identification and ethno-national identity is emphasized. In this 
case, the national autocephalous church has often been instrumentalized in several ways: in 
serving the general nationalist and patriotic policies of the regime (evident in the majority of 
national Orthodox churches); in legitimizing highly contested measures such as ethnic or 
linguistic assimilation (e.g. Serbian Church); in sacralizing the idea of the nation, producing a 
messianic religious-political mythology (e.g. the idea of ‘Greater Serbia’, ‘Greater Bulgaria’); 
in contributing to the preservation of the national cultural heritage.  
The second form is ‘co-optation’ – it is understood in terms of developing a stable 
cooperation with the state (usually under non-democratic regime), though being in a 
subordinate condition, ensuring support to the regime and its political goals. In turn, the 
church receives limited support for its organizational, functional or financial needs (e.g. 
minimum toleration for religious services; educational activity in theological schools and 
academies, limited access to public funds). The co-optation is a form of church-state relations 
which is not necessarily connected to the communist regimes. The national Orthodox 
churches could be co-opted under different political circumstances, thus acquiring a 
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privileged status in a society, being recognized as an established and official religion of the 
nation (e.g. the Greek Orthodox Church). 
The third form is ‘opposition’ – emerging within the church and directed against the 
authorities under various political and social circumstances.  
Beyond these forms of church-state relations, a sufficient number of the clergy and the 
laity has always professed that there exists a spiritual core of fundamental beliefs of the 
Orthodox Church, which cannot be reduced to mere political or social doctrines, or used in 
legitimation of different ideologies and regimes. 
For a more systematical and comprehensive presentation of the church-state relations 
during different historical periods, a simple periodization could be elaborated. It is focused on 
the essential and defining characteristics of each period and refers to the political-theological 
doctrines which have been predominantly accepted and practiced: 
 
[1] Medieval period: foundation of states, Christianization, and political development (7
th
-
14
th 
centuries).  
This period of the political and cultural development of the SEE states is strongly 
influenced by the political and religious models, practiced in the Byzantine Empire. The 
Byzantine governmental structure, political culture and religious tradition had been accepted 
as civilizational standard, creatively adopted and developed by the emerging SEE countries 
(Bulgaria and Serbia).  
During this period, in all countries with predominantly Orthodox population, the church 
had been instrumentalized by the state in offering divine legitimacy for the autocratic rulers 
and in elaborating a political theology in support of the established socio-political system. The 
doctrine and the model of symphonia between the state and the church had been adopted in 
the new monarchies. The period had been dominated by continuous struggles with Byzantium 
for recognition of the new monarchial rulers (recognition of the full kingly power and the title 
of  ‘tsar’) and recognition of full independence of the local state churches.88  
 
[2] Ottoman period: loss of political and religious independence during the times of the 
Ottoman Empire (15
th
 -19
th 
centuries).  
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The Ottoman Conquest in the region had been conceived by all Christian states in terms of 
a national collapse. It had led to the abolishment of the independent states and the autocephaly 
of their churches. The imposition of the Ottoman rule and of deeply foreign models of 
political and social organization had played a catalytic role for the continuous struggles for 
preservation of the Christian societies in the region. In this period, the lack of institutionalized 
political structures of the Christian communities had been partially compensated by the 
preserved hierarchical structures of the Orthodox Church (represented by the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate of Constantinople). The Ecumenical Patriarch had been recognized by the empire 
as ‘ethnarch’, both a religious and political leader of the Orthodox Christian population, 
organized within the ‘millet’ system (which represents communities, designed and defined on 
the basis of a particular religious affiliation, not an ethnic origin).
89
 The result of such political 
organization had been the placement of all Orthodox Christians, regardless of their ethnic 
origin, under the administration of the same millet structure. For the Orthodox Christians this 
had been the ‘Rum-millet’ (the community of the Romans), with the Ecumenical Patriarch as 
its administrative and religious leader. 
Despite the religious character of the imperial power, within the ecclesiastic structures of 
the Orthodox Church (parishes and bishoprics) and under its protection, certain social 
activities had been possible (organization of schools; commemoration of religious feasts, 
some of them connected to the communal and professional life; support for continuing higher 
education; adjudication of civil and religious cases according to the canon law and the old 
Byzantine law). However, the Ottoman rule had never been recognized by the predominant 
part of the Christian population as a legitimate political form and popular uprisings and 
liberation movements had been common. For the whole period, the Ottoman rule had been 
considered by the Christian population a foreign and oppressive type of regime.  
 
[3] National Awakening in the late 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries.  
In the 18
th
 -19
th
 centuries the gradual development of the societies and of the economic 
activity among the Christian populations in the Ottoman Empire had led to the formation of a 
small and isolated, but relatively wealthy and educated class. This phenomenon could be 
traced to the opportunity to travel and trade within the large empire. Meanwhile, the Ottoman 
Empire had initiated political reforms in 1839 and 1856 leading to the introduction, at least 
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formally, of the principle of equality before the law of all subjects regardless of their religion, 
recognition of the rights of education, free exercise of religion, access to justice and to 
appointments of Christians in the administration. These reforms had been implemented along 
with the gradual adoption of secular legislation based on the European legal tradition. These 
had been important preconditions for the process of political and cultural emancipation which 
resulted in the periods of ‘National Awakening’ for the Christian population in the region. 
Under these conditions, struggles for recognition of national identities of different peoples and 
of the independence of their Orthodox churches had followed. The intensification of the 
developments in the spheres of culture, economy and religion prepared the ground for the 
revolutions for national independence.  
 
[4] Liberation/ independence and state-building in 19
th
 – 20th centuries 
The elaboration of a national identity of different ethnic groups living in the region had 
resulted in emerging claims for political autonomy and independence from the empire. 
Nineteenth century is significant with the organization of national liberation movements in 
Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria which had coincided with the period of decline of the political 
power of the empire.  
Shortly after the period of the liberation movements, in the newly found nation-states 
modern political institutions had been created. The legislation had been transferred from the 
most developed European legal systems – the French and the German, without taking into 
account the undeveloped local social practices. Countries in the region had been constituted as 
monarchies where members of the European dynastic families had been elected to the throne 
(Serbia being an exception).  
Politically oriented and connected to the Western countries (through their monarchs, 
political and intellectual elite), the nation-states from the region with predominantly Orthodox 
population had remained spiritually influenced by both Constantinople (Ecumenical 
Patriarchate) and Moscow (Moscow Patriarchate). The Orthodox churches had received the 
opportunity to be involved in and to influence the social and political life of the national 
communities. All major political and social events had involved the participation of the 
church. Yet, the process of secularization had been unfolding in a direction that affected the 
role of the church in society: national Orthodox churches had been instrumentalized by the 
dominant political regimes. 
This had been a period of intense modernization of traditional societies in the region 
which caused deep social tensions and conflicts within the communities. During these 
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struggles, the churches had often sided with the conservative, nationalist and traditionalist 
social forces. During the period authoritarian regimes had been established in most of the 
countries and had often received support on behalf of the national Orthodox churches. In this 
period, the national churches had systematically developed their ethno-nationalist political 
theology. 
 
[5] Under the communist regime (1944-1989). 
The communist regime had been imposed violently by the Soviet Army occupying the 
states in the region with the aid of local partisan movements. During this period, the 
communist state significantly suppressed the activity of the churches. At the same time many 
individual church members (both clergy and laymen) had been severely persecuted (including 
measures of arbitrary detention in prisons and labor camps, torture, and murder). In the last 
decades, however, the regime in some communist countries had been slightly relaxed, 
allowing some basic religious activities. The policy of active persecution of the first years had 
evolved into a policy of administrative repression towards active believers and low-ranking 
clergy and measures of co-optation and control over the high clergy (bishops, abbots and 
metropolitans). Different ecclesial bodies had been systematically infiltrated by the 
communist secret services, in order to secure their compliance with the policies of the regime. 
Generally, this period of co-optation and collaboration of the churches with the 
communist regime had led to questioning their legitimacy by the emerging anti-communist 
opposition in the late 1980s. If recognized as a potential oppositional force, the churches 
could have played more decisive role in the process of democratic transition and consolidation 
in the 1990s.  
Overall, the compromises made with the regime still affect the prestige of the churches 
and their recognition in the democratic societies.  
 
[6] The period of democratic transition and consolidation (since 1989).  
In the beginning of 1990s, after ‘gentle revolutions’ in the region, democratic states have 
been reestablished. The general direction of political change has been toward creating 
societies that will respect the rule of law and democracy, will develop a free market economy 
and a vibrant civil society. In the political sphere, the key moment in this period is the 
adoption of new democratic constitutions providing the framework of democratic institution-
building along with the protection of rights and freedoms. This has affected the religious 
sphere through the recognition and protection of the freedom of religion as a fundamental 
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right, establishing the separation of church and state as well as allowing active public 
presence of the church in society.  
Meanwhile, the present place and role of the Orthodox churches in the SEE societies is 
predetermined by the heavy communist legacy (compromises and collaboration with the 
communist regime), on the one hand, and the lack of vision, creativity and understanding on 
behalf of some ecclesiastic leaders of the current moral, political and social trends and 
challenges, on the other. The general weakness of the public presence of the churches 
continues to be their public defense of nationalist sentiments (instead of more personalist and 
universalist) and their state-oriented public engagement (instead of more civil society 
oriented).   
In the following sections, the emphasis will be placed on the socio-political processes that 
have developed in the last two centuries, as they are closely linked to the research goals – 
analyzing the interaction between the Eastern Orthodoxy and democracy in the light of the 
political-theological dimensions of the Orthodox doctrines. The introduction of the historical 
periods (early modern and contemporary), which are decisive for the formation of distinct 
Eastern Orthodox church-state relations, will be followed by critical analysis, of the central 
problems and trends of this interaction. National contexts that will be analyzed are these of 
Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and former Yugoslavia, Romania. Having very similar historical 
experiences (though with deep tensions and conflicts between them), in the last decades these 
countries have faced the challenges of democratic transition and consolidation. Occasional 
references would be made to Russia, which according to the statistics, has the largest 
Orthodox Christian population in the world, despite the fact it has suffered the longest atheist 
and coercive regime in the modern history. Referencing to Russia is also justified on the 
grounds of its historically developed relations with the SEE region and the ongoing political 
and religious influence among the SEE countries.  
  
3. Church and Politics in the SEE countries: from state independence to the modern 
nation-state   
 
3.1. Greece 
The church-state relations in Greece have been shaped by different traditions: Byzantine 
political-theological legacy, early-modern secular constitutional monarchy, contemporary 
parliamentary republic. The Byzantine religious and political heritage and models of 
interaction between church and state have been re-interpreted in relation to the modern forms 
of church-state relations. It is noteworthy, that the Greek modernity, historically developed 
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first in the region, has been a laboratory for experiments regarding the church-state relations. 
The complex interaction between the doctrines of secular Enlightenment and the traditionalist 
Orthodox teachings has been a constant source of tension and contradictions in the Greek 
society. Insofar the elaboration of the Byzantine doctrine of symphonia and its subsequent 
interpretations and applications will be more extensively studied in the next chapters, the 
analysis here will focus on the modern dimensions of church-state and religious-political 
relations.    
The current shape of church-state relations in modern Greece is a product of the last two 
centuries. The historical claim to the Byzantine heritage is much more visible in the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, embodying the continuity of almost two millennia, than in the 
autocephalous Orthodox Church of Greece (CoG). It has been established in the first half of 
the 19
th
 century (1833) which coincided with the formation of the Greek nation and the state-
building process. This development has been a deviation from the Orthodox traditions. As it 
was highlighted above, during the times of the Ottoman Empire, the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
had been vested with administrative and spiritual jurisdiction over all Orthodox peoples 
within the empire regardless of their ethnicity. Hence, the creation of a national church had 
fallen in conflict with the tradition.  
Initially, the independence of both the state and the church has been proclaimed in 1821 
with the beginning of the national revolution. In 1833, with the adoption of the first Greek 
constitution, the autocephaly of the Church of Greece has been reasserted. This unilateral 
proclamation of the church independence had been strongly opposed by the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate which had caused a temporary schism between the two churches. The 
controversy was resolved in 1850 when the Patriarchate recognized the independent status of 
the Church of Greece.
90
  
Furthermore, according to the foundational charter of the church, the institutions of the 
state had to play a decisive role in its governance. Ecclesiastic governance had to be exercised 
by a synod consisting of five members nominated by the government, while the decisions had 
to be approved by the secular government in order to be valid. Moreover, the validly of the 
synod session depended on the presence of a responsible royal commissioner.
91
  
This development has laid the foundation of a problematic synthesis between the Greek 
Orthodoxy and the Greek nationalism which viewed the religion as an integral element of 
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national identity.
92
 This had resulted in a political-religious fusion, in which the Greek Church 
gained a state-supported status (mandatory religious instruction in the schools, weekly 
attendance of religious services by students; important religious holidays being celebrated as 
official national holidays; public presence of religious symbols and ceremonies including in 
the official state ceremonial). In turn, the church had offered religious legitimation and loyal 
support to the governing regime.  
Alongside nationalism, during the Civil War in Greece (1946-1949), the church embraced 
another ideology – anti-communism. This step had affected both the church and society. 
Consequently, the left-leaning clergy was dismissed from office, while the progressive 
intellectuals and left-wing groups in the society were alienated from the church for several 
decades. Further, the problematic cooperation between the church and the state, as well as the 
elaboration and practice of a specific blend of reactionary political theology, distinctive with 
its active support for the nationalist, authoritarian and ultra-conservative policies of the 
regime (including the regime of the military junta between 1967-1974), had significantly 
damaged the public image of the Church of Greece.
93
 Thus, the national church is often 
considered by the left-wing political groups a reactionary force that should be reformed from 
the outside by passing restrictive legislation (e.g. continuous attempts at confiscating or 
limiting the use of the excessive church property).  
Moreover, during the military dictatorship, the official doctrine of the regime had been 
intertwined with religious symbolism and teachings. For instance, one of the official 
propaganda slogans of the junta had been ‘Greece of Christian Greeks’ - a striking example of 
the politically dangerous blend between nationalism, religion, and authoritarianism.
94
 In this 
way, the junta sought religious legitimation and popular approval of its truly repressive 
policies. The church had also been instrumental in securing organized support for the regime 
through one of its influential lay organizations, the Brotherhood of Theologians Zoe. It had 
maintained close ties with the junta government, ensuring religiously motivated and highly 
disciplined social base that could be engaged in pursuing the goals of the regime and in 
disseminating the right-wing populist propaganda.
95
  
What is distinct in the development of the church-state relations in Greece, it has never 
experienced the repressive character of the communist atheist regime leading to persecution 
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and alienation of the believers and radical secularization of the society. However, the general 
process of secularization and modernization of the Greek society has triggered tensions, 
struggles and contradictions between the state and the church in a way similar to other 
countries in the region.  
Facing the process of democratization of the country and the EU integration in the 1980s 
the Church of Greece has reconsidered its allegiance to the nationalist ideology and its role as 
a protector of the ethno-cultural identity and has become more supportive of democratic 
values and human rights.   
    
3.2. Bulgaria 
3.2.1. The National Awakening and the struggle for independent Bulgarian Church    
The period of National Awakening in the late 18
th
 - 19
th
 centuries had been closely linked 
to the social activity of the local churches and monasteries, where first schools had been 
organized by educated clergy. These schools under the protection of the church had 
disseminated both religious and secular knowledge in a vernacular language. The formation of 
educated elite had been supported by many ecclesiastic officials who offered a number of 
scholarships for Bulgarians to study in the big religious and political centers of the Ottoman 
Empire (Constantinople and Thessaloniki) or beyond its borders – in the universities in Russia 
and Central Europe.  
According to the accepted historical interpretation, in the second half of the 19
th
 century, 
the evolving process of spiritual, social and political awakening of the Bulgarian nation had 
gradually led to the movement for independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The ecclesiastic 
independence from the Ecumenical Patriarchate was self-proclaimed by the Bulgarian clergy 
and laity in 1860. It was enhanced with the establishment of Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 
based on an official imperial decree (Sultans’ firman). It is also significant that the the 
Exarchate was designed as a proto-democratic institution. Its structure and internal 
organization was based not only on the implementation of the conciliar principles of the 
Eastern Orthodoxy, but also on direct participation of lay Christians in the governing and 
decision-making at all church levels (parish church councils, eparchy councils and the 
Exarchate council). Moreover, lay members had taken part in the procedure of election of an 
Exarch, of metropolitans and priests.
96
 This experience has cultivated a practice of 
participation and engagement in the public sphere that was decisive for development of 
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organized educational and cultural activities, as well as for the formation of modern Bulgarian 
national identity.   
Close relations between the Bulgarian Church and the formation of the modern nation is 
evidenced in the fact that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Exarchate had been designed to 
encompass the ethno-national Bulgarian territories. Again the religious affiliation had been 
equated with the national identity. According to the canon law of the Orthodox Church, 
however, such unilateral act of secession from the Patriarchate is illegitimate and leads to a 
schism and excommunication of the seceding group. This act had been rejected by the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate as grounded on ‘ethno-phyletism’ (religious nationalism), and caused 
the excommunication of the Bulgarian Church. The decision was taken by a pan-Orthodox 
church council convened in Constantinople in 1872 and the schism continued until 1945. 
There are justified claims, however, that this decision had been itself influenced by the 
specific Greek cultural nationalism (Hellenism).
97
  
It is also significant, that the process of acquiring church independence had been 
interlinked with the movement for national liberation from the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s. 
The religious awakening had inspired the political and revolutionary movements. The national 
revolution of 1876 (the April Uprising of 1876), though unsuccessful, had been a result of the 
joint endeavors of the newly formed Bulgarian intellectual elite, revolutionaries, local clergy 
and the common citizens.  
The history of the Bulgarian Church in the late 19
th
 century is exemplary for the formation 
of ethno-political theology in the region where the independent national church is 
comprehended as an outpost of the nation-state and is instrumentalized by the authorities. In 
ethno-cultural terms, the following decades the Bulgarian Exarchate had played a role for the 
religious integration of the divided Bulgarian nation, as an aftermath of the decisions of the 
international Congress of Berlin (June-July 1878).    
              
3.2.2. Church-state relations during the Third Bulgarian State (1878-1944) 
Close relations between the church, the nation and the state had been enhanced after the 
national liberation and the formation of the semi-independent Bulgarian principality in 1878. 
Notwithstanding the fact that only a part of the historical ethno-cultural Bulgarian nation had 
been integrated in the newly formed principality, the role of the Exarchate, headquartered in 
Constantinople, had been to provide spiritual guidance and a sense of cultural community for 
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these parts of the population which remained under the Ottoman rule (in Macedonia and 
Trace).    
The state-building in Bulgaria had started with creation of the institutions of government 
and the convocation of the first constituent assembly with the main task to adopt a 
constitution. The constitution was adopted in April 1879 (1879 Tarnovo Constitution). In this 
founding document the Eastern Orthodoxy had been recognized as the official religion of the 
state (Art. 37). The freedom of religion had been safeguarded (Art. 40), at least formally. The 
primacy of the Orthodox Church in the public sphere had been guaranteed with the 
requirement the monarch should confess the Orthodox faith (Art. 38).
98
  
These constitutional guarantees for the privileged position of the church had served as a 
precondition for having an active role in the society and the politics. In different times, 
members of the clergy had served as MPs and as governmental officials. For instance, the 
chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly had been the highest ranking cleric of the 
Bulgarian Church - Exarch Antim I. He also presided (April – June 1879) the first Grand 
National Assembly for the election of the first monarch – Prince Alexander of Battenberg. 
This close cooperation between the state and the church had been publicly visible: all official 
state ceremonies (taking constitutional oath by the monarch, MPs and ministers; celebration 
of official state holidays) had been conducted with the blessings and the participation of the 
higher clergy. In the field of family and inheritance law, religious marriage had been 
recognized officially and judicially enforced.  
In the society, the church had played a significant charitable and social function. It had 
maintained educational and missionary activities organizing a well-developed structure of 
charities and Christian fellowships (e.g. Union of Orthodox Christian Fraternities with more 
than 50 000 active members in 1930s).
99
 In the primary and secondary education in public 
schools, basic religious studies (core doctrines and rituals of the Eastern Orthodoxy) had been 
part of the mandatory curricula.  
The role of the church in elaborating and supporting a patriotic and nationalist political 
theology is visible in the social activities of some high-ranking clergy. In the interwar period 
(1920s-1930s), members of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Church had been involved in the 
creation and support of patriotic nationalist organizations, such as Otec Paisij All Bulgarian 
Union (in 1927: Vsebulgarski sayuz ‘Otec Paisij’), presided by the influential Metropolitan of 
                                                          
98
 For the text of the 1879 Tarnovo Constitution, see the web-page of the Bulgarian Parliament:  
http://www.parliament.bg/bg/17  
99Atanas Slavov, ‘Sobornost i suzdavane na pravoslavni miryanski organizacii’ [‘Counciliarity and 
Establishment of Orthodox Lay Organizations’] (2012) 10 Christianity and Culture, 42-50. 
64 
 
Sofia Stefan, and the more secretive and extreme nationalist organization Ratnik (in 1936: 
‘Ratnichestvo za napreduk na bulgarstinata’).100 
 Thus, the church had not remained isolated from the social and political processes. It had 
seemed that the church, for some time, had supported the established authoritarian form of 
government. Unfortunately, this authoritarian ‘medicine’ for the corrupted political party 
regime, as had been considered at the time, had proven to be neither proper, nor effective and 
more dangerous than the ‘disease’ itself. Once had been lost in the 1930s (with the coup 
d’état on 19th of May 1934) the democratic government had not been restored for the next 
sixty years.       
One example of the influence of the church over the political process, in defense of the 
dignity of the person and religious tolerance, is connected to the status of the Bulgarian 
Jewish population in the 1940s. In accordance with the Law for the Protection of the Nation, 
adopted by the Bulgarian Parliament in January 1941, following the Third Reich’s policies, 
the authoritarian government had been expected to deport the Jewish minority to Nazy 
concentration camps. However, the intensive campaign and support in favor of the Jewish 
cause by the Bulgarian Church, including metropolitans, priests and the lay people, enhanced 
by wider civil society movement, along with some parliamentarians, had led to the 
preservation of the Jewish community within the sovereign territory of the Bulgarian state 
(thus around 50 000 lives have been saved).
101
  
The history of the church-state relations after the formation of the modern Bulgarian state 
has proven concrete the close relationship between the two institutions. This connection had 
resulted in the elaboration of a specific nationalist political theology that had been enforced 
by the secular legislation. 
 
3.3. Serbia      
The process of state- and nation-building in Serbia is closely interconnected with the 
history of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the late 18
th
 century the Serbian Church had been 
                                                          
100
 Nikola Altunkov, Narekoha gi fashisti [They Were Called Fascists] (Sofia: Tangra TanNakRa, 2004), 118-
126, 683-684. 
101
 Michael Bar-Zohar, Beyond Hitler’s Grasp: The Heroic Rescue of Bulgaria’s Jews. (Holbrook, Mass.: Adams 
Media Corp., 1998); Stephane Grueff, Crown of Thorns: The Reign of King Boris III of Bulgaria 1918-1943 
(Madison Books, 1998), Chapter 21.  
It is not the whole story, however. There is also a darker side: in the territories of Northern Greece and 
Macedonia, temporarily administered by the Bulgarian authorities between 1941and 1944 (without having 
sovereignty over these territories), more than 14 000 Jewish people were deported to Nazi concentration camps. 
Thus, the Bulgarian authorities, while saving the Jewish population within the sovereign territory of the state, 
were instrumental in following Nazi policies in the so called “New territories”.   
65 
 
closely linked to the organized national resistance movements against the Ottoman rule. 
Similarly to other Balkan nations, this had resulted in identifying the Orthodoxy with the 
Serbian national identity. Consequently, the church had been instrumentalized in the process 
of state-building that followed in the 19
th
 century.    
In the first half of the 19
th
 century, Serbia had been re-founded as an autonomous 
principality dependent on the Ottoman Empire. An autonomous status of the church was also 
recognized in 1832 by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The full independence and autocephaly of 
the Serbian Church was recognized in 1879 following the official proclamation of state 
independence. The patriarchal status of the church was restored in 1920. 
During this period, the Serbian Church had acquired extensive social functions far beyond 
its purely religious jurisdiction. The church had been gradually infiltrated by the nationalist 
ideology and co-opted by the state as a powerful ally in enhancing the Serbian national 
identity and in assimilating minority ethnic groups (with non-Serbian origin).
102
 During the 
interwar period (between 1920s and 1930s), the extreme nationalist organizations (‘Zbor’ and 
paramilitary royalist ‘Chetnik’ movement) had the support of some high-ranked Serbian 
Orthodox clergy along with the state support in their pursuit of the ‘Greater Serbia’ 
program.
103
 Moreover, notable theologians and clergy had taken an openly critical position 
against modernity, secularization, individualism, capitalism, and in defense of a homogenized 
Orthodox national community. For defining and classifying the synthesis between Orthodoxy 
and Serbian nationalism, given the active political involvement of both the clergy and the 
laity, a new term ‘Political Orthodoxism’ is elaborated in a recent study of church-politics 
relations in interwar Serbia.
104
  
In 1930s, Orthodox theologians had tried to accommodate the ideology of nationalism in 
the doctrinal frame of the church and the traditional concept of symphonia. The nation had 
been described as a necessary link between the family and the humankind that have to be 
supported by the church, as far as it constitutes the ‘body’ of the church. The goal had been 
defined in terms of bringing the nation into harmony and perfection with the divine. 
Consequently, the church had been perceived as overlapping with the national community, 
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thus forming a unified national-ecclesiastical body. This understanding had found its most 
comprehensive interpretation in the particular Serbian political-theological doctrine of 
Svetosavlje (called after St. Sava who was the first archbishop of the autonomous Serbian 
Church in the 13
th
 century) – thus relating the foundational moments of the state and the 
church with the modern nationalist ideology. 
Moreover, the understanding of the church as a community of believers, rather than an 
institution, had contributed to equating the ecclesial with the national community. This fusion, 
according to the Serbian Church, had resulted in the formation of a national-ecclesiastical 
body.
105
 In terms of their ideological content, these doctrines emphasize the organic unity 
between the church and the nation, the communal and the spiritual. This communal concept 
differs from the predominantly institutional views of cooperation between the church and the 
state, imagined as distinct entities and two separate realms. The political-theological 
dimension is discernable in the approach focused on integration, community and unity of the 
nation-church, rather than on the church-state mutual recognition and institutional interaction. 
A particular organizational embodiment of the ethno-political-theological approach had been 
the formation and growing acceptance of the Devotionalists’ movement (Bogomoljci), 
associated with the popular Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirović. Similar developments had been 
witnessed in other Orthodox churches in the region (Zoe in Greece, Otec Paisij Union and lay 
Christian fellowships in Bulgaria, Legion of Archangel Michael in Romania). Common 
features of these lay organizations had been the fusion of religious spirituality, symbolism and 
practices with nationalism and right-wing ideology, public activity and mass mobilization of 
their lay members.     
Some of the most influential exponents of this ethno-theological fusion had been high-
ranked clerics - Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirović and Archimandrite Justin Popović (both 
glorified as Orthodox saints in 2003 and 2010), theologians Dimitrije Najdanovich and Djoko 
Slijepcević, political activist Dimitrije Ljotić (Zbor). Their ideological legacy is still visible in 
the contemporary Serbian Church.       
The political-theological ideology that emerged with the aid of the church in the 1930s 
could be distinguished from the earlier period doctrines of church-state cooperation. It is 
noteworthy, that the new doctrine, with its religious-national integralism, in fact undermined 
church’s own institutional independence. This is particularly understandable in the light of the 
internal logic of the nation-state building: the need to establish legitimacy, based exclusively 
                                                          
105
 Falina, Pyrrhic Victory, 179-187. 
67 
 
on a secular legal and political paradigm and recognition of undivided sovereignty, hence all 
other allegiances, including religion, have to be revoked or placed in a subordinate position. 
The state intervention in the domain of the church is notable with the adoption of legislation 
which regulated the election procedure of the Serbian primate.
106
  
The internal weakness of the church vis-à-vis the state had existed despite the fact that 
Serbian constitutions of 1888 and 1903 recognized a privileged status of the church and the 
Orthodox faith as an official state religion. Likewise, these constitutions had guaranteed the 
public presence of the church during celebration of the national holidays, as well as provided 
for compulsory religious instruction in public schools. The situation formally had changed 
with the adoption of constitutions in 1921 and 1931 of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes, which guaranteed freedom of religion and equal rights for the legally 
recognized religions.
107
   
The history of the Serbian Church is also indicative for the trend of political-theological 
developments in the region during the interwar period. Quite remarkably, despite their self-
proclaimed anti-Westernism and anti-modernism, national Orthodox churches had embraced 
the model of active political involvement, defending the values of homogenous national 
communities, infused with religious ideas and symbolism, typical for the Western Christian 
communities during the inter-war period. 
 
3.4. Romania 
The history of the Romanian Orthodox Church is also interlinked with the processes of 
nation- and state-building. The movement for national liberation in the 19
th
 century and the 
forming of an autonomous principality in 1829 has led to the establishment of an autonomous 
Orthodox Church in 1856. In the following decades, after the recognition of the state 
independence in 1864, the autocephaly of the church was self-declared in 1865. The 
subsequent recognition of the kingdom status of the state in 1881 was followed by canonical 
recognition of the autocephaly of the church by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople 
in 1885.  
The elevation to the rank of a patriarchate happened in 1925 after the territorial 
enlargement of the state following the collapse of Austro-Hungarian Empire in the end of the 
World War I. The Romanian case of church-state relations is also exemplary of the way the 
political recognition and the state power are interconnected with the status of the national 
                                                          
106
 Fallina, Pyrrhic Victory, 50-51.  
107
 Fallina, Pyrrhic Victory, 79.  
68 
 
church. These are certain tendencies and internal logic of the processes revealing some 
general characteristics of the Eastern Orthodox understanding of church-state relations 
applicable in the nation-states.  
Similarly to other Orthodox churches in Southeastern Europe, the Romanian Church had 
merged religion with nationalism and had been an important instrument of the state in shaping 
and defending the Romanian national identity.
108
 During the inter-war period in the 1930s, the 
existence of religious nationalism had been connected to the authoritarian regime and the 
activity of reactionary political forces (such as the ultra-nationalist Iron Guard), which placed 
great emphasis on the Orthodoxy and used extensively religious symbolism in their public 
demonstrations. There had been organizations, affiliated with the regime, which collaborated 
with members of the higher clergy, in order to strengthen, as they believed, both the nation 
(the state) and the church.
109
  
A political-theological understanding of the relations between the church, the state and the 
nation could be discerned in the works of an influential Orthodox intellectual Nichifor 
Crainic.
110
 His interpretation overemphasized the role of the homogenous Orthodox culture 
for the preservation of the Romanian state and society. In his view, Western democratic 
principles and ideals constituted a threat to the unity of national culture and religion.
111
 
These ideological developments had been representative for the inter-war period in 
Romania and the region, where the fear from bolshevism had contributed to the unholy 
alliance of ultra-nationalist and fascist authoritarianism with the national Orthodox churches. 
Thus the potential for elaboration of a political theology that is focused on some inherently 
democratic values had been severely weakened. The Christian view of engaging with the 
world in order to witness for the truth and love found in God had been replaced by fear and 
exclusion of others.      
This brief historical account of the simultaneous process of church-state-nation 
development in the region reveals their interdependence. Certainly, this development could 
not be evaluated in positive terms. From this alliance there had been many challenges arising 
for both the church and the state. For the church, one of the significant challenges had been to 
remain faithful to its core teachings and specific mission, hence, not to compromise with, rely 
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on or submit to the state as powerful as it might be. This primarily means the church should 
have not confused Christ and the Gospel with the nation, neither the state with the heavenly 
kingdom. For the state, the challenge had been to remain respectful to the mission of the 
church, not willing to dominate and transform the church’s powerful liberating massage into a 
new nationalistic ideology.  
On both sides, however, accommodations had been made under particular historical 
circumstances. While the state had been strengthened with the elaboration of the new 
nationalist political theology, veiled in religious symbolism and mythology, the church had 
been weakened and instrumentalized to serve temporary goals foreign to its core doctrines. 
The predominantly authoritarian politics during the inter-war period had influenced the 
general ideological horizon in which a comprehensive political theology could be developed. 
Consequently, the political-theological statements of that period had undemocratic overtones.      
The prevailing strong nationalist sentiments had contributed to another tendency 
emphasizing the importance of attaining independence of the national church as a means of 
safeguarding the national independence. This tendency should be critically evaluated. 
According to prominent Orthodox scholars John Meyendorff and Alexander Schmemann, the 
struggles for national church independence had their roots and justification not in Orthodox 
ecclesiology, but in the nationalist movements of the last two centuries.
112
 The focus on 
independence has revealed the self-understanding of the national church as a protector of 
national culture, language, and traditions. It has shaped the church’s own position of 
exclusiveness towards the West, Western Christianity, modernity, globalization, to the extent 
they have been considered threats to the traditional national culture and social order, protected 
by the national churches. Though not justified theologically, such a position has remained 
widely accepted until recently.         
While the modern nation-state has made certain accommodations to allow a free space for 
the church to exist and practice its teachings, to develop good cooperation with the state on 
many social issues, the imposition of totalitarian communist dictatorships in the region had 
radically changed the context in which the church had to function. Initially, the communist 
regimes had tried to eliminate and destroy the church. The difference with the preceding 
periods had been sharp and the very existence of Christianity and believers had been 
threatened.  
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The present-day Orthodox churches in the region are still affected by the long period of 
restrictions, persecution and infiltration of the church ranks by the secret services of the 
communist regime. The following section will provide a brief account of the position of the 
Orthodox churches under communist dictatorships in the region highlighting the political 
instrumentalization of the churches in the later period of the communist regime. The heavy 
legacy of that period is still traceable in the contemporary public image of the churches.     
 
4. Eastern Orthodox churches and the communist regime: between formal cooperation 
and tacit resistance 
Nothing has been more dangerous in the last centuries for the existence and the mission of 
the Orthodox Church, than the period of its persecution and subordination to the communist 
regimes. The ambivalent role played by the Orthodox churches during the communist 
dictatorship – preserving minimum religious functions at the price of collaboration of the 
higher clergy with the regime - still affects its present-day mission in post-communist 
societies.  
To understand the complex situation in which the Church had been placed, a general 
typology of church-state relations during communism could be developed. Three strategies 
had been employed for ensuring the submission of the Orthodox Church to the communist 
regime. First, in order to eliminate the active resistance of the church against the regime in the 
first years after 1944, severe persecution and oppression against the clergy and believers had 
been undertaken. These actions had been justified with the legitimizing role the church played 
under the previous authoritarian regimes and its collaboration with the ‘reactionary forces’ in 
society. Thus, the church had been held accountable for supporting the atrocities against 
communists and other left-wing opposition groups during the previous regimes.  
Second, after the elimination of the ‘reactionary elements’ within the church, its ranks had 
been infiltrated by the communist secret services. Some influential members of the episcopate 
and other clergy ranks, as well as some distinguished lay members (professors at the divinity 
schools and academies) had also been co-opted, in order to eliminate internal opposition and 
to prevent actions hostile to the regime.  
The third strategy had focused on the instrumentalisation of the church in serving the 
regime goals – most notably, to express public support for the ideological policies of the 
regime, both domestically and internationally.  
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4.1. Soviet Russia as a model of church –state relations during communism 
The first strategy of brutal persecution and oppression was very actively implemented 
during the first decade of the communist regime. In Russia, for instance, some of the most 
symbolic churches in Moscow and Petersburg were destroyed, closed or converted to 
museums.
113
 Moreover, during the first years after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks 
executed twenty-eight Orthodox bishops and 1215 Orthodox priests, while thousands were 
imprisoned, deprived of their rights or exiled. The number of churches functioning (remaining 
open for divine services) had dropped 100 times for 30 years: from around 54 000 in 1914 to 
500 in 1941.
114
  
The ultimate goal of these policies had been the total extermination of Christianity and 
complete transformation of the Russian society according to the state supported ideology of 
scientific communism and militant atheism. However, following the strong patriotic 
engagement of the church during the World War II, the restrictions were slightly relaxed and 
thousands of churches were reopened. This process did not last long: between 1959 and1964, 
during the Khrushchev’s campaign against Christianity, half of the Orthodox churches in 
operation (10 000 out of 20 000) were completely closed.
115
 By the end of the communist 
regime, the number of churches in operation had dropped significantly (the total being around 
6 500). These oppressive policies had been constant threat to the church despite the formal 
constitutional proclamation of complete separation between the church and the state during 
the atheistic regime.  
The second strategy of co-optation or at least formal cooperation between the episcopate 
and the regime had been practiced thus threatening the very essence of the church. While the 
first strategy had created martyrs and inspired true believers, the second had corrupted the life 
of the church from inside. This had been done in a number of ways, the primary goal being 
the same - the ultimate submission of the church to the regime and overshadowing its mission 
in society. For instance, one of the requirements towards the Russian Orthodox Church had 
been to endorse in its official public statements the Soviet foreign policy, thus defending the 
superior character of the socialist form of political and social organization. Public appearances 
of formal church-state cooperation had been used by the official party propaganda to claim 
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internationally that religious freedom had been protected within Soviet Russia. Thus, the 
church had been used in polishing the international public image of the communist regime.
116
  
As far as the USSR had been the general model for other communist countries to follow, 
its policies on church-state relations had been practiced in other countries. Similarities are 
easily traceable comparing the initial phase of the imposition of the communist regime in each 
country (the strategy of radical persecution) and during the period of regime consolidation 
(the strategy of infiltration and co-optation). These periods will be briefly analyzed in the 
historical trajectories of the countries in the Southeastern Europe. The existing challenges 
toward the public presence of the Orthodoxy in the SEE countries and the potential of 
elaborating a political theology in line with democratic values are still related with the 
ambivalent role the church had played during communism.        
 
4.2. Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and other traditional religious institutions (Catholic 
Church, mainline Protestant denominations, Islam) were severely oppressed in the first years 
under the communist regime. Many Orthodox priests and believers were imprisoned, tortured 
and killed in prisons and labor camps.
117
 The traditional church jurisdiction over marriage, 
divorce, issuance of birth and death certificates, of religious instruction in public schools had 
ended with the adoption of new communist legislation. The religious life had been restricted 
to the divine services only in church buildings, while the public function and the social 
activity of the church had been terminated.  
Formally, communist constitutions of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, adopted in 1947 
and 1971, had provided for complete separation between the church and the state (Art. 78 of 
1947 Constitution and Art. 53 of 1971 Constitution). The constitutional protection of the 
antireligious propaganda had been guaranteed, as well as the leading role of the communist 
party in the society and the state (Art. 1 of the 1971 Constitution). Moreover, there had been 
included constitutional requirements for educating the youth, as well as for developing of the 
science and research, arts and culture in a communist spirit (Art. 39 and art. 46 of the 1971 
Constitution). The legislation, adopted during the period, had also limited the opportunities 
for free exercise of religion, while placing religious institutions under the control and 
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supervision of the governmental Committee for Church Affairs. Most importantly, the 
communist secret security services had been instrumental in infiltrating members of the clergy 
as well as some professors at the theological academy, thus ensuring obedience and influence 
over church life and the career development of the clergy and theological scholars. The 
process of election of metropolitans (diocese bishops) and a patriarch had been subject to the 
monitoring and influence by the State Security, the Committee for Church Affairs and the 
communist party Politburo. Hence, only candidates ready to compromise and cooperate with 
the regime, had been selected for the highest church offices.   
Alongside the oppression of the church, two other major events in its organizational life 
had occurred during the period. First, the disputed autocephaly of the church was recognized 
by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1945. This process gradually led to the restoration of the 
Bulgarian Patriarchate in 1953 (recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1961) and the 
election of Patriarch Cyrill (then Metropolitan of Plovdiv and a distinguished church 
intellectual). In 1971, he was succeeded by Patriarch Maxim, who had remained in divine 
office for the next four decades (until 2012). These significant events had been preceded by 
complex church and state diplomacy moves. There should be no doubt that the patriarchal 
election process had been predetermined by the decisions of the Politburo of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party.
118
    
The process of pan-Orthodox and international recognition of the Bulgarian Church had 
been supported by the influential Russian Orthodox Church. To some extent, this recognition 
had been a side result from the struggle for primacy within the Orthodoxy - between the 
Greek churches (represented by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and having pro-Western 
orientation) and the Slavic churches (existing in the Eastern European states under the 
influence of Moscow Patriarchate). Furthermore, this power-play had involved the Bulgarian 
Church to participate on the international arena and to accept membership in the World 
Council of Churches where it allied with other ‘progressive’ and ‘democratic’ churches on 
important social and political questions. These ‘progressive’ churches had also been 
influenced by the communist/socialist parties in their states and infiltrated by communist 
secret services. Thus, in the field of international relations, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
had supported the official propaganda of the communist state. Notwithstanding this 
collaboration and compromise with the regime, the domestic control over the church had not 
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been significantly relaxed. Control and restrictions on the church services and activities had 
persisted, though not to the degree of mass persecution witnessed in the first years under 
communism.
119
  
In a recent study on the role of the Bulgarian Church during this period, an elaborate 
classification of the stages of church-state relations is suggested.
120
 The first period could be 
described as the period of ‘the Repressed Church’ (from 1944 to the middle of 1950s), when 
many members of the clergy had been oppressed and the church subordination to the state had 
been achieved by the use of force. The second period could be presented as ‘the Provincial 
Church’ (starting with the election of Patriarch Cyrill in 1953 to 1971), when the church had 
been successfully marginalized and isolated in the periphery of the society through effective 
administrative repression. The third period could be described as ‘the State-controlled 
Church’ (during the 1970s and 1980s) – this period includes the first two decades of the office 
of the elected with the endorsement and the aid of the communist regime Patriarch Maxim. 
During this period the church had been instrumentalized to support the communist policies 
through participation in the international socialist peace movement and engagement with the 
social justice movements.  
During the third period, the regime’s policy towards the church had begun to change 
allowing its increased public presence. As the regime’s ideological legitimacy began to 
weaken, it had turned to other motivational sources other than the belief in the world-wide 
proletarian socialist revolution. Moreover, the change in the church-state relations coincided 
with the general political shift towards the nationalist ideology. Thus the role of the church for 
the preservation of the Bulgarian nation under the Ottoman rule and for the national cultural 
and political awakening in the second half of the 19
th
 century had been publicly recognized by 
the official state propaganda.
121
 The church had been acknowledged as a protector of the 
national identity as well as a living museum of the national history.
122
 Academic interest in 
the religious art (icons, chants, manuscripts, architecture) had also been revived. 
Despite the anti-religious policies of the regime, the church had retained a degree of 
limited autonomy in its everyday parish life (though with very low active participation of 
believers). While being instrumentalized to a certain degree, the church had resisted the 
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temptation of becoming a vocal supporter of the nationalist polices of the regime in the 
second half of the 1980s (unlike the Serbian Orthodox Church).
123
  
Though being infiltrated by the secret services, the church had never completely 
abandoned its spiritual mission. As late as the 1960s/70s and despite the official atheist 
propaganda, some basic church rituals (baptism, marriage, memorial services) had been 
widely practiced. In attempt to limit and replace the use of religious rituals in a socialist 
society, the regime had taken a decision to introduce secular ‘civic rituals’ for 
commemoration of important family events.
124
  
Notwithstanding the numerous oppressive measures, including the forced secularization, 
persecution and other oppressive actions against the clergy, infiltration by secret services, 
limited opportunities for active parish life, and marginalization of believers, the church had 
tacitly resisted. However, the church’s public role and legitimacy had been significantly 
affected. This had weakened the legitimate position of the church and hampered it active 
public role during the first years of democratization.  
 
4.3. Romania  
With the establishment of the communist regime in Romania oppressive measures against 
the church had immediately followed: several bishops were arrested; hundreds of priests were 
detained in concentration camps; a number of schools and seminaries operating under the 
church jurisdiction were closed. In the late 1950s, a new wave of oppression against the 
church let to the arrest of thousands of monks, priests and lay members, as well as to the 
closure of many monasteries. Moreover, these members of the church had not received proper 
protection on behalf of the patriarch and the Holy Synod which remained overly submissive 
to the government.
125
  
With the change of political course of the country in the 1960s, the attitude to the church 
was reconsidered. The church had been rediscovered as an ally in strengthening the new 
nationalistic propaganda, being respected for its contributions to the preservation of the 
Romanian culture and the nation during the centuries. This new mode of closer church-state 
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relations had allowed many Orthodox churches to be reopened and the church itself to 
become more visible in the public sphere.  
In a larger context, these more tolerant policies toward the church and its increased public 
visibility could be critically evaluated as ambivalent, due to the infusion of nationalistic 
ideology into the church life and the cooperation with the regime. This shift towards 
cooperation and compromise with the regime had become visible with the elaboration of 
unique ideological symbiosis between Christianity and socialism – the doctrine of social 
apostolate. This doctrine has been define in terms of reconciling the mission of the church 
with the ideas of social justice.
126
 As a recent study suggests, the blend between nationalism 
and Orthodox Christianity in Romania, as well as the legacy church state cooperation during 
communist regime, have remained some of the main challenges to the active role of the 
Romanian Orthodox Church in the post-communist period and in the process of democratic 
transition.
127
  
 
4.4. Serbia and former Yugoslavia 
Serbian Orthodox Church had faced similar experiences during the first years under the 
communist regime. Initially, being associated with the former monarchy and the reactionary 
forces, the church had to be isolated, suppressed and placed under the state control. However, 
the nationalist sentiments within the church continued to be strong.  
The ideological shift of the regime towards Serbian nationalism, which happened with 
Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power in 1987, made the church once again closely associated 
with nationalistic politics and recognized by the state as an important ally. During the 
Yugoslav wars that followed in the 1990s some members of the Holy Synod supported the 
official nationalist policies of the regime.
128
 Despite its religious nationalism, the church 
during the communist regime had retained its spirituality and its active parish life, along with 
developing a distinguished Orthodox theological scholarship.   
The church’s embracement of Serbian nationalism had provoked an unexpected 
development. In 1967 a group of bishops and laity in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
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proclaimed an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church. This act, however, was not 
recognized by the canonic Orthodox churches in communion with the Serbian Orthodox 
Church. After its secession from Yugoslavia, and recognition of its state independence, the 
Macedonian state continues its support for the national church, which serves the state-building 
and nationalistic policies of the new political elite.  
The profound political changes in the end of the 1980s opened new opportunities for the 
Orthodox churches in the region to participate as an active force in the development towards 
liberal democracy. Their status under the communist regimes had been neither easy, nor 
secure. It would be oversimplification to describe their position as mere collaboration or 
compromise with the regime. During the whole period, there had been moments of severe 
persecution and everyday oppression for the lower clergy ranks and the laity. Nevertheless, 
the Orthodox churches in the SEE countries had tried to perform, though to a very limited 
scale, their spiritual function. This had been done despite the forceful forfeiture of their 
material resources and the restrictions of their presence in the public sphere.  
Consequently, being for the most part of their history placed in societies lacking liberal 
and democratic experience, the some ranks and communities in Orthodox churches had often 
been infused with anti-modernist and nationalist ideologies. This heritage, though being 
foreign to the Orthodox theology and tradition, has remained a principal challenge to the 
church’s positive role in the years of democratic transition and consolidation that followed in 
the 1990s.    
 
5. Democratic consolidation and Eastern Orthodox churches in the region
129
 
The church-state relations in the process of democratic transition and consolidation in the 
region have been complex. Liberated from the communist dictatorships, the SEE countries 
have approached the Western models of constitutional democracy. This process, however, has 
not been without challenges and deep concerns about the institutional capacity and the level 
of democratization in each country. The implosion of the communist system has revealed an 
ideological vacuum which had to be replaced by the civil society and the new hopes for 
democracy and European integration of the whole region. A number of complex reasons – 
social, geo-political, cultural – have contributed to the political choice made by some of the 
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countries and their political elites (e.g. in former Yugoslavia) to turn to ultra-nationalist 
policies, rather than to pursue democratic ideals. In this process, some national Orthodox 
churches (Serbian Church; Macedonian Church) have offered a new form of political 
theology to replace the lost ideological security of communism. The Orthodox churches in 
Bulgaria and Romania have tried to play an important role during the first years of the 
democratic transition. Due to a number of reasons, they faced different social reality– in 
Bulgaria the role of the church was weakened, mainly due to the internal divisions in the 
1990s, while the Romanian Church enjoyed a period of revival.  
In either case, however, the present role of the Orthodoxy in the public sphere in the post-
communist societies is still affected by the legacy of the decades of atheistic regime. 
Meanwhile, the opportunity to interpret the interaction of the Orthodox churches with 
constitutional democracy and civil society in the light of the experience of the Church of 
Greece is beneficial for the study. The Church of Greece has been the first from the region to 
experience and accept the gradual democratization of the state and society and to cope with 
the challenges arising from the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country.  
           
5.1. Democratic consolidation and church-state relations in Greece since 1975  
The process of democratic transition and consolidation in Southeastern Europe has begun 
not in 1990s with the fall of communism, but in mid-1970s – with the democratization of 
Greece. Greece has been the first among the countries in the region to face the challenges of 
globalization, democratization, and EU accession, thus having a chance to elaborate 
meaningful answers that could be considered by the rest of the states. In this respect, it is 
worth having a brief overview of the role the Greek Orthodox Church has played in that 
process, most importantly, the direction it has influenced the new constitutional order of the 
republic (established with the 1975 Constitution).  
The recent history of church-state relations in Greece is also indicative for the complex 
and often ambiguous position of Orthodox Christianity concerning the challenges of 
modernization and democratization of society. In this process, unfortunately, the church very 
often sided with ultra-nationalist, reactionary and authoritarian governments (1967-1974), 
similar to the Romanian and Serbian churches in the 1930s.        
The degree and intensity of church-state relations in Greece is reflected first in the 
constitutional ‘preamble’, which consists of a direct invocation of the Holy Trinity in the 
Orthodox dogmatic formula: ‘in the name of the holy, consubstantial and indivisible Trinity’ 
(similar invocation of the Holy Trinity could be found in 1937 Constitution of Ireland). The 
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established, official state status of the Church of Greece is constitutionally entrenched in the 
Article 3 of the 1975 Constitution:  
 
The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of 
Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with the Great Church 
of Christ in Constantinople and with every other Church of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, 
as they do, the holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is autocephalous and is administered 
by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod… 
 
It is noteworthy, that the section of church-state relations is placed at the second position 
in the Constitution, after the section on the form of government. Furthermore, the privileged 
position of the Greek Church is also enhanced through the constitutional recognition of its 
special function as a protector of the text of the Holy Scriptures: ‘The text of the Holy 
Scripture shall be maintained unaltered. Official translation of the text into any other form of 
language, without prior sanction by the Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great 
Church of Christ in Constantinople, is prohibited.’ 
 The constitutional protection of the church is further ensured: there is a prohibition of 
proselytism which in fact limits the scope of religious activity of non-Orthodox 
denominations, despite the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of religion in Article 13.  
The public presence of the Orthodoxy is visible in the political sphere as well. Thus, the 
Constitution provides that solemn oaths taken by the president, MPs and ministers should be 
in the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity (Art. 33, par. 2; Art. 59).
130
 
In the field of the public education there is a constitutional obligation for the state to be 
committed to nurturing the national and religious conscience of the Greek people (Art. 16, 2). 
This general constitutional provision is used as a legal foundation of the daily prayers at 
schools.
131
  
The strong connections between the state and the church are further revealed in the public 
sphere: many national holidays coincide with the most celebrated religious feasts; the 
government ministers have to take oath at the presence of the archbishop of Athens on the day 
of assumption of their duties (with the exception of non-believers or professing other faiths); 
the state pays the salaries of the Orthodox clergy, which have the status of civil servants; 
metropolitans are appointed by the president on the proposal of the Holy Synod of the Church 
of Greece. This mode of church-state relations is often defined by scholars of religion and 
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politics as sunallelia ('being together').
132
 The logic of this relationship, however, does not 
exclude controversies, opposition and heated debates on certain political and moral issues. 
The church is also criticized for not taking into account the modernization of the country and 
the liberal and pluralistic tendencies in the Greek society.
133
 
In relation to the public engagement of the church with nationalistic causes, two different 
cases could be highlighted. First, in 2000, a dispute arose between the government and the 
church regarding the entry of information on the religious affiliation of the citizens in the new 
ID cards. The government insisted that the anti-discrimination legislation of the EU prohibits 
the disclosure of religious affiliation in official documents as a means of guaranteeing the 
freedom of conscience and equality before the law. The church opposed this decision with 
arguments driven by the modern political-theological synthesis between religion and 
nationalism. Even the archbishop took a nationalistic, rather than religious stance. He insisted 
on the importance of the link between the church, the nation and the state in preserving the 
Greek national identity. Moreover, he envisaged the role of the church in terms of resisting 
the forces of globalization that would undermine the national identity.  
The second case, in 2004, concerned the jurisdictional dispute between the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and the Church of Greece regarding the election of metropolitans in the so called 
‘New Lands’ (the Northern Greek provinces which were incorporated in the state territory 
after the Balkan Wars 1912-1913 that brought to an end the Ottoman dominion in the region). 
It is noteworthy, that during the arguments that followed, each side employed mutually 
challenging interpretations of both secular and canon law. The Church of Greece relied more 
on the support of the Greek authorities and on the secular legislation rather than on pure 
canonical grounds. Thus, once again, the close church-state alliance was emphasized.  
In contrast, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has employed supra-territorial and universalist 
argumentation driven from the Sacred Tradition, the cannons of the Orthodox Church as well 
as from the Patriarchal Act of 1928 which provided a specific procedure for election of 
metropolitans in the New Lands (requiring submission of a list with candidates to the 
Ecumenical Patriarch and his rights to withdraw and add candidates as well as to approve the 
election). To some extent, this dispute has been indicative for the ideological currents within 
the Orthodoxy, the one focused on nationalism and nation-state and opposing globalization 
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and modernity (employed by the national Orthodox churches), the other, emphasizing the 
universality of the Christian faith and the church’s mission, addressing positively the process 
of democratization and globalization (the Ecumenical Patriarchate).
134
  
In this context of church-state relations, one of the contemporary political-theological 
currents among the Orthodox intellectuals in Greece, after the end of the dictatorship, has 
been the ‘neo-orthodox’ movement (with his notable representative the conservative religious 
philosopher Christos Yannaras). Some of the distinctive features of this movement are anti-
westernism, nationalism, anti-liberalism, while holding a critical stance on modernity, 
globalization and multi-culturalism. This neo-orthodox movement continues to be influential 
among the theological and ecclesiastical establishment and shapes in rather conservative 
fashion the Orthodoxy in Greece.  
Despite the predominant traditionalism of the Greek Church, a remarkable development 
during the period of democratization has been its gradual openness for left-wing Christian 
intellectuals and the engagement with social issues. Although the church has not developed a 
comprehensive ‘liberation theology’ primarily engaging with issues of social justice, there is 
growing influence of progressive intellectual groups over some high-ranked clerics (e.g. 
Metropolitan of Volos). For almost two decades after the fall of the military junta, the 
Christian Socialist movement (‘Christian Democracy’ and its youth organization EXON) and 
the publication of a weekly newspaper I Christianiki have started to change the traditional 
association of the Greek Orthodoxy with conservative groups and ideologies. This movement 
has tried to elaborate a third way between capitalism and socialism, offering perspectives of 
social change and liberation from Christian positions. Thus, a fundament for a more 
progressive reading of the Orthodox tradition has been laid.
135
                    
  
5.2. Democratic consolidation and church-state relations in Bulgaria since 1989   
The process of democratic consolidation is ongoing in Bulgaria and the church’s public 
engagement with different moral and political issues is becoming more visible. There is 
growing understanding of the fact that without such wide popular acceptance and 
internalization of democratic values, principles and practices, democratic institutions and 
procedures would remain a mere façade of oligarchic structures and practices.    
The public presence of the church in the first years after 1989 was shaped by several 
factors: first, the heavy legacy of collaboration of the high-ranked clergy with the regime in 
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the last decades, especially in the fields of international socialist initiatives (the international 
peace movement of the socialist countries) as well as in the nationalist propaganda during the 
infamous ‘Revival Process’ against the Bulgarian Muslim minority; second, the involvement 
of members of the Holy Synod in the communist secret services, which in turn had weakened 
their legitimacy among believers; third, the internal tensions within the Holy Synod and the 
division among its members leading to the creation of an alternative synod of metropolitans. 
All these have contributed to the problematic public image of the church in the first years of 
democratic transition.     
In the beginning of 1990s, there was a high expectation among emerging democratic 
opposition and civil society that the church will render its powerful support for the 
democratization of the country and will side with the anti-communist opposition groups in the 
society. The reasons for this expectation were logical – the church, as the prevailing religious 
denomination, was one of the most suppressed during the communist atheistic regime. All its 
functions – religious, educational, social and charitable, were severely limited, while the 
majority of the clergy suffered intense persecution in the first decades of the regime. In the 
view of Bulgarian democrats, all these conditions should have made the church a natural ally 
which will stand for a democratic political change. These hopes, however, have remained 
unfulfilled. With the exception of some parish priests, the higher clergy and the Holy Synod 
had remained mostly silent on political issues. The synod had functioned as if the bureaucratic 
socialism had been there and the opportunities for public engagement of the church had been 
limited.  
In this context, the emerging civil society had been looking for spiritual guidance, but had 
found an empty phraseology on behalf of the church leaders. The reasons for this situation 
had been complex. As stated above, most of the members of the higher clergy had been co-
opted by the communist regime. They had collaborated on some foreign policy and nationalist 
issues, while the functions of the church had been reduced and severely restricted. Their 
infiltration by the communist secret services had influenced their career as they had been 
elected as bishops and metropolitans with the aid of the regime after pledging allegiance. 
Until recently this has been an issue in the church: in 2012 after public disclosure of the 
communist State Security files it was announced that more than two-thirds of the members of 
the synod had been recruited as secret services agents (11 out of 15 metropolitans). 
Consequently, their public legitimacy has been eroded and the polls measured significant 
decrease of the public trust in the church (from above 55% to around 40%). After the election 
and enthronement of the new Bulgarian Patriarch Neophite in February 2013 and the 
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replacement of some older metropolitans with younger bishops non-related to the communist 
regime, the public trust in the church is increasing up to 66%.
136
    
The public presence of the church during the 1990s has been rather problematic. Some 
democratic politicians, representing the pro-Western and reformist liberal opposition (Union 
of Democratic Forces - UDF) started to question the ambivalent role of the church in the 
democratic process, demanding its radical de-communization and renovation. These 
politicians had criticized the Synod and metropolitans for their collaborative role under the 
totalitarian system.  
After the first democratic elections in June 1990 some members of the Synod and the 
lower clergy were elected in the constituent assembly (Grand National Assembly). Their 
participation in the constitutional debates was memorable with the attempt to defend certain 
rights and privileges for the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The constitutional formula that has 
been accepted in the new democratic constitution (adopted 12 July 1991), defining the role of 
the Eastern Orthodoxy in the society, stipulates as follows: ‘Eastern Orthodox Christianity 
shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria’ (Art.13, 3). 
 It should be pointed out, however, that the term ‘traditional religion’ differs from ‘official 
religion’, and the constitutional provision should not be considered an establishment clause 
and does not provide for a ‘state’ or ‘official’ religion. With this provision, it is only 
acknowledged that the Orthodoxy is the religion of the majority of the population and it has 
existed for a long period of time. This constitutional provision does not secure any specific 
privileged position for the church, though the practices that have emerged and the subsequent 
legislation have moved towards this direction. In line with the prevailing liberal and 
democratic character of the 1991 Constitution, it provides for church-state separation (Art. 13, 
2), as well as guarantees the freedom of religion and its free exercise (Art. 37). A specified 
provision bans the use of religious institutions, communities and beliefs for political ends 
(Art. 13, 4), thus limiting the possibility for religiously motivated political extremism.  
In 1991, with the development of the democratic process, it became clear that the church 
will remain mostly apolitical, though without initiating reforms from inside the church. 
Meanwhile, the political situation in the country became so antagonistic that a clear line of 
division between ‘democrats’ and ‘communists’ had been drawn. On the parliamentary 
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elections in October 1991 the democratic reformist forces won the popular vote and were able 
to elect the first non-communist government of the country.
137
  
Along with the reformist policies, undertaken by the new democratic government it also 
tried to pursue a reform in the religious sphere. The democratic government was convinced 
that the church could be reformed only through active involvement of politicians and laity in 
the process (therefore through new legislation and political statements). They also tried to 
ensure support for the progressive wings within the church. However, the active governmental 
involvement in the church issues provoked resistance from the conservative ecclesiastic 
groups and inspired internal division within the Synod of metropolitans. In the following 
years two opposing groups of synod members had challenged the legitimacy of the whole 
church as an institution. These events have led to continuous controversy and arguments 
between the two groups with respect to the legitimate representation of the Bulgarian Church. 
The tensions were fueled by acts of mutual ex-communication of both groups.
138
 
The governmental and political involvement in the church issues has been found violating 
the international and European standards of human rights protection and especially the 
freedom of religion. The European Court of Human Rights ruled against the country 
reasoning that the Bulgarian legislation on the free exercise of religion as well as the measures 
undertaken by the state (of direct involvement in denominational disputes) has been found to 
be in conflict with the principles and standards of Article 9 of the European Convention. 
Thus, in 2010 the Court decided that the country had to compensate a group of Orthodox 
Christians, led by metropolitan of the ‘Alternative Synod’.139 
Significant steps towards reunification of the two groups have been made during the pan-
Orthodox Church Council convened in Sofia between 30
th 
of September and 1
st
 of October 
1998, chaired by the Ecumenical Patriarch. The council was attended by six patriarchs (of 
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Alexandria, Antioch, Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria), as well as by representatives of the 
other autocephalous Orthodox countries. Its session concluded with publicly announced return 
of the majority of the clergy of the Alternative Synod in communion with the recognized 
canonic church (Bulgarian Patriarchate).
140
 
Despite the formal reunification at the pan-Orthodox Council some issues remained 
unresolved until the adoption of new legislation on religious freedom and association (2002 
Denominations Act), which has provided a privileged role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
(Bulgarian Patriarchate). including special ex lege status of legal personality (no need to 
register with the court as is required by other denominations and religious institutions). As a 
preventive regulation against future divisions, the law prohibits persons who had seceded 
from a registered religious institution to use the same name or its assets. 
The preamble of the 2002 law is indicative for the principles and objectives of the 
following normative regulation. First, the freedom of religion and the equality before the law 
is proclaimed for all persons, regardless of their religious convictions. Second, the 
‘traditional’ role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the history of the country and in the 
development of its culture and spirituality is emphasized. Third, the preamble states that 
legislators pay due respect to Christianity, Islam, Judaism and other religions, while 
supporting mutual understanding, tolerance and respect among them.  
Several provisions of the new law restate the principles laid down in the constitution. The 
freedom of religion along with the principle of separation between religious institutions and 
the state and the ban of any form of discrimination on the ground of religion are protected 
(Art. 1 to Art. 4 of the law).  
The role of the Eastern Orthodoxy for the state and society is defined (Art. 10) along with 
its traditional character, it is stated that the Orthodoxy has ‘a historical role for the Bulgarian 
state and actual meaning for its state life’. Furthermore, the law stipulates that the Eastern 
Orthodoxy is represented by the self-ruling (autocephalous) Bulgarian Orthodox Church - 
Bulgarian Patriarchate, which is the legitimate successor of the Bulgarian Exarchate and a 
member of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. It is governed by the Holy Synod 
and is represented by the Bulgarian Patriarch. It is also provided that the Bulgarian Church 
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has a legal personality established by the law, while its structure and governance are laid 
down in its statute.
141
  
Conditions and procedures of active lay participation in the governance of the church in 
line with the principle of conciliarity are provided in its statute. Lay Christians are eligible for 
election and participate at different levels of ecclesial decision-making: 1) in the general 
church council which exercises the highest legislative authority in the church and is convened 
every 4 years; 2) in the general church council convened for an election of a new patriarch; 3) 
in the eparchy council, as well as in the procedure for election of a metropolitan; 4) in the 
parish council. Participating at all these levels lay Christians exercise full voting rights. 
However, they form a qualified majority of all members only in the local parish councils, 
where they can directly influence the day-to-day activities of the local church and Christian 
community. All other higher decision-making bodies are dominated by representatives of the 
clergy and proposals of the lay members will be discussed but not necessarily included in the 
final decision.
142
 These rules, however, are only preconditions for active lay engagement in 
church life and the public sphere. In reality, very often they remain inoperative due to long-
lasting practices of passivity and obedience with respect to the high-ranking clergy.     
Beyond the factual description of the steps which had caused the division within the 
Bulgarian Church, it is noteworthy to focus on tendencies. Due to the long-lasting schism (de 
facto more than 10 years) during the important stages of democratic state-building and 
consolidation, the church had been significantly weakened and expelled from meaningful 
participation in the public sphere. Instead of participating with positive and thoughtful 
positions on socio-political processes, providing spiritual witness and moral direction in times 
of deep social, economic and political transformation and turbulence, it had been visible 
rather with scandals. Being divided, its leadership lost respect and influence, thus becoming 
once again easily used by the political actors of the day. The church, in fact, had been made a 
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hostage of the power struggles between the former communists with their parallel power 
networks and the emerging democratic movement. In this process of subordination of the 
church to the shortsighted political agenda, personal ambitions and shortcomings of the 
members of the Synod had also played a role. Beyond the formal recognition of the 
‘traditional’ role of Eastern Orthodoxy for the state and society, the most important civil 
society players – the civic organizations and the media – have often regarded the church as a 
marginalized structure, focused on its own survival, detached from any meaningful social 
activity.  
In providing an objective evaluation of the public presence of the church, it should be 
taken into account that for the last two decades the Bulgarian society has remained extremely 
secularized, lacking the basic knowledge of the Christian faith, symbols and rituals. There 
should be no doubt that the high percentage of people (almost 60 % of the population of 7 
millions) declaring themselves Orthodox, is due to the traditional overlapping between the 
national identity and religious affiliation which is accepted by the majority of the 
population.
143
  
In the last years, a positive development is under way. There is a growing community of 
Christian intellectuals, academics, civic leaders that engage critically with contemporary 
political and social issues. They participate in lay organizations and engage actively in the 
public debates regarding the role of the Eastern Orthodoxy and the church in the society. The 
majority of this group embraces democratic values and principles and is closely associated 
with the modernization and democratization project of the country, including deepening the 
Euro-Atlantic cooperation and integration of the society. Some of these intellectuals (among 
them academic religious philosophers and historians Kallin Yanakiev, Georgi Kapriev, Toni 
Nikolov, Momchil Metodiev) are involved in the publication of the academic journal 
‘Christianity and Culture’ which is a platform for open and critical discussion among 
different Christian denominations on religious, cultural and socio-political issues (Orthodoxy 
in dialogue with other major Christian churches, with modernity, and democracy).
144
 Some 
political-theological interpretations of the Orthodoxy could also be found within the journal. 
Along with these public intellectuals and scholars, a small, but vibrant community of 
academic theologians (Marian Stoyadinov, Svetoslav Ribolov, Svilen Tutekov, Delyan 
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Nikolchev and others) is also active in the public sphere and inside the church, very often 
challenging official church statements and advocating for public engagement on the side of 
democracy, justice and human dignity thus opposing the ethno-nationalist interpretation of the 
Orthodox tradition. These scholars also emphasize the role of the laity in the life of the 
church, thus connecting the value of civic participation in public life with an active position in 
the ecclesial life. Moreover, the growing emphasis on the participation in the Eucharist and 
church life in general highlight the development of an inclusive community based on the 
values of personalism and participation. In the field of public policy, these Christian groups 
defend democratic and participatory values.                    
Until recently, the voice of the church in popular debates and the decision-making process 
has been marginal. This is partly due to the communication problem of the church with 
respect to the civil society and the media. Within the church leadership there is still inability 
to speak the language of civic culture, human rights and non-discrimination, social justice, 
pluralism and tolerance, while linking these values and principles to the religious doctrines 
and values. The decisions and encyclicals of the Holy Synod often use inappropriate language 
and formulations, while addressing contemporary issues as bio-ethics, social conflicts, 
migration and refugees.  
In the last years, however, the church’s attitude towards public participation is changing. 
The Synod has adopted declarations and encyclicals on significant moral-political issues. In 
its positions, the Synod has advised legislators and the government to change provisions in the 
drafts of the Denominations Act, Family Code, Education Act, Protection of the Child Act, as 
well as has expressed positions in relation to the issues of religious education in public 
schools, freedom of religion, ‘in vitro’ fertilization, migration and refugees. Not all of these 
statements have been positively evaluated in the society. Nevertheless, the church has 
defended its public role and involvement becoming one of the important players in the public 
debates. These positions sometimes have challenged the established popular views (e.g. on the 
issues of bio-ethics); on other cases they have relied on constitutional arguments and human 
rights justification.
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In 2013, in the official statements of the Patriarch and the Holy Synod during the mass 
demonstrations and protest movements against the corrupted political elite and the oligarchy, 
some democratic political ideas were also endorsed – the right to live under a just political 
order and limited and accountable government, the idea of the popular consent for the 
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government, the right to protest against an unjust and arbitrary rule, values of religious and 
ethnic tolerance. Even before that, in 2011, the Synod issued a declaration in which 
emphasized that the principle of justice originates from God and it demands a just punishment 
for committed crimes and that the state should be responsible for the administration of justice. 
The Synod defended that in cases when the just political order is not guaranteed, the people 
have the right of resistance against an unjust rule. Moreover, the basic forms of social justice 
and solidarity have to be guaranteed for every citizen and each group in society, otherwise it 
is legitimate for them to seek recourse in the right of resistance. According to the Synod, the 
principles of justice and solidarity are the fundament of the state and should be implemented 
by the government.
146
                  
In the last two decades of democratic transition and consolidation, the role of the 
Bulgarian Church has gradually increased in the society. Though weakened and divided in the 
first half of the period, in the last decade the church has become much more visible in the 
public sphere. Not always, however, the church has supported vocally the positive processes 
of democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration, due to its negative experience with internal 
crisis and division, and the initial inertia of non-involvement in political and public processes. 
In some instances, the church has endorsed more traditional and nationalist-leaning policies, 
instead of the universalistic values of human rights and democracy. Other times, the church 
has vigorously defended justice, rights and democracy in the official encyclicals.  
The overall impression of political-theological debates in the Bulgarian context could be 
described as ambivalent.
147
 The Holy Synod’s official statements oscillate between 
endorsement and ambivalence on the issues of democracy and human rights, but with growing 
acceptance of new political realities; small, but strong and active Christian communities 
continue to shape the debates within the church defending the compatibility between the 
Orthodoxy and democracy. Nonetheless, there are also Orthodox groups remaining critical to 
the liberal democratic project, as based on the Enlightenment as foreign to the Orthodox 
tradition, however, they remain in the periphery. There is also growing acceptance and 
advocacy of the active lay participation in both the ecclesial and public life, thus cultivating a 
culture of engagement and inclusion, based on the understanding of the Christian tradition.         
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5.3. Democratic consolidation and church-state relations in Romania since 1989   
The end of the communist regime in Romania involved violence and clashes between the 
mass demonstrations and the organized institutional resistance. Until December 1989 the 
Romanian communist system had remained one of the most closed and, embracing a radical 
nationalist ideology. The beginning of the democratic process had been hampered by the 
remaining powerful networks of the former communist party.
148
  
Unlike the rest of the countries in Central Europe, in Romania the democratic opposition 
had been very weak in the first years of the transition period. Its organizational capacity had 
not allowed winning the national elections until 1997. Hence, former communists had 
controlled the direction of the democratic transition in the first decisive years of the process. 
This has affected the institutional performance and has caused problems with democratic 
consolidation even after the EU accession of the country in 2007.  
In the beginning of democratization, due to the collaborative role of the Romanian 
Orthodox Church with the communist regime, its position in the society had been initially 
weakened. In 1990, in order to prevent critical statements against the church on behalf of the 
emerging democratic opposition, and to clear the way for a positive change and renewal, 
Patriarch Theoctist offered his resignation to the Holy Synod. Though this act was publicly 
justified with health issues, its true reasons were the civic pressure and expectations on behalf 
of the Orthodox clergy and laity. However, the Patriarch had received organized public 
support on behalf of pro-nationalist movement in the church and returned to the office.  
Further acts of public confession and repentance by the leadership of the Romanian 
Church (Holy Synod, metropolitans and bishops) for their collaboration with the regime had 
been limited to formal declarations without significant consequences for ecclesial life. 
Nevertheless, this process was not one-sided. During the political events that followed, some 
members of the church have taken an active role in providing spiritual support and leadership 
for the people participating in the mass demonstrations across the country (the clergy led 
public prayers in support of democratization movement).
149
 In 2007, Theoctist was succeeded 
by Patriarch Daniel, a distinguished theologian of the church with active public presence.  
Meanwhile, reinvigorated theological and parish life of the church and its missionary 
endeavors as well as an active community service program have led to increasing public trust 
and support for the church. In the 1990s, a group of active clergymen, theologians and lay 
intellectuals was formed aiming to address the most persistent problems of church-state 
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relations, the need of spiritual renewal within the church, as well as to develop adequate 
position toward the democratic transformation and the ecumenical relation of the church (the 
Group for Reflection and Church Renewal)
150
. This group has contributed to the active 
involvement of the church in addressing the current problems of the society.   
Nowadays, the church is involved in partnership with the state and the local authorities, as 
well as with NGOs in a number of social activities: preventing domestic violence, human 
trafficking, drugs abuse; preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS; promoting integration and 
social inclusion of those at risk (people with disabilities, unemployed etc.). Its public outreach 
is also enhanced by well-developed network of religious media (BASILICA Media Center is 
organized, including radio and TV services, newspapers and magazines; there is also press 
agency and communications office of the Romanian Patriarchate), functioning under the 
governance of the church. Thus, due to its social service and missionary efforts, being the 
second largest among the Orthodox churches in the world (around 18 800 000 believers, 
almost 87 % of the Romanian population)
151
 the importance of its current development could 
not be underestimated. 
Among the negative tendencies in the church life is the continuing identification of 
religious affiliation with the nation identity. In its official statements the church often focuses 
on the national dimension, on the church’s spiritual role in the formation of the nation-state, 
on the organic link between the people and their religion.
152
 In counter-balancing this 
tendency, it is suggested that the church could embrace a certain type of public theology 
resisting the temptation of sacralization and absolutization of any political system or 
ideology.
153
 The church should resist absolutization of ideology of any kind, regardless its 
conservative or progressive dimensions. It is defended that this critical opposition to the 
ideological systems will contribute to the process of democratization in the country. On many 
instances, however, the Romanian Church has failed to distance itself from the ideological 
and oppressive policies (including the dispossession of churches and other buildings 
undertaken by the communist regime against the Greek Catholic Church in union with 
Rome).
154
   
Furthermore, important developments for the church-state relations proceed from the 
constitutional and legal regulation. In the 1991 Constitution of Romania, alongside the 
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provisions on the freedom of religion, the autonomy of the religious denominations from the 
state is safeguarded. The right of the religious institutions to receive support from the state for 
its public presence and social mission is also guaranteed (‘including the facilitation of 
religious assistance in the army, in hospitals, prison, homes and orphanages’ – Art. 29, par. 5). 
It is noteworthy that the religious denomination which mostly benefited from this 
constitutional provision is the Romanian Orthodox Church as the predominant religion in the 
country. Public presence of religion is also visible in the official state ceremonies – for 
instance,  the ceremony of taking constitutional oath by the president during his inauguration 
ends with the solemn formula of invocation of God (‘So help me God!’- Art. 82, par. 2).  
This constitutional regulation, based on the principles of autonomy and cooperation 
between the state and religious communities, has been laid down after a heated debate on the 
role of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The church’s claims had emphasized its traditional 
role as a national church with significant contributions to the formation of the Romanian 
nation. Though, not all groups in the society agree with such exclusivist claims, the church 
had attempted to influence the legislation in its own favor.  
In December 2006, the new Law on Religious Freedom was adopted, securing to some 
extent the privileged position of the Romanian Church. Specific provisions in the law have 
been included limiting religious proselytizing. They are deemed highly restrictive by religious 
minorities (some Evangelical Christian denominations) and independent international 
observers. Questions in regard to other restrictive and discriminatory clauses of the law have 
been raised, though they have remained not properly addressed by Romanian institutions. 
Some of the controversial provisions include restrictive requirements for religious 
denominations on the eligibility for state support (twelve years of existence before being 
considered for the eligibility for preferential status granted by the state as well as requiring the 
membership of minimum 0, 1% of the population). Other restrictions include limits on certain 
forms of the freedom of expression and free speech which are considered violating established 
religious symbols (Art. 13 of the Law).
155
     
The Romanian Church continues to play an important role in the public sphere. On 
numerous occasions the church has successfully influenced the legislation (e.g. in the field of 
religious education in the public schools); it has addressed the public opinion on important 
issues of bio-ethics (on abortion and euthanasia) and public morals (against legalization of 
homosexuality); politicians regularly seek support for their public campaigns by the church 
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leadership and promise to defend their agenda in the decision-making process.
156
 Moreover, 
the church’s connections to the state are rather strong as the state continues to pay the salaries 
of the priests. 
With respect to the EU membership of the country, the church officially supports this 
political development. Beyond its nationalist sentiments, the church is not openly critical to 
the values of democracy and human rights. However, when it comes to recognizing pluralism, 
secularism, modernization or particular kinds of rights, the church’s attitude is much more 
nuanced and often critical. One of the major challenges faced by the church is how to 
transform its pro-democratic public image into a deeply internalized commitment to 
democratic values. Critically evaluating the Romanian Orthodox Church’s inclination to 
nationalism, it would be unfair to deny its generally positive role in the process of democratic 
transformation of the society. Overcoming its negative legacy and shortcomings, the 
Romanian Orthodoxy is viable enough (in terms of theology, mission, active social program 
and public presence) to offer a positive message for its adherents living in a modern and 
democratic state. With its social activism and increased public presence, it may cultivate the 
ethos of social engagement and participation among different groups in the society. 
 
5.4. Democratic consolidation and church-state relations in Serbia and former Yugoslavia 
countries 
5.4.1. Serbia: church-state relations and political theology   
One of the most controversial roles the Eastern Orthodoxy has played in the last two 
decades in the region has been in the case of Serbia and former Yugoslavia. Having a 
traditionally strong nationalistic inclination in the last century, the Serbian Orthodox Church 
has been an important religious-political player in the conflicts in the Western Balkans in the 
1990s. Initially, in 1990, the position of the Holy Synod was in support of the democratization 
process. The church welcomed new opportunities for political and social self-determination 
and spiritual renewal. There had been public expectations that the church will engage with 
active social work and religious-educational mission and will be active in the schools, 
hospitals, mass media, and in the public life in general. Meanwhile, the Church Council 
shared the understanding that the church needs to be elevated above the ordinary politics and 
parties, because its role is to unite, not to divide people. Moreover, the Council emphasized 
                                                          
156
 Lavinia Stan, Lucian Turcescu, Church, State and Democracy in Expanding Europe (New York: OUP, 2011), 
148-149. 
94 
 
the importance of the public witness of the clergy, but also expressly banned their active 
involvement in politics and party-political life.
157
  
The subsequent political events, however, led to a rather different public engagement of 
the Serbian Church. The long tradition of associating and equating ethnicity with religion had 
resulted in political instrumentalization of the church - being used by the Milošević’s 
authoritarian regime in legitimating the pursuit of regime’s ultra-nationalistic and chauvinistic 
goals. It is well-known that after the breakdown of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Serbian 
government had embraced violent and biased ethno-religious policies that subsequently led to 
the Western Balkan wars (1991-1999). During military campaigns heavy crimes and atrocities 
(war crimes and crimes against humanity) had been committed by military and paramilitary 
forces coordinated by the Belgrade politicians.  
After the beginning of the violent conflicts, the Serbian Orthodox Church sent rather 
ambivalent messages regarding the Milošević regime. On the one side, Patriarch Pavle had 
been supportive of the nationalistic cause of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 
Croatia, nonetheless expressing regrets for the casualties. He had also made statements 
advancing peace, justice and reconciliation.
158
 On the other side, the Patriarch directly 
confronted Milošević’s government during the 1997 pro-democratic demonstrations. The 
Patriarch himself took part in the anti-government protests, accusing the regime for the 
political downfall of the country. Though the traditional role of the church is to stay 
politically neutral, in June 1999, after almost three months of NATO air strikes, the Holy 
Synod called Milošević to resign. After the presidential elections in 2000 and the pressure on 
behalf of the church along with mass demonstrations, Milošević finally resigned.159  
Generally, it could be said that the position of the Serbian Church in regard to the Western 
democratic model has been rather ambivalent and contradictory during the 1990s. In 2000, the 
church’s unequivocal support for the election and recognition of Vojislav Kostunica as the 
legitimate president of Yugoslavia, succeeding Milošević, led to the democratic breakthrough 
in Serbian politics. Nowadays, the Serbian Church officially supports democratic reforms and 
the EU integration process, however, it remains concerned with the preservation of Orthodox 
traditions, with ensuring religious education in public schools, as well as with the uneasy 
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situation of the Serbian Orthodox community that remained in Kosovo after the 1999. In 
relation to Kosovo, the church’s attitude is justified to some extent, due to the continuing 
tensions between the Albanian majority and Serbian minority and the historical importance of 
certain places in the formation of the Serbian statehood and spirituality.
160
  
After the fall of the authoritarian regime in 2000, Serbia has gradually developed into a 
democratic state. In October 2006, a constitutional referendum was held approving the new 
democratic Constitution of Serbia, thus replacing the 1990 Constitution.
161
 The democratic 
progress was further recognized by the EU in March 2012, by admitting Serbia to the status of 
a negotiating country.   
Regarding the constitutional status of religion, Serbia is defined as a secular state, the 
principle of separation between church and state is respected, as well as there is constitutional 
ban on giving a specific religion an official state or mandatory status (2006 Constitution of 
Serbia, Art. 11). Subsequently, more specific provisions (Art. 43 ‘Freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion’; Art. 44 ‘Churches and religious communities’) provide further 
regulation of the issues of the separation of church and state and secularism. In the 
constitution no special status of the Serbian Orthodox Church is provided. This, however, 
could not preclude the traditional good connections between the Serbian Church and the state. 
The church and the state remain open for cooperation and interaction for the benefit of the 
society according to the traditional symphonia concept.  
Issues of church-state relations and the public role of religion have been interpreted by 
different high-ranking churchmen and religious intellectuals. For instance, during the 
nationalist conflicts in the 1990s, some higher clergymen had been vocal in support for the 
nationalistic ‘Greater Serbia’ project. Bishop Artemije of Raška and Prizren (Kosovo) had 
defended the Serbian nationalist cause and the Orthodox religious sites against the violent 
threats on behalf of Kosovo Albanians. He had also opposed the unilateral Declaration of 
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State Independence of Kosovo and on behalf of the Serbian Church refused to recognize the 
legitimacy of the Kosovo institutions.
162
 
During the Yugoslav wars another high-ranked cleric, the influential Metropolitan 
Amfilohije Radović, supported the former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. Years later 
Radović claimed that it would be better for Karadzic to surrender to the UN International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague (as being indicted for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity). Nevertheless, the metropolitan has remained supportive of the 
nationalist policies.
163
  
Alongside their position on contemporary political events, some distinguished Serbian 
clergymen and theologians have developed ideas on more conceptual political-theological 
issues. As a leading Serbian theologian Radović has presented a specific political-theological 
understanding that is openly in opposition to the values and principles of liberal democracy. 
He has elaborated on the ideas of ‘theo-democracy’ or ‘Christian democracy’ understood as 
holistic concepts integrating Orthodoxy, nationhood and democracy.
164
  
Another influential theologian - Bishop Atanasije Jevtić – has presented more 
eschatological and personalist political-theological views. He understands the Church as being 
a living spiritual reality above and beyond all politics and parties. He defends that the Church 
supports freedom and denies any form of subordination and enslavement of human persons. 
In his view, the Church is an icon of the Divine Kingdom on earth and should act as an 
alternative to all political parties. Thus, the Church transcends the state and the political 
order.
165
   
To the other pole, Bishop Danilo Krustić, defends the idea of ‘Orthodox monarchy’ and 
the concept of symphonia between the church and the state as the correct and legitimate way 
of their interaction, co-existence and cooperation in their mutual benefit. His theo-political 
inspiration and imagination could be traced back to the medieval Byzantium and Serbia in 
which the specific notions of Orthodox monarchy and symphonia had been practiced.
166
 
Openly engaging with political-theological issues, Bishop Irinej Bulović upholds the 
principle of a free church in a free society (state), which requires also mutual support and 
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cooperation, while respecting the differences and boundaries between the two entities. He is 
critical of different political forms which either absolutize or fully exclude the public role of 
the church. These are the forms of a state church, a Christian state, a state without the church 
and a state instead of the church which could be viewed as equally utopian constructs. He also 
understands politics as present within the nature of the church.
167
    
A distinguished Serbian theologian and an Orthodox priest, Radovan Bigović is among 
those who defend the idea of compatibility between the Orthodoxy and the Western liberal 
democracy with its values – human rights, the rule of law, limited government, pluralism and 
toleration. In his understanding, the emphasis on personality, both human and divine, comes 
first. He sees this approach as truly consistent with the Orthodox ontology and anthropology, 
where the divine person and the human person constitute the highest value that can never be 
sacrificed for other goals or values including the state, politics, culture, progress, etc. In his 
understanding, the human person is free and unique, she remains open to communication both 
horizontally (with fellowhumans) and vertically (with God). Regarding the form of political 
regime, Bigović expressly endorses the liberal democracy. He defends that without liberalism 
democracy by necessity will end with a majoritarian dictatorship over the minority. In his 
view, the Orthodox Church is against any form of dictatorship, authoritarianism, imperialism 
and tsarism.  
Given that the church in its canon law recognizes the principle of separation of powers 
and functions – legislative, executive and judicial, consequently it shall accept the separation 
of powers in the secular democratic state. It is also noteworthy that in its internal relations the 
church relies on different regulations (morality, customs and traditions, canon law), thus 
remaining internally pluralist. Bigović defends the church has to support for the rule of law in 
a democratic state, given that the function of the law is to defend the rights of the persons 
against the abuse of the government and the others. Insofar the highest value for the church is 
the human person, the church has to be among the first to support human rights. Regarding 
democracy, Bigović finds correspondent principles and procedures in the church: in its 
governance the church accepts the majority principle as well as the rules of unanimity and 
consensus on the most important issues. Hence, the democratic ethos is not foreign for the 
church and shall be recognized in the secular context. Meanwhile, Bigović warns against the 
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vices of imperfect democracies – corporatism, consumerism and materialistic culture, 
egocentrism, as well as against the radical understanding of national unity.
168
  
In relation to nationalism, Bigović interprets critically the establishment of nation-states in 
the Balkans. He views the fusion between the religious and ethno-national identification in the 
context of post-Byzantine Balkans as grounded in the Ottoman millet system and criticizes the 
transfer of administrative competences to the church leadership (‘ethnarchy’ model). He sees 
the subsequent claims of autocephaly of the national churches as grounded on the emerging 
nationalism among Balkan peoples.  
Bigović remains critical of the ideal of the nation-state based on ethno-religious 
homogeneity. Once inspiring the Serbians and other Christian nations on the Balkans to 
pursue their political and ecclesiastic independence, the nationalist ideal is no more 
acceptable. The political ideal of organic state-nation-church unity is already utopian, it is 
impossible to be realized by political action due to different objective reasons. He also 
questions and rejects the acceptance of secular national-romanticism into the church doctrine 
which produced the ideology of ethno-phyletism of the late 19
th
 century. Bigović recognizes 
the social reality that the Orthodox churches are no more limited to the boundaries of 
homogenous nation-states, but transcend national borders and exist in multi-national 
conditions. This, in turn, changes their relations to state politics.
169
 Hence, the values and 
principles which the church shares in the public discourse could not be those of a closed 
ethno-religious society, but rather of personalism, public engagement and universalism.                            
The church-state relations in Serbia are yet to face challenges arising from the ongoing 
processes of democratization, modernization and EU integration of the country. The Serbian 
Orthodox Church, being a long-lasting supporter of ethno-religious politics, needs to find 
creative answers to the issues of human and minority rights, of non-discrimination, of 
constitutional democracy and multi-level governance. Otherwise, it risks to be placed at the 
periphery of a democratizing society. In the recent years positive signs could be detected - in 
the church’s understanding of its responsibility towards society and acceptance of some 
democratic values and principles. To be in line with the current conditions, the church should 
move far beyond the synthesis of Serbian nationalism and Orthodoxy. Moreover, as far as 
many Serbian communities exist in diaspora in the neighboring Balkan countries and in 
immigration in the EU and North America, in order to provide adequate spiritual and moral 
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guidance, the Serbian Church is bound to overcome its religious-nationalistic overtones and to 
begin to participate in the public discourse endorsing democracy and human rights.      
 
5.4.2. Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) 
Challenges of nationalism and political utilization of religion exist with regards to the 
Orthodox Church in Macedonia. The development of the Macedonian Orthodox Church is 
hampered by its schismatic status due to its unilateral separation from the Serbian Orthodox 
Church in 1967, without the consent of the latter and without the approval on behalf of other 
canonic Orthodox churches. Though the majority of the Orthodox population belongs to this 
denomination, it still remains unrecognized by the rest of the canonical Orthodox churches. 
Historically, the schism of the Macedonian Church had its origin in the will of the local 
leadership during the times of socialist regime in Yugoslavia of which the Republic of 
Macedonia had been a federative state, to have influence over the church matters. The move 
to the schism had served the political goals of creating and elaborating a distinct Macedonian 
nation and culture, defined in ethno-nationalist terms. Moreover, the creation of the 
schismatic Macedonian Church has been evaluated as directed against the unity of the 
influential canonical Serbian Church and its further weakening.
170
  
The public role of the state-supported Macedonian Church has been enhanced after the fall 
of the communist regime and the declaration of state independence from Yugoslavia. During 
the period, several attempts at reunification with the canonical church and official recognition 
have been made. In 2002, the Metropolitan of Veles Jovan, appointed to represent the canonic 
Archbishopric of Ohrid, sought reunification with the Serbian Orthodox Church. With 
facilitation by the Archbishop of the Church of Greece Christodoulu, an agreement (Nis 
Agreement, signed on 17 May 2002) for canonical unity between the Serbian Church and the 
Macedonian metropolitans was reached. Consequently, the autonomous status (within the 
Serbian Church) of the newly created canonical Ohrid Archbishopric was recognized, though 
without the word ‘Macedonian’ in the official name of the church. However, after signing the 
agreement, in the following months three of the metropolitans of the Macedonian Church 
withdrew their support and remained outside the canonical communion. For his role in the 
process of reunification with the Serbian Church, Archbishop Jovan was forcefully removed 
from his cathedra, in July 2002.  
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In May 2005, with a decision by the Patriarch of Serbia Pavle, Metropolitan Jovan was 
confirmed as Archbishop of Ohrid and Metropolitan of Skopje, as well as Chairman of the 
Holy Synod of Bishops of the Ohrid Archbishopric.
171
 Since then, the Ohrid Archbishopric 
struggles to acquire legal legitimacy and to register with the competent Macedonian 
authorities. However, these attempts have been consistently denied which violates 
internationally recognized standards of freedom of religion and separation between church 
and state. This is particularly acknowledged in the U.S. Department of State International 
Religious Freedom Report 2006.
172
 The schismatic Macedonian Orthodox Church has 
enjoyed the support of all Macedonian governmental authorities.  
Nowadays, the restrictions of the activities of the canonical church still apply. In the last 
few years the Archbishop of Ohrid Jovan had been imprisoned several times. He was finally 
released in February 2015, after the diplomatic involvement of the Moscow Patriarchate, in 
expectation of a future negotiation process for overcoming the schism.
173
  
Beyond the schismatic status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, its relations with the 
state have constitutional and legal grounds. In principle, the 1991 Constitution provides for 
the freedom of religion, separation between church and state, and equality before the law for 
all religious communities and groups (Art. 19). However, the Macedonian Orthodox Church 
is expressly mentioned in the constitutional text which safeguards its privileged status. 
Moreover, the 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups also acknowledges 
the special status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church.  
Currently, the religious situation in Macedonia is yet to improve. The Ohrid 
Archbishopric continuous to function without official recognition by the state and suffers 
persecution, while the Macedonian Orthodox Church enjoys all benefits of a state-supported 
church. To be able to meet the international standards and to fulfill the political criteria for EU 
membership, the Macedonian state needs to ensure the freedom of religion and the principle 
of separation between the church and the state, as well as to enforce the principle of neutrality 
towards particular religious groups.  
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The history of development of the Orthodoxy in Macedonia is another example of the 
historically close ties between the national churches and the state, and the challenges to the 
public presence of religion in the European Southeast. The presentation of country-specific 
cases has also highlighted the ethno-nationalist political theology embraced by the 
nationalized and politically instrumentalized Orthodox churches.    
 
Conclusion 
In the process of democratic transition and consolidation in the SEE societies, national 
Orthodox churches have often played a rather ambivalent role. Nowadays, there is a positive 
trend among the Orthodox churches providing support to democratic institutions and 
endorsing democratic values. Yet, some concerns and reservations remain due to the doctrinal 
beliefs of the Orthodox Church in general (gay rights, abortion, and euthanasia).  
Generally, after the fall of the communist regimes, Eastern Christianity and the Orthodox 
churches have enjoyed increasing visibility in the public sphere. Public visibility of the 
churches in the post-communist societies does not necessarily presuppose their direct 
empowerment or political involvement. It rather means a renewed opportunity to spread the 
core teachings of the Eastern Orthodoxy in the context of a democratic political sphere, and 
pluralist civil society and by means of public witness and engagement (public awareness 
campaigns, participation in a broader public consultative process, public ceremonies, media 
coverage of church’s social, educational and religious activities).          
On a conceptual level, the common trend within the Eastern Orthodoxy and the national 
Orthodox churches in the region for the last two centuries has been the development of a 
nationalist political theology. It has relied on the fusion between the religious and the ethno-
national identity. This development emerged from the process of national awakening and 
national romanticism that spread across the Balkans in the 19
th
 century. It had some positive 
effects inspiring the movements of national liberation of the SEE societies. The elaboration of 
a specific nationalist political theology had served the needs of both the national Orthodox 
churches and the emerging nation-states, providing institutional strength of the former vis-à-
vis Ecumenical Patriarchate and religious-political legitimation and unity of the latter, against 
the Ottoman Empire. The result had taken the form of a powerful conceptual synthesis: the 
concept of symphonia, traditional for the Byzantine Orthodox political imaginary, had been 
enriched and reinvented by the 19
th
 century romantic nationalism spreading across the 
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Balkans. The political consequence from this process of fusion between these concepts had 
been the creation of the Orthodox nation-states on the Balkans.
174
    
Furthermore, the recent history of the Orthodox churches in the SEE region is exemplary 
for the main challenges faced by the Orthodoxy in relation to the process of modern 
democratic state- and nation-building. First, there is a general weakness of the trans-national 
ecclesial institutional structures which justifies the close association of the national Orthodox 
churches with the state. This institutional weakness, namely the absence of a single pan-
Orthodox central authority and jurisdiction, similar to that of the Roman Catholic Church (the 
Pope and the Vatican), has the negative effect of constant exposure of the national Orthodox 
churches to the political changes of the time. Though remaining in full communion of faith, 
canons and liturgy, Orthodox churches are more dependent on the particular political 
conjuncture in a given state. Their attitude to local political regimes is also dependent on their 
organizational capacity and institutional status in society.    
 Second, a significant challenge has been the embrace of the nationalistic ideology by the 
autocephalous churches. This obscures the true nature and mission of the Orthodox Church as 
reducing it to a religious-cultural department of the sovereign nation-state instrumentalized in 
the elaboration of modern national identities. Thus the church becomes a symbolic ally of the 
state in the political process of nation- and state-building. The negative effects are for both the 
church and the state. For the church, these negative consequences could be seen in the 
transformation from within of its sacramental reality, reducing it to mere ritualism. The side 
effect is the transformation of Christianity into an ideological system and structure, which 
serves the goals defined by the nation-state alone, rather than remaining a living communion 
of free persons. For the state, this amalgam of religious nationalism is also threatening, for it 
endangers the modern democratic, pluralist and constitutional order, often leading to 
exclusion and discrimination of certain groups on the basis of either religion, or ethno-
national identity.   
Third, due to their historical connection to the formation of the nation-states, 
autocephalous Orthodox churches tend to be more conservative and traditionalist. The claim 
to autocephaly is justified with the sovereignty of the state (political and territorial borders, 
and legal jurisdiction) and national self-determination, not with theological doctrines. 
However, the overemphasis on the autocephaly and the use of national languages, celebration 
of national holidays, elaboration of particular prayers for the nation, means that a certain line 
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has been crossed and some parts of Orthodox theology have also been affected by the 
nationalist ideology. This in fact explains the constant invocation of past and present rulers 
and references to the history of the people (nation) in public prayers and liturgies offered by 
high clerics.  
It could be summarized, due to the complex synthesis between modern nationalism, 
national romanticism and religious traditions, the role of the Orthodox churches in the 
creation of the SEE nation-states, as well as in the national histories and mythologies has been 
significant. Consequently, autocephalous Orthodox churches often present themselves as 
threatened by the processes of modernization, democratization and EU integration, which 
transcend the borders of the nation-state and produce open public space for competition 
between different political and religious traditions. Supranational and multilevel governance 
affecting the decisions and policies of the nation-states, create more challenges to the 
traditional role of the national Orthodox churches in the SEE societies. These processes have 
been viewed as endangering the nationalist political theology embraced by the Orthodox 
churches in the last two centuries.  
It should be acknowledged, however, that in each of the Orthodox churches in the region, 
as well as in the universal Orthodoxy, have always existed tendencies and voices critical of 
the process of nationalization of the church. Influential leaders of the Orthodox Church, 
including the Ecumenical Patriarch, have constantly urged against the spirit of and the 
dangers of ethno-phyletism and emphasized the universal scope, meaning and mission of the 
church. In the last two decades, there have been numerous occasions when the Orthodox 
churches have openly endorsed democratic principles and values as well as defended human 
dignity and fundamental freedoms, thus paving the route to more personalist and 
universalistic engagements. Moreover, all predominantly Orthodox countries in the SEE 
region are recognized in international surveys as democratic states, though with a varying 
degree of consolidation of democracy.
175
  
Furthermore, distinguished Orthodox theologians of the last century have made significant 
contributions to the development of the Orthodox theology in relation to the Christian 
personalism, participatory ethos and universalism, remaining faithful to the core Orthodox 
doctrines. These scholars have remained sensitive to the eschatological dimension of the 
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Orthodox Church, which safeguards against full identification of the church with the state, 
nation or political regime.
176
  
Evaluating the relation of Eastern Orthodoxy to the process of democratic consolidation in 
the region, in terms of existing church-state relations and the public presence of religion, the 
study cannot be conclusive. There are tendencies that may facilitate and contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation – when the Orthodoxy, from its own doctrinal position, 
emphasizes the dignity of the person and the values of personal freedom and justice. There are 
also tendencies that may hamper the democratic consolidation – the overemphasis on the 
church-nation-state relations and the nationalist sentiments shared by powerful church leaders. 
The following chapters will address in a more consistent and critical way the theoretical and 
doctrinal underpinnings of the contemporary Eastern Orthodox political theology with a 
specific emphasis on its personalist, participatory and universal dimensions. 
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Part II. Towards participatory political theology: concepts and models 
 
Chapter Three. Political Theology in Western and Eastern Christian 
perspective. Concepts and interpretations  
 
Introduction 
For the most part of its history the Orthodox Church coexisted with powerful 
autocratic states. The traditional doctrine of church-state relations (‘symphonia’) had been 
part of the imperial political ideology (originating in the Byzantine Empire, though being 
accepted and practiced in the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Russian empires). With the advance of 
political Modernity in South East Europe and the creation of nation-states in the region after 
the period of national revival and awakening in the late 18-19
th
 centuries, the doctrine of  
symphonia had been reinvented to serve the nationalist ideology. The result could be seen in 
the ‘nationalisation’ of Eastern Christianity leading to the emergence of national Orthodox 
churches, having the status of an official state religion, providing legitimacy of the political 
regimes and serving the spiritual needs of the new ‘Christian Nation’.177   
As Chapter Two of this research suggests traditional Eastern Christian doctrines and 
models of church-state relations have been used in legitimating either the imperial rule, or the 
nation-state. Historically formed models of comprehensive political theologies in the 
Christian East (the imperial and the nationalist) emphasized mutual dependence, collaboration 
and integration between the ecclesial and the political realms.
178
 Thus, they differentiated 
from the Western Christian political theologies elaborating on competing claims of superiority 
between the church and the state since St Augustine’s City of God.179  
Before engaging with the institutional political-theological models, experienced in 
Eastern Christian context, this chapter will present critically some major interpretations of 
Christian political theology in both Western and Eastern traditions. In this chapter, the 
elaboration and the modern usage of the term ‘political theology’ will be presented first. Next, 
some major works and engagements of distinguished contemporary scholars (in both Western 
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and Eastern Christian traditions) on the development of political-theological ideas will be 
discussed. Third, institutional statements and engagements of some Orthodox churches with 
political and social issues will be presented (official statements, declarations, encyclicals). 
This would be highly selective presentation of works and ideas in order to highlight main 
philosophical trends in thinking politics and religion as conceptually related spheres. The 
presentation of contemporary Eastern Christian thinkers will be mostly focused on their 
conceptualizations of the interrelation between democracy and Eastern Orthodoxy. Thus, 
comparing political-theological insights from both Eastern and Western traditions, often in 
tension and contradiction with each other for centuries, will lay down the basis for the 
reconstruction of Eastern Orthodox concepts in the light of participatory political theology.     
    
1. Political theology: contemporary debates and interpretations 
1.1. Schmitt on political theology 
It is well-known that the modern use of the term ‘political theology’ had been 
introduced by the German constitutional scholar Carl Schmitt. His groundbreaking book 
Political Theology, published in 1922, had been primarily concerned with the fundamental 
understanding of the secular theory of the state with its core concept of sovereignty. Being 
committed to both philosophical radicalism and political conservatism, he sought the 
conceptual and systematic parallels between political and theological concepts to exemplify 
the complete autonomy of the political from the religious sphere. Despite the use of the term 
‘theology’, his work could not be considered theological in any strict sense of the word. 
Rather it is a scientific attempt, elaborating on the history of ideas, to develop a distinct kind 
of sociology of legal concepts focused on the concepts of sovereignty, exception and decision. 
Thus, he coined the specific meaning of the term ‘political theology’, by claiming in the 
opening of the third chapter that  
 
all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only 
because of their historical development – in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, 
whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because of their 
systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts. The 
exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy can we 
appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state developed in the last centuries.
180
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The sociology of legal concepts, as Schmitt understands it, is grounded in a consistent 
ideological system. The process of secularization has emptied the political and legal concepts 
from their earlier religious connotations, but has preserved their systematic structure related to 
their theological origin. Complementary to his sociology of legal concepts is a line of 
argument which relates political forms and regimes of a particular age to the predominant 
metaphysics and theological understanding (Medieval monarchy is linked to the Christian 
belief in one true God; revolutions and emerging constitutional states during the 
Enlightenment relate to the deistic philosophy; modern industrial states rely on agnosticism 
and atheism as belief systems). Thus, claims Schmitt, an analogy exists between the 
metaphysical image of the world elaborated in a specific age and what is considered to be the 
relevant form of political organization.
181
 The scientific goal of the sociology of concepts is 
‘to discover the basic, radically systematic structure and to compare this conceptual structure 
with the conceptually represented social structure of a certain epoch’.182 Further, Schmitt 
provides a comprehensive example of his theoretical framework: the transcendence of God in 
relation to the world is paralleled to the theoretical understanding of the transcendence of the 
sovereign in relation to the state in the 17
th
 and the 18
th
 centuries; in contrast, the period of 
modernity, democratization and industrialization of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries is related to the 
predominance of concepts of immanence, decline of theistic beliefs and acceptance of 
agnosticism and atheism.
183
  
As a general impression, Political Theology is centered on the history of ideas leading 
to the recognition of sovereign political authority in the West and its systematic analogy to the 
theological concepts, developed within the Western Christian tradition.
184
 It remains a book in 
constitutional theory and theory of the state where the theological dimension is limited to 
providing a methodological basis for understanding the legal concepts. In this respect, what is 
important from a theological perspective is the systematic structure of concepts and the 
opportunity to draw analogies and analyze existing correspondence between theological and 
legal concepts. Comprehensive religious doctrines remain beyond the focus of the Schmitt’s 
study.      
It would be wrong to suppose that Schmitt is not interested in theological concepts per 
se. For the most of his life being associated with the conservative Catholic circles, Schmitt 
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openly engages with theological doctrines. Along with his more celebrated Political 
Theology, Schmitt studies the public presence and the political role of the Catholic Church in 
the Western societies.
185
 Decades after his first engagement with political-theological issues, 
Schmitt offers a new insightful study - his Political Theology II.
186
 In this new book, 
completed in 1969 in very different religious (post-Vatican II), intellectual (rising new-left 
and mass civic and student movements) and political (established liberal constitutional 
democracies in Western Europe) context, Schmitt revisits and reinterprets the interaction 
between the realms of politics and theology. In his new study Schmitt reacts to challenges 
raised by his contemporaries by elaborating a staunch defense of the possibility of a genuine 
Christian political theology. This approach is justified as far as Christianity is a public, not an 
escapist and otherworldly religion. Given that Christ in himself relates the divine and the 
human nature, there should be an opportunity to draw a political theology, to seek analogy 
between the divine and the human order.  
There is no doubt, Political Theology II is a book of significant ideas and themes: on 
Christian eschatology and the role of the state as a restraining force (katéchon) with respect to 
the Second Coming of Christ; on Christian theology versus Christian ideology; on judgment, 
authority and legitimacy; engaging with Church history through the prism of Christological 
debates of the first ecumenical Council of Nicaea; on the essence, possibility and necessity of 
Christian political theology and its persuasive defense; on the tensions between the Christian 
gospel and spiritual witness and political regimes with their court intellectuals. The study is 
openly polemical – it criticizes a concept developed by the Roman Catholic theologian Erik 
Peterson who argued against the use of Christianity in legitimizing political regimes and 
openly denounced the possibility of a political theology that remains faithful to the core 
Christian beliefs.
187
  
This conceptual debate – on the nature and possibility of a Christian political theology 
and its use in legitimating political regimes
188
 – is of core relevance to the present study. The 
problem could be summed up in the following question: how could Eastern Orthodoxy 
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contribute to the strengthening of democracy in the SEE societies without slipping into two 
extreme and equally undesirable modes - of the church’s direct political engagement (the 
church being too powerful politically influencing the political agenda) or of the church being 
instrumentalized by the powerful political conjuncture (the church being toо weak to act 
independently). In its millennial history the Eastern Orthodox Church has experienced both 
modes with negative results. However, in the following chapters, it will be demonstrated that 
the Orthodox Church’s conceptual and doctrinal system reveals a potential to develop a more 
personalist and participatory political theology in line with contemporary democratic values 
and principles.    
 
1.2. Schmitt-Peterson debate on the possibility of a Christian political theology 
The public presence of religion in Western societies could be understood in the context 
of Schmitt-Peterson debate. This debate on the possibility of a Christian political theology is 
rich of themes and arguments. Beyond the historical form of this debate - reconstructing the 
imperial political theology in times of Constantine the Great, in fact Schmitt-Peterson 
argument relates to contemporary issues (of the 20
th
 century) which have changed the 
ideological and political landscape at the European Continent. First major sub-theme is the 
rise of the political religion of National Socialism of which Schmitt had been an open 
adherent being directly involved in its intellectual justification and Peterson’s criticism 
against such political and ideological position. Second sub-theme is the Schmitt’s reaction to 
the changing public role of the Roman Catholic Church as an aftermath of the Second Vatican 
Council (1962-1965), its embrace of modernity, opening itself to the ecumenical movement, 
recognizing the value of human rights, civic and lay engagement and the democratic political 
order.  
In his Political Theology II Schmitt argues against Peterson’s view that political 
theology is unacceptable for Christians on a purely theological basis. For Peterson, the 
political theology emphasizing the sovereign decision, in reality justifies authoritarian 
political regimes. The underpinning model of this authoritarian political theology is the idea 
of the supreme and sovereign God which is secularized and transplanted in the political realm 
in the form of the idea of the absolute ruler.  
Peterson objects this form of political theology as questioning the relevance of the 
method of analogy and correspondence of ideas and doctrines between the theological and the 
political spheres. In doing so, Peterson relies on the fundamental Christian doctrine of the 
Holy Trinity which, in his view, prevents against over-simplistic interpretation of theological 
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concepts: the Christian God is not only a sovereign and omnipotent divine ruler, but is also a 
trinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, who exist in love and communion, hence, it 
is both unity and trinity. The result has been that it is impossible to translate this transcendent 
divine reality into simplistic political-theological doctrines, justifying authoritarian rulers. 
  By interpreting the works of the Cappadocian Church Fathers (Gregory of Nazianzen, 
Gregory of Nyssa), Peterson arrives at the conclusion that the idea of the Triune Christian 
God is beyond the natural philosophy typical of paganism and transcends the worldly 
realities. It is impossible to reduce this fundamental Christian belief to either natural or 
political order because it has no parallels in the created world. This, in turn, precludes any 
possibility of analogy between the divine order (unity as trinity) and the earthly political order 
(absolute ruler) and thus renders political theology impossible in Christian terms.
189
 The 
concept of the Christian God as Trinity transcends the one-dimensional political concept of 
monarchy. Moreover, the role of the Church in the history of salvation as an eschatological 
community (‘in this world, but not of the world’) witnessing for the Kingdom of God, could 
in no way be paralleled to the limited existence of the earthly perishable kingdom.        
  From this rather selective presentation of the argument, it is visible that in order to 
counteract the Schmittian fusion between the political and theological, Peterson underlined 
the orthodox Christian doctrine of the Triune God. The Christian doctrine represents God as 
being one in essence, but eternally existing in three distinct, but related persons (hypostases) – 
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, remaining transcendent in nature. In Peterson’s 
words, all human and political reality has to be encountered with eschatological reservation, 
meaning that it remains conditional, never fully reflecting the will of God.
190
 Therefore, any 
political theology, which attempts to justify and perpetuate the created reality based formally 
on Christian ideas, in fact disrespects the God’s transcendence and dishonors his existence. In 
his words  
 
only in Judaism or paganism can something like ‘political theology’ exist. But the Christian 
proclamation of the Triune God is beyond Judaism and paganism, because the mystery of the Trinity only exists 
in the divinity itself, not in the creature. Likewise, the peace that the Christian seeks is not granted by any 
Caesar, but is only a gift by him who is ‘higher than all rationally’.
191
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Further, Peterson explains the formation of the concept of divine monarchy in terms of 
fusion between the Jewish belief in the omnipotent God and the monarchic principle of Greek 
philosophy. These have been integrated into a form of pseudo-Christian political theology to 
serve the ideological needs of the Roman Empire. Peterson insists that political theology may 
exist only in a non-Christian context, while the Trinitarian belief in the Christian God leads to 
‘the theological impossibility of any ‘political theology’.192 
To this theologically founded understanding, Schmitt counter-poses equally valid 
theological argument. Schmitt claims that Christian theology is inherently political because of 
the Incarnation of God. As long as the divine and the human nature are united in the 
personality of the God-man Jesus Christ, the divine order and the earthly political order 
cannot be sharply separated. In fact, in Schmitt’s view, the Council of Nicaea in 325 which 
recognized and highlighted the orthodox Trinitarian doctrine had also rejected any rigid 
separation between religious and political orders. 
 
Peterson wants to uphold the absolute separation between the two domains, but, where the doctrine of 
the Trinity is concerned, an absolute separation would only be possible in the abstract, given that the second 
person of the Godhead represents the perfect unity of the two natures, the human and the divine, and that Mary, 
the biological mother, has given birth to the divine child in a certain place at a certain time in history.
193
  
 
In their attitude towards worldly politics and power-holders lies one of the major 
disagreements between the two scholars. To what extent could the theological beliefs be 
instrumentalized to serve the political conjuncture, to legitimize and conceptualize the 
existing authority or do they serve as a prophetic and eschatological sign of the otherworldly 
Kingdom of God? Is the Christian Church one of the powers of this world, hence endowed 
with the attributes of the temporal authority or is it an eschatological community, a witness 
and foretaste of the Kingdom of Heaven with a mission to transform and change this world 
and the humans according to the image and likeness of God? These opposing views are 
discussed at length in relation to the historical personality of bishop Eusebius of Caesarea, the 
courtly spiritual advisor of Constantine.  
In Peterson’s view, Eusebius, seen as a prolific church historian and sympathizer of 
Arianism, had also been instrumental in elaborating an imperial political-theological 
ideology.
194
 In his writings, Eusebius praised Constantine as a divinely inspired great ruler, 
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equal to the Apostles, external bishop of the Christian Church.
195
 Thus, by applying the idea 
of a divine monarchy to Constantine and the Roman Empire, Eusebius legitimized the 
imperial politics and the emperor’s ambition to dominate even in the religious matters. 
According to Peterson, Eusebius had been an early Christian exponent of the imperial 
political theology, supporter of caesaropapism and the absolute state.
196
 For Peterson, 
however, the imperial political theology had to be dismissed on purely theological grounds as 
contradicting the core Christian teachings. In his view, the orthodox Christian faith as 
confirmed by the Council of Nicaea requires a very clear distinction between the political and 
the theological realms.   
Schmitt interprets the story in a rather different way. Eusebius had not been the 
political propagandist as presented by Peterson. The significance of the Eusebius’ teachings 
should be understood in the context of the Council of Nicaea. What was at stake then 
concerned the fundamental doctrine of the Trinity, especially the relationship between the 
divine Father and the divine Son. The heterodox Arian challenge to the Trinity emphasized 
the difference in nature between the Father and the Son, insisting on the idea that the Son has 
a beginning, being first created by the Father, before the creative act of the universe. To that 
extent, the Son could not be considered of equal rank and of one divine nature with the Father 
(contradicting the Nicene Creed doctrine of ‘consubstantionality’).  
In Schmitt’s view, Eusebius should not be regarded a consistent exponent of Arianism 
given that he had sought a compromise between the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity and the 
idea of difference between the Father and the Son. Eusebius defended, claims Schmitt, that 
the Father and the Son are identical in substance, yet remaining different in their divine 
qualities: the Son is genitum (begotten, not created) and thus subordinate to the Father. 
Eusebius’ subordinationism with respect to the divine nature and qualities of the Son had been 
more moderate teaching compared to Arianism. Understood in this way, the theological 
doctrine of Eusebius rescued the idea of the divine monarchy of the Father that could be 
transferred to the earthly kingdom. In this line of argumentation Schmitt sees the possibility of 
elaborating a Christian political theology based on a specific understanding of the Council of 
Nicaea: to accept the possibility of a political theology one does not need to be heretical or 
heterodox (as the Peterson’s argument suggested).197 In Schmitt’s view, the church council in 
fact supported the idea of ‘the impossibility of any rigid division, in practice, between 
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religious and political motives and goals…Countless church fathers and canonical teachers, 
martyrs and saints throughout the ages have passionately engaged in the political struggles of 
their time because of their Christian convictions’.198  
What have been at the center of this debate is the place of the Church in this world, its 
role and mission, on the one hand, and the proper function of Christian theology in relation to 
power, politics and ideology, on the other. Peterson and Schmitt have elaborated two 
opposing approaches: Peterson defended the eschatological nature of the Church, being ‘in the 
world, but not of the world’, in which one is able to foretaste the coming Kingdom of God; 
Schmitt viewed the Church as an institutional counterpart of the earthly empire, which is 
legitimately utilized for political purpose. While the first account stems from the orthodox 
Trinitarian doctrine and authoritative patristic sources, the second is inspired by the political 
philosophy of ultra-conservatism and authoritarianism, embracing an institutionalized, and yet 
subordinated to the political powers, view of the church. Generally, in terms of paradigms, 
Peterson followed the Augustinian division of ‘two kingdoms’ (‘two cities’), while Schmitt 
emphasized their fusion. For Schmitt, a political theology presupposes a secularized 
understanding of politics, in which the state and the power are the ultimate objects of respect 
and allegiance (not God and the Church). While for Peterson, a political action in a Christian 
perspective is possible only with respect to the ultimate belief in the Triune God and within 
the participation in the glorious Christian liturgy.
199
 In the end, Peterson remained a faithful 
Christian theologian who opposed the abuse with the Church for political purposes and fought 
against the overwhelming political religion of the Nazi regime, while Schmitt allowed his 
understanding of the authoritarian political theology to lead him to support the totalitarian 
state.
200
 
 
1.3. Schmitt on the public role and visibility of the Catholic Church   
To have a more comprehensive understanding of the Schmitt’s approach to political 
theology one needs to consider his other works on the public visibility, presence and the 
political role of the Catholic Church.
201
 In his Roman Catholicism and Political Form Schmitt 
emphasizes the relation of the Catholic Church to the juridical rationality and logic, on the 
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one side, and its internal connection to the political sphere, on the other. Through the 
acceptance of the principle of representation reflected in its internal structure and hierarchy 
the Church relates to the political sphere:  
 
This formal character of Roman Catholicism is based on a strict realization of the principle of 
representation, the particularity of which is most evident in its antithesis to the economic-technical thinking 
dominant today…  
Catholic argumentation is based on a particular mode of thinking whose method of proof is a specific 
juridical logic and whose focus of interest is the normative guidance of human social life… 
This rationalism resides in institutions and is essentially juridical; its greatest achievement is having 
made the priesthood into an office – a very distinctive type of office.
202
  
 
The importance of the concept of representation could be seen in two directions: the 
Church represents the Person of Christ in this world; throughout its history the Church also 
created different representative figures: the pope, the emperor; the monk; the knight.
203
 
Furthermore, in Roman Catholicism Schmitt discovers the relation between the 
political and the theological exemplified in the personal authority exercised by the Pope: 
 
The Pope is not the Prophet but the Vicar of Christ. Such a ceremonial function precludes all the 
fanatical excesses of an unbridled prophetism. The fact that the office is made independent of charisma signifies 
that the priest uphold a position that appears to be completely apart from his concrete personality. …In 
contradistinction to the modern official, his position is not impersonal, because his office is part of an unbroken 
chain linked with the personal mandate and concrete person of Christ.
204
          
 
  In his Political Theology II Schmitt has further developed his earlier formulations 
found in Roman Catholicism: ‘The essay defends the unique political form of the Roman 
Church as the historical and visible representation of Christ … which has three forms of 
public manifestation: as an aesthetical form in great art, as a juridical form in the development 
of cannon law and as a glorious form of power that impacted on the history of the world’.205  
  Schmitt interprets the current role of the Catholic Church in relation to modern politics 
in the industrialized capitalist states in a critical perspective: ‘An alliance of the Catholic 
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Church with the present form of industrial capitalism is not possible. The alliance of throne 
and altar will not be followed by an alliance of office and altar, also not factory and altar.’206 
In his rejection, however, Schmitt remains close to the social realities by claiming that 
‘Catholicism will continue to accommodate itself to every social and political order, even one 
dominated by capitalist entrepreneurs or trade unions and proletarian councils’.207 Such 
accommodation is possible only after new economic forces become political and assume 
political representation.
208
  
  Due to its genuinely political form the Catholic Church is bound to be visible, active 
and publicly present in this world, to receive the attributes of power and glory: ‘In the proud 
history of the Roman Church, the ethos of its own power stands side by side with the ethos of 
justice. It is even enhanced by the Church’s prestige, glory, and honor. The Church 
commands recognition as the Bride of Christ; it represents Christ reigning, ruling and 
conquering. Its claim to prestige and honor rests in the eminent idea of representation’.209   
   With respect to the relation between the political realm and the Catholic Church, 
Schmitt uses the concept ‘complexio oppositorum’, which expresses the Church’s ability to 
engage with different, often contradictory, social and political forces. This is also recognition 
of the internal pluralism of the Catholic doctrine, which provides justification of different 
interpretations and syntheses often contradictory to each other.
210
 One particular dimension of 
this complexio is connected to the juridification of the Catholic Church and doctrine, hence 
relying on formalism, on the one side, and the idea of the personal representation of God in 
the figure of the Pope (as Vicarius Dei), i.e. personalism, on the other. In Schmitt’s view, the 
juridical aspect is the Church’s defining and intrinsic feature. The specific complexio here 
could be identified with ‘a curious mixture of traditional conservatism and revolutionary 
resistance in line with natural law’ which could be found in both Catholicism and secular 
jurisprudence. Catholicism, however, is greater than secular jurisprudence, because ‘it 
represents something other and more than secular jurisprudence – not only the idea of justice 
but also the person of Christ – that substantiates its claim to a unique power and authority. It 
can deliberate as an equal partner with the state, and thereby create new law, whereas 
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jurisprudence is only a mediator of established law.’211 Moreover, the complexio finds 
expression in the history of the Church which presents a variety of conditions of coexistence 
with the secular powers, thus, in different epochs, endorsing different forms of political 
regimes and yet remaining faithful to its core doctrines. 
  In his earlier essay The Visibility of the Church Schmitt grounds the idea of public 
presence and visibility of the Church in the Incarnation of the Word of God, as well as in the 
mediatory role played by the Church. Schmitt emphasizes the classical Christian concept of 
the Church as being in this world, but not of this world. ‘Just as Christ had a real body, so 
must the Church have a real body.’212 Thus, recognition of the Church’s visibility in the world 
remains an important characteristic of the orthodox Christian belief.  
  The Church’s visibility is further realized in the community of believers, in the 
understanding of the Church as a corporate entity and institution with its internal structure, 
hierarchy and offices. Through the institutionalization, juridical continuity, mediation and 
historicity of the Church, Christ is ever present in this world.
213
 In contrast to his Roman 
Catholicism, which is focused on the concept of representation, here Schmitt emphasizes the 
understanding of the Church as a mediator between this world and the Kingdom of God. This 
change in concepts and perspective over several years is significant in terms of accentuating 
the issues related to exercising both spiritual and political power in this world. Representation 
is a more intensive form of presence in this world compared to mere mediation.     
To the extent that different interpretations of the social teaching and political theology 
of the Catholic Church continue to exist, the debate remains open for further consideration 
and argumentation.
214
 The scope of the field of political theology does not completely cover 
contemporary formulations of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. The existence of 
official statements on the social doctrine of the Catholic Church (pastoral constitutions, 
declarations, compendiums) and their elaborate interpretation in the last 50 years does not 
preclude the debate over the genuine political-theological questions.
215
 It is truly significant 
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that in the second half of the 20
th
 century, the Catholic Church has reinterpreted its own 
tradition to provide recognition of the values of human dignity, human rights and democratic 
political order. In its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et 
Spes), adopted at the Second Vatican Council, the Church has proclaimed:  
 
[73.] In our day, profound changes are apparent also in the structure and institutions of peoples. These 
result from their cultural, economic and social evolution. Such changes have a great influence on the life of the 
political community, especially regarding the rights and duties of all in the exercise of civil freedom and in the 
attainment of the common good, and in organizing the relations of citizens among themselves and with respect to 
public authority. 
The present keener sense of human dignity has given rise in many parts of the world to attempts to bring 
about a politico-juridical order which will give better protection to the rights of the person in public life. These 
include the right freely to meet and form associations, the right to express one's own opinion and to profess one's 
religion both publicly and privately. The protection of the rights of a person is indeed a necessary condition so 
that citizens, individually or collectively, can take an active part in the life and government of the state.
216
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See also the following excerpts, emphasizing a genuine social perspective on human existence:    
‘74. Men, families and the various groups which make up the civil community are aware that they 
cannot achieve a truly human life by their own unaided efforts. They see the need for a wider community, within 
which each one makes his specific contribution every day toward an ever broader realization of the common 
good. For this purpose they set up a political community according to various forms. The political community 
exists, consequently, for the sake of the common good, in which it finds its full justification and significance, 
and the source of its inherent legitimacy. Indeed, the common good embraces the sum of those conditions of the 
social life whereby men, families and associations more adequately and readily may attain their own perfection. 
…It follows also that political authority, both in the community as such and in the representative bodies of the 
state, must always be exercised within the limits of the moral order and directed toward the common good - with 
a dynamic concept of that good - according to the juridical order legitimately established or due to be 
established. When authority is so exercised, citizens are bound in conscience to obey. Accordingly, the 
responsibility, dignity and importance of leaders are indeed clear. 
…But where citizens are oppressed by a public authority overstepping its competence, they should not protest 
against those things which are objectively required for the common good; but it is legitimate for them to defend 
their own rights and the rights of their fellow citizens against the abuse of this authority, while keeping within 
those limits drawn by the natural law and the Gospels. 
75. It is in full conformity with human nature that there should be juridico-political structures providing 
all citizens in an ever better fashion and without any discrimination the practical possibility of freely and actively 
taking part in the establishment of the juridical foundations of the political community and in the direction of 
public affairs, in fixing the terms of reference of the various public bodies and in the election of political leaders. 
All citizens, therefore, should be mindful of the right and also the duty to use their free vote to further the 
common good. The Church praises and esteems the work of those who for the good of men devote themselves to 
the service of the state and take on the burdens of this office.’ 
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  Subsequently, in the Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae), the 
Church emphatically defends the equal dignity of all human persons:  
 
[1.] A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the 
consciousness of contemporary man, and the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own 
judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of 
duty. The demand is likewise made that constitutional limits should be set to the powers of government, in order 
that there may be no encroachment on the rightful freedom of the person and of associations. This demand for 
freedom in human society chiefly regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit. It regards, in the 
first place, the free exercise of religion in society.
217
 
 
The official Catholic doctrine, further developed in the Compendium of the Social 
Doctrine of the Church, emphasizes the dignity of the human person and the function of the 
state to promote and safeguard it. Yet the political order should balance the respect of the 
human dignity and the concerns for the common good.
218
 Thus, the contemporary approach to 
the public presence of the Catholic Church is far different from the Schmitt’s understanding 
of political theology, in terms of method, values and principles, and the scope of research.      
In the last decades, the Catholic social thought had to answer the challenges of the 
Catholic groups on the left and their liberation theology which employs a critical approach 
towards secular powers and over-institutionalized religion, engaging with social and voluntary 
                                                          
217
 Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) on the Right of the Person and of Communities to 
Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious, promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI on December 7, 
1965: http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html  (06.05.2014).  
218
 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, trans. Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana (Washington, D.C.: USCCB Publishing, 2005), Chapter 8;  
Michael L. Coulter, ‘Serving the Person through the Political Community: Reflections on Compendium Chapter 
8’, in D. Paul Sullins and Anthoni J. Blasi (eds.), Catholic Social Thought: American Reflections on the 
Compendium (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 101-113, 101:  
‘According to the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, the state and its related political institutions 
exist to serve the human person. The human person is existentially prior to the state and more important than any 
particular political institution. Promoting the dignity of the human person, however, should not be taken to mean 
that the political institutions described exist only to serve the conception of political life that is radically 
individualistic or that only the narrow self-interest of individuals is what matters to political order. The state 
should promote the general concern for the common good. The common good is believed truly to exist …The 
state should work to enable authentic human life – a human life where one can serve God, one’s family, and 
other human beings and where one can have the freedom to exercise one’s talents and have political structures 
that will safeguard those freedoms. Political life is to serve all the elements of civil society, including the family 
and private associations, because those elements serve the authentic good of persons. The political actors do not 
determine the good for human beings; rather political life should help human beings attain the good that can be 
known through reason and revelation and is promoted by the Catholic Church. In this respect, the state is not 
neutral with respect to the good’.   
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service to the poor and the disadvantaged.
219
 Liberation theology has emerged as an answer to 
the Conservative Catholic teaching and practices, which continue to oppose the openness, 
tolerance and engagement with the modern society. These open tensions between more 
progressive groups and ultra-conservatives are still ongoing after the Aggiornamento 
period.
220
 The official Catholic doctrine tries to balance these tendencies and to oppose the 
extremes on both sides. Thus, once again in its historical existence the Catholic Church 
achieves the complexio oppositorum of which Schmitt had been a proponent, while with 
respect to the basic values and concepts the church stays closer to Peterson’s views. 
Nonetheless, of certain political ideologies, moral issues and social tendencies the church 
remains highly critical – it continues to challenge the secular liberalism excessively focused 
on the individual autonomy, privatization of religion and the value neutrality of the state, as 
well as remains critical of materialist and consumerist attitudes. 
Disagreements over the meaning and significance of political theology and of the 
public role and mission of the church are also relevant in the Eastern Orthodox context. 
Before engaging with the Eastern Orthodox perspectives of political theology, a brief 
overview of the understanding and approaches to the issues by different contemporary 
scholars will be presented. 
 
1.4. Contemporary engagements with Schmitt 
Contemporary interpretations of political theology encompass a variety of approaches, 
doctrines and concepts. A recent study of political theology, undertaken by the Egyptologist 
Jan Assman, proposes a revision of the Schmittian approach by suggesting its inversion: ‘the 
significant concepts of theology are theologized political concepts’.221 Depending on the 
interpretation (in the Schmittian or Assmanian perspective) taken as a departing point of the 
analysis, conclusions on the internal connection between the theological and the political 
concepts will be different. Nevertheless, this relation should not express precedence, 
subordination or causality between the two realms, but their mutual recognition and 
interaction.    
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A recent engagement with Schmitt’s concepts, in the context of 21st century pluralist 
liberal democracy, could be found in Paul Kahn’s Political Theology.222 Beyond the 
legitimate political structures of the liberal state, with their focus on the rule of law, human 
rights, social contract, justice, Kahn discovers a sovereign will that could demand human 
sacrifice in the name of defense of an (imaginary) collectivity (the American nation, the 
Homeland). Kahn criticizes the liberal political theory which tends to exclude this dimension 
of sacrifice from its political imagination. He insists that  
 
we must take up the perspective of political theology, for political violence has been and remains a form 
of sacrifice…Liberal theory puts contract at the origins of the political community; political theology puts 
sacrifice at the point of origin. Both contract and sacrifice are ideas of freedom. The former gives us our idea of 
the rule of law, the latter our idea of popular sovereignty. On this difference turns not only the distinction of 
political theory from political theology, but also our understanding of ourselves and of our relationship to the 
political community.
223
  
 
Kahn defends that the liberal principles of the rule of law, civil and political rights and 
the Constitution could inspire people to fight for and make sacrifice (as was the case with the 
American Civil War or the ongoing ‘war on terror’)224. Thus, political theology may serve a 
liberal society by ensuring mobilization in times of crisis, demanding sacrifice in defense of a 
liberal constitutional order established by the popular sovereign - the nation. 
On the meaning of political theology, Kahn fully embraces the secularization thesis 
elaborated in the Schmitt’s work, centered on the concept of sovereignty: ‘not the 
subordination of the political to religious doctrine and church authority, but recognition that 
the state creates and maintains its own sacred space and history’; ‘Political theology argues 
that secularization, as the displacement of the sacred from the world of experience, never 
won, even though the church may have lost. The politics of the modern nation-state indeed 
rejected the church but simultaneously offered a new site of sacred experience’.225 This new 
sacred experience is found in the popular sovereign ‘as a collective, transtemporal subject in 
which all participate. It is the mystical corpus of the state, the force of ultimate meaning for 
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citizens. The poplar sovereign can always demand a life; it can demand of citizens that they 
kill and be killed for the state’.226 
In Kahn’s account, political theology does not prescribe a particular ideological 
understanding of justice, it does not substitute authoritarian for liberal views on justice. Rather 
political theology provides insights on the role of the sacred and the sacrifice in the political 
life of the nation. ‘If the political order maintains both an idea of the sacred and an idea of 
justice, of sovereignty and law, then the point of political theology is not to undermine a 
particular concept of justice but to expand the horizon within which we understand the 
operation of the political imagination. Liberal politics may strive to achieve a defensible idea 
of justice, even as liberal theory fails as an explanation of the source and character of political 
experience’.227  
With his interpretation of the meaning of political theology with respect to the liberal 
constitutional state, Kahn offers insights on the importance of shared values and experience 
for the political community. His views challenge the accepted liberal paradigm of the value 
neutrality of the liberal state, justifying the need to defend and preserve fundamental values of 
the community (sometimes at the cost of sacrifice). 
 
1.5. Multiple interpretations of political theology  
Despite the modern use of the term, political theology is not a modern phenomenon. 
Its ideological roots can be traced to the ancient world. As it is exemplified with the Schmitt-
Peterson debate, in the times of the Roman Empire, both in its pagan and Christian periods, 
specific forms of political theology had been elaborated. The imperial political theology had 
served the need to strengthen the sense of community and common identity. Moreover, 
specific forms of political theology could be traced back to the ancient Greek cities, as well as 
to the ancient Egypt. In each case, political theology had been an integral part of the political 
form of government – as a ritual, as an ideology, as a popular form of civil religion.             
Studying different sources, Schmitt presents the form of government of a Greek polis 
as a community organized on the basis of a particular cult. In this context, political theology is 
understood as a part of the nomos (a fundamental law of any social organization) and as a 
building element of the public sphere. Its social function is to provide the conditions for a 
political identity related to the traditions, customs and beliefs of the community. Through the 
public rites and ceremonies it connects the past with the present generations and ensures the 
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continuity of the political community. In this respect, political theology is viewed as a 
constitutive condition for the political organization of the ancient city-state.
228
  
Recognizing the significance of interaction between politics and religion in the ancient 
polis Jean-Luc Nancy emphasizes another important dimension.
229
 He begins with the idea 
that the very existence of the polis depended on its differentiation from the forms of theocratic 
rule: politics ends where theocracy begins. The predominance of religion over politics 
challenges the very existence of the political realm. The encompassing nature of religion has a 
potential to constitute a community alternative and parallel to the state and thus to consume 
the political sphere. This understanding leads Nancy to emphasize the idea of the separation 
between church and state as a vital precondition for the presence of the political. The principle 
of autonomy is essential for the political realm and presupposes rather limited space of 
religion in a society.  
In regard to civil (political) religion, however, Nancy recognizes its place and role in 
the constitution of the political realm. Thus, civil religions of Athens or Rome, uniting 
juridico-political and religious elements, peacefully co-exist with the political without being 
in constant tension. For instance, the Roman model of civil religion is exemplary for the 
overlapping and interrelated functioning of the legal-institutional and political order with the 
religious order. The integrating role of the Roman civil religion was most visible in the fact 
that the chief-magistrate was endowed with a religious function, he was a pontifex maximus. It 
could be maintained, therefore, that certain forms of religion (namely civil religion and 
political theology) remain closely linked to the essence of the political without necessarily 
leading to theocracy that destructs the political. Within the political domain, the religious 
could exist and remain vital to the extent it serves the political collectivity. This understanding 
allows a space for civil religion and political theology in the public sphere of the state, while 
limits the space for religion which remains faithful to its eschatological perspectives.  
In regard to the role of Christianity Nancy follows the classical Augustinian model of 
a conceptual division between church and state. Christian ekklesia is a form of a separate 
community, which is not tied to the political and the social order.  Christianity, in his view, 
elaborates the idea of the two kingdoms, two laws, two cities, thus signifying deep and 
inherent separation between the political and the religious. In this respect, the religious could 
not dissolve itself into the political. Christian community remains substantial and holistic; 
similarly, the state grounds its existence on the concepts of national unity and popular 
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sovereignty. Christianity separates religion and politics ontologically, yet ‘it constitutes the 
religious itself on the political model of the kingdom or the city’.230 On the other side, the 
construction of the political relies on the secular concept of sovereignty and endorses a civil 
religion that will engage the hearts, not only the minds of the citizens.      
Nowadays, claims Nancy, the foundational principle of separation between church and 
state is shaken. The two kingdoms not only resist each other, they attempt to dominate and 
overcome one another. In contemporary Christian context the distinction between these two 
kingdoms, two cities and two laws (legal and prophetic) remains important, and yet, there 
should be an understanding of the impossibility of their complete separation. Nonetheless, the 
church-state relations remain a rather complex phenomenon, of mutual resistance, of co-
existence in tension.
231
 By recognizing the political nature of both the church and the state, 
and employing Augustinian concepts, Nancy’s understanding does not follow Schmitt’s view 
of the political as the exclusive domain of the sovereign state. 
An impressive study of contemporary political-theological themes and concepts, 
creatively engaging with the Schmitt-Peterson debate, is presented by the Italian philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben.
232
 His genealogical inquiry of the origin of political power is undertaken in 
the light of Trinitarian Christian beliefs, revealing the aspects of transcendence and 
immanence of the Triune God. He parallels the doxological, acclamative and liturgical 
dimensions of both governmental power and religion.  
Engaging with the Schmitt-Peterson debate, Agamben follows Peterson in 
accentuating the public character of the Church (ekklesia) and Christian worship, particularly 
liturgical rites. Peterson emphasizes the public nature of liturgy, which is also deducible from 
the etymological meaning of the word – a ‘public service’. The Christian ekklesia, in 
Peterson’s words, is ‘the assembly of citizens of the celestial city with full rights, that gather 
together to carry out acts of worship’. It is visible that Augustinian themes and concepts as the 
‘city of God’ and celestial citizenship of believers dominate Peterson’s thinking of the public 
politico-religious nature of the Church. The Christian people (laos) taking part in the service, 
is united in ekklesia, a community of the faithful. Given the relation between the public 
institutional and the legal spheres, Peterson interprets laos and ekklesia as having truly public 
and juridical capacity. This relation is further developed with Peterson’s claim that popular 
acclamations (axios, amen, dignum et iustum est, nika, vincas) in some cases have a juridical 
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value and role, according to Roman public law.
233
 Thus, common to both political ceremonies 
and liturgical celebration, acclamations emphasize the juridical function of the people in the 
Church, expressing genuine popular consensus. By using acclamations, the Christian laos 
assents and confirms the public spiritual reality created and represented in the liturgy. To be 
truly a laos, to have a public and juridical capacity, the Christian people needs to be present 
directly, participating in the liturgical act. The Christians become laos to the extent that they 
participate.  
  What is decisive in Agamben’s interpretation of Peterson is the focus on the Church as 
a public body in its own right. Peterson rejects the political-theological interpretation of the 
Christian faith in a specific sense (political subservience and instrumentalization), while 
upholding the public politico-religious character of the Church. Peterson insists on the parallel 
between the earthly kingdom with its imperial ceremonial and the celestial kingdom where 
Christ solemnly reigns. The apolitical multitude (ochlos) becomes the Christian people (laos) 
through the public action and celebration of the liturgy. Having politico-religious nature, in no 
way is the Church dependent on the secular authorities. The publicity of the Church is 
different from the concept of the political confined within the secular domain. The public 
nature of the Church is present as long as both the angels and the faithful, the members of the 
visible Church and the citizens of the celestial city (saints and angels) are united in the liturgy 
singing the song of praise to God. In Agamben’s account, Peterson’s theology liberates the 
Church from any form of secular dominance or political-theological reduction.
234
    
In his study, Agamben also reconstructs and contra-distinguishes two interrelated 
paradigms, both based on Christian theology. The first is political theology which connects 
the concept of sovereignty to the belief in a single God; the second, economic theology (from 
Greek term oikonomia - economy, ordering of a household), which is focused on the 
immanent ordering, administering a household in both divine and human form.
235
 Related to 
these paradigms are two different types of activity: on the one side, the ordering and 
administration of a household (oikia), later associated with the life of the Church as a 
community; on the other, the governance of the city (polis), hence politics.
236
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It is noteworthy, in the process of development of Christian doctrine, the meaning of 
economy becomes more theological and more nuanced: it signifies the internal composition of 
the Triune God and the harmonious relations between the divine persons, yet preserving the 
unity of God; along with that, oikonomia is used to refer to the providential divine plan of 
salvation in eschatological perspective. In the works of the Church Fathers, the meaning of 
oikonomia embraces the process of revelation and salvation, of divine love and care to the 
humans and the world, based on the Scriptural readings: ‘For God so loved the world that He 
gave His only begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him should not perish but have 
everlasting life’ (John 3:16). Namely this represents the ‘economy of the Savior’ as a real 
historical event, not as a spiritual myth. 
Further, in the Byzantine canon law oikonomia is explained and applied with two 
meanings: first, it is associated with the Incarnation of the divine Logos and the process of 
salvation; second, it is viewed as a form of purposeful exception and mitigation in the 
application of a rigid canon rule at the face of the weak state of the believer and in the name 
of his salvation (thus opposing the legalistic views on retribution and severe punishment).
237
     
In the contemporary Western political theology the concepts of ‘economic trinity’ 
(trinity of revelation) and ‘immanent trinity’ (trinity of substance) are related. In a certain 
way, claims Agamben, the economic trinity is determined by the immanent trinity, which has 
a foundational role. The former is based on the understanding of God as interacting with 
humans within the process of revelation and salvation, the latter emphasizes the inner life of 
the divine essence. Thus, the ontology and theology of divine essence (immanent trinity) exist 
along with the praxis and economy of divine care for the world (economic trinity). To the 
immanent trinity corresponds the reality of the Kingdom, while to the economic trinity – the 
sphere of government. In spite of their differentiation, the two trinities unite in mutual praise 
and glorification: ‘The economy glorifies being, as being glorifies economy’.238  
This understanding of substantive connection and distinction at the same time could be 
exemplified with the antinomic theological formulae of the Nicene Creed. According to the 
formulae, the Father and of the Son remain distinct persons (with specific personal qualities 
and attributes), and yet consubstantial (united in nature): ‘We believe in one God, the Father 
Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord 
Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only-begotten, begotten of the Father before all ages. Light 
of Light; true God of true God; begotten, not made; of one essence with the Father, by whom 
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all things were made’. Likewise, distinct, but not divided, rather united in glory, is the image 
of the Kingdom (the immanent trinity, the divine essence and life) and the Government (the 
economic trinity, the salvific action of God in the world).   
According to Agamben, the common nexus between the religious and the political is 
Glory, ‘in its dual aspect, divine and human, ontological and economic, of the Father and the 
Son, of the people-substance and the people-communication’.239 Glory is also directly 
connected with acclamations, ceremonies, liturgies and insignia which both religion and 
politics share. For Agamben ‘the theology of glory constitutes, in this case, the secret point of 
contact through which theology and politics continuously communicate and exchange parts 
with one another’.240 The domain of glory has contemporary projections in modern 
democracies where the media play a decisive role in the political process and the formation of 
public opinion. ‘Contemporary democracy is a democracy that is entirely founded upon glory, 
that is, on the efficacy of acclamation, multiplied and disseminated by the media beyond all 
imagination.’241 Thus, acclamations and glorification connect the religious and the political 
realms in their ancient and modern forms alike.  
The analogy and correspondence between the spheres of religion and politics is most 
visible in the acts of public performance of rituals and liturgies. This field is systematically 
studied by Ernst Kantorowicz who explored the role of liturgical acclamations in the Middle 
Ages as an expression of medieval political theology.
242
 In his Laudes Regiae, Kantorowicz 
uncovers the history of the liturgical acclamation ‘Christus vincit, Christus regnat, Christus 
imperat’ by tracing its origin to the Gaul-Frankish Church in the 8th century. This acclamation 
had been gradually accepted in the Western Church and is significant with its reflexive 
content – it consists of both liturgical and political verses. God, angels and saints are praised 
alongside the emperor and the pontiff, the emperor is paralleled to Christ, the earthly kingdom 
– to the Kingdom of God. Thus, it is exemplary for the formation of a medieval political 
theology.
243
    
   Furthermore, as a form of direct interaction between the temporal and the spiritual 
realm, Kantorowicz studies the gradual development in the Western tradition of the rite of 
royal anointment from the 8
th
 century onwards. He observes that the role of the Church in the 
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imperial ceremonial had increased significantly with the coronation ceremony of Pepin and 
Charlemagne. This ritual included blessing and approval by the Church as well as 
acclamations (Laudes) to express the assent of the Church and of God to the royal investiture. 
Meanwhile, the rise of the clerical function in the coronation ceremony led to limiting the role 
played by the people. With this development the process of royal investiture had become an 
integral part of the liturgical and ecclesiastical domain. The initial requirement of popular 
assent during the investiture ceremony had been transformed into a liturgical role of 
pronouncing acclamations. The fundamental role in the ceremony had been reserved for the 
Church and the clergy: ‘The acclamation as a constitutive and legal act on the part of the 
people was supplemented by ecclesiastico-legal act, namely by an acclamation on behalf of 
the Church. This was precisely the function of the laudes at the coronation: they represent the 
sanction and assent of the acclaiming Church’. Further, in the evolving ritual, the role of the 
assenting people had been separated from the liturgical act, which had remained under the 
administration of the Church. The popular assent had to be given at an earlier stage, while the 
decisive part of the ceremony had been to invest the king with the legitimate power mandated 
by God via his Church so that he may become Deo coronatus – thus his power being limited 
and subordinated to the Church.
244
  
A comparison with the Byzantine tradition of coronation ceremony of the same period 
would reveal a clear distinction between the constitutive acclaim of the senate, army and the 
people (in Byzantium) and the liturgical acclamation as an act of recognition of the legitimate 
authority of the king (in the Western tradition). The latter, though not of a constitutive nature 
(with one important exception – the coronation ceremony of Charlemagne), had been 
considered of high importance expressing the public and solemn assent made by the whole 
Church.
245
 
The study of the interrelated juridical, political and religious aspects of acclamations 
with respect to the coronation ceremonies presents an important dimension of the medieval 
political theology. In his illuminating book The King’s Two Bodies, Kantorowicz reveals the 
deep meaning of and interrelation between political and theological concepts. Kantorowicz 
relates some fundamental theological doctrines – such as the two natures (human and divine) 
and two bodies (natural and mystical) of Christ – with emerging corporatist and organic 
doctrines with respect to the Church and their transfer to the theory of the state. The doctrine 
of the corpus mysticum of the Church had been applied to the secular political entities. 
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Likewise, the allegiance owed to the Church had become a political obligation to be loyal to 
the state and to defend it in times of crisis. The powerful analogy between the Church and the 
state continues with respect to the ‘governance’ of each of these bodies. The logic of this 
analogy goes as follows: as the Church is the mystical body of Christ, the divine head of the 
Church, who is eternal in his divine glory, the mystical body of the king is also immortal as 
long as he is the head of the body politic. Given that the body politic is based on eternal 
values - Grace of God, Justice and Law, to the extent the king respects and remains faithful to 
these values, his perpetuity as the head of the body politic is secured.
246
  
The parallel interpretation of theological concepts along with political doctrines leads 
to different understandings of the nature and origin of the imperial power. The traditional 
medieval forms of theo-political interpretation oscillate between the ‘liturgical kingship’ 
related to the God-man Jesus Christ and the kingship centered on God the Father. The first 
concept assigns a specific role of the king as a mediator between heaven and earth, centered 
on the psychological dimension of power, the second concept accentuates the hierarchical 
juristic notion of government.
247
 
 This type of political theology centered on the medieval concepts and doctrines to the 
larger extent remains outside current trends and tendencies. Though it might have inspired 
political-theological syntheses in other periods, nowadays it does not connect to the 
contemporary political context in democratic societies. In this specific context, not 
monarchical concepts (divine or temporal), but the notions of active participation and 
involvement are more likely to occupy the center of political-theological studies.  
     
1.6. Civic participation and political theology in the Western Christian context 
In the last decade leading religious scholars have engaged with the participatory 
dimension of the Christian political theology. Grounding their studies on the Augustinian 
concept of Two Cities, they elaborate on the ideas of citizenship (celestial and earthly) and 
participation.
248
 It is important that their political-theological accounts could be reconciled 
with the values and principles of liberal democracy, and could be viewed as opening a 
transcendental perspective to the secular political forms.  
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In these studies, participatory perspective is centered on ecclesia and endorses 
Christian practices which favor a democratic polity. Eschatological perspective in the Church 
creates a free space in which democratic practices could emerge and develop. Civic 
participatory perspective is even more evident in the works of Charles Mathewes and Eric 
Gregory.
249
 Both Gregory’s civic liberalism and Mathewes’ civic republicanism250 draw on 
the Augustinian concepts and emphasize the idea that human beings are created for love and 
participation, to live in communion with God and the others. Being a Christian means 
participating in ecclesia, but also practicing engagement and love in other interactions with 
the world, including the political sphere.
251
  
Mathewes emphasizes a particular dimension of politics that should be viewed in the 
perspective of struggling for and anticipating communion with others and with God. The 
sphere of politics and the communion in ecclesia could not be fully identified, though they 
should not be fully separated either. Christian attitude to politics and the public sphere is that 
of an ‘ascetical citizenship’ according to which others are to be recognized, trusted and 
engaged, their dignity and uniqueness fully respected.
252
 
‘Ascetical citizenship’, in Mathewes’ view, presupposes a form of democratic polity 
that is participatory, civic republican. Civic republicanism is different from liberalism, which 
is focused on negative freedoms, the institutional side of checks and balances and limited 
government. It is also different from communitarianism, which tends to accept an organic or 
holistic view on society and social cohesion. Civic republicans consider not only the 
importance of collective identity and the common good, but also recognize the need of 
attaining and practicing political virtue, the value and role of individual participation. Civic 
engagement and participation have a liberating and educating function by enhancing the 
citizens’ autonomy and making them better and vigilant members of the society opposing the 
concentration of state power. However, civic republicans remain preoccupied with the secular 
political order, often emphasizing absolute commitment and loyalty to the republic and the 
community, while liberals properly warn against holistic approaches.
253
   
All three paradigms – liberal, communitarian and civic republican, should face certain 
constraints in order to be fully compatible with the Christian views. ‘Christians can take from 
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civic republicanism its affirmation of civic participation as the primary public good, its 
suspicion of all attempts at political closure, and its insistence that explicitly political 
structures are fundamentally secondary to and derivative of what politics is really about – 
namely, civic participation.’254       
  The alternative offered by Mathewes is ‘Christian republicanism’, ‘theology of 
citizenship’ that is freed from the immanentist and radical connotations found in the secular 
civic republicanism.
255
    
 
Public engagement should be faithfully undertaken, given certain minimal conditions, as part of the 
larger mode of ascetical and evangelical engagement with the world today. But such engagement teaches us that 
political institutions must not be the object of ultimate faith, and so should be affirmed only in a qualified way. 
Yet they must be so affirmed, again on grounds of faith, in order to encourage citizens both to be genuinely 
engaged and also to recognize the ‘‘mundaneness’’ of any particular political dispensation. But we cannot speak 
only in a civic register. We need a properly theological argument for why such civic engagement is good for 
faith, on its own terms – why, that is, such engagement is ascetically as well as civically fruitful. We need a 
theology of public engagement, a theology of citizenship – a vision of the relationship between Christians’ 
commitments to their earthly polities and to the kingdom of heaven.
256
  
 
Relating Christianity and public engagement inspired by the Augustinian tradition, 
Mathewes insists that ‘Christianity does not suggest that its adherents keep the faith by 
withdrawing from civic engagement, but by engaging more fully in it – more precisely, 
through a kind of civic engagement that is sensitive to how life in this polity allows and/or 
hinders Christians’ fundamental activity, the worship of God with their lips and in their 
lives.’257 
This participatory political-theological account corresponds in many ways to the issues 
and perspectives of the present study. In the next chapters, the participatory dimensions of the 
Eastern Orthodox theology and liturgical practice will be developed accentuating the public 
role of ecclesia and Eucharist.  
 
2. Political theology in contemporary Eastern Christian thought 
After highlighting some contemporary interpretations of political theology, following 
sections will engage with the Eastern Christian perspectives on the subject. The last section 
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will present institutional views of the Orthodox churches in relation to fundamental political 
concepts and values (democracy, freedom, human rights, justice) as well as their official 
positions on socio-political issues.  
Some of the approaches presented here, including the Schmitt-Peterson debate on the 
political usage of the Church and Christian theology, resonate in contemporary Eastern 
Orthodox engagements with political theology. Thus, the debates on the imperial political 
theology in times of Constantine and on the secular political theology of the nation-states 
(focused on the popular sovereignty), presented in the first section, could be related to the 
political-theological models of symphonia and the Christian Nation, elaborated and practiced 
in the Eastern Orthodox context. In this respect, the general purpose of the next sections is to 
outline the contours of a participatory political theology, based on the Eastern Christian 
concepts and practices. 
          It should be taken into account that the term ‘political theology’ has been in use in the 
contemporary Orthodox Christian scholarship, though not with the meaning suggested by 
Schmitt in his 1922 study (analogy and correspondence between the political and theological 
concepts with regards to their systematic structure). Scholars of Eastern Orthodoxy often use 
the term in a broader sense to describe interactions and mutual influences between the 
religious and the political spheres and to present theological perspectives on political and 
social issues. For the contemporary Eastern Christian political theology doctrines of the 
Trinity and Incarnation underpin the understanding of the nature of the Church (ecclesiology) 
and personhood (Christian anthropology). Political-theological meaning of communion, 
personhood and participation is revealed through the prism of Eucharistic ecclesiology and 
the conciliar nature of ecclesia.  
In the following section, contributions from Eastern Orthodox theologians and 
scholars who openly engage with these issues and concepts as well as relate them to the 
broader political and social context will be highlighted. In order to distinguish among 
different traditions and directions of the contemporary political-theological thinking the 
scholars that will be presented express different views: conservative, liberal, progressive, 
participatory.  
 
2.1. John Zizioulas on Eucharistic ecclesiology and Christian personalism  
One of the most significant contributions to the contemporary Orthodox theology 
belongs to Metropolitan John Zizioulas (Ecumenical Patriarchate). He develops a form of 
Christian personalism and emphasizes the importance of participation and communion in 
132 
 
ecclesia. His theological studies and conceptualizations are of primary importance for the 
present study. Though not developing a political-theological system per se, his understanding 
of Eucharistic ecclesiology is underlying the participatory political theology elaborated here.     
In his scholarship Zizioulas underpins that the person is a relational being, not an 
autonomous egocentric individual separated from others and from God. Zizioulas’ 
anthropology is based on his understanding of the nature of God as Trinity. As long as human 
being is created in the image and likeness of God who is Trinity, existing in communion and 
love of divine persons of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, so the only possible mode of 
human existence is being as communion.
258
  
Moreover, this communion is fully realized in the event of the Eucharist and ecclesia, 
thus emphasizing the core dimension of participation in the Orthodox understanding of the 
person and community. In his studies, Zizioulas underlies the uniqueness, irreducibility and 
the freedom of the person as a relational being. Likewise, communion and otherness are 
constitutive for the understanding of the Trinity, and have projections in Orthodox 
anthropology and ecclesiology: 
  
God is not first one and then three, but simultaneously one and three. His oneness or unity is 
safeguarded not by the unity of substance, as St Augustine and other Western theologians have argued, but by 
the monarchia of the Father, who himself is one of the Trinity. It is also expressed through the unbreakable 
koinonia that exist between the three persons, which means that otherness is not a threat to unity but a sine qua 
non condition of it.  
 
Otherness is not a quality of the person, but the ontological way of existence of the 
person (‘We cannot tell what each person is; we can only say who he is.’). Understanding God 
as Trinity indicates relationship and communion: 
 
Father, Son and Spirit are all names indicating relationship. No person can be different unless he is 
related. Communion does not threaten otherness; it generates it.  
 
The Christian way of relating human persons to each other is also modeled after the divine 
being and his interaction with the world.  
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Since the Son of God moved to meet the other, his creation, by emptying himself through the kenosis of 
the Incarnation, the ‘kenotic’ way is the only one that befits the Christian in his or her communion with the other 
– be it God or one’s ‘neighbour’.259 
 
Transferring the Trinitarian concept to the field of anthropology, Zizioulas draws some 
important theses. First, relationship is constitutive of personhood, which presupposes 
uniqueness and communion at the same time (‘The person is otherness in communion and 
communion in otherness’). Second, ‘personhood is inconceivable without freedom’, including 
as the most important the freedom to be yourself (‘This means that a person is not subject to 
norms and stereotypes; a person cannot be classified in any way; a person’s uniqueness is 
absolute. This finally means that only a person is free in the true sense’). This freedom is not 
negative (from), but rather positive (for) – ‘freedom for the other’. Freedom is realized in 
love, not in isolation and protection of a private sphere. Third, personhood is creativity; it is ‘a 
movement of affirmation of the other’. Zizioulas parallels creation as a free act of grace and 
love to the act of communion with the other in the Church.
260
 Hence, personhood is not 
understood in simplistic essentialist categories, it is not a product of philosophical 
speculation, it is a matter of experience: being precedes essence.
261
  
The relevance of Zizioulas’ theology to the public sphere and participation could be 
seen when turning to his ecclesiology. Communion, relationship, participation are defining 
features here as well. His understanding of the Church as a community of persons is based on 
the defining and constituting role of the Eucharist for the Body of Christ (Eucharistic 
ecclesiology).
262
 Thus not the institutional or organizational aspect of the Church, but rather 
the communal, relational, transformational aspects of the community of persons in the 
Eucharist, is what constitute the true Church.  
The Eucharist constitutes the Church as an assembly of the faithful, representing the 
resurrected Body of Christ. This is not simply historical, but an eschatological event – 
participation in the Eucharist transcends all limits and divisions, social or natural, elevating a 
particular assembly of different people to the People of God. Thus, Christian eschatology 
introduces a present-future modality, a promise of the future realization of that unity that acts 
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back to unite the faithful in community now. The Eucharist is understood as an event of 
divine-human communion in Christ, which relates to the communion of the divine persons of 
the Trinity.
263
           
Zizioulas’ understanding of the relational and communal being of the person and of 
the importance of participatory dimension of the Church and the Trinity
264
 relying on personal 
uniqueness, freedom, and otherness has projections in political imagination. It is indeed a 
legitimate question what would a political community look like if these basic presuppositions 
are transferred from the field of theology and ecclesiology to the field of politics. In a rather 
short essay on the issue, Zizioulas frames his answer in a way to emphasize the role of human 
dignity and human rights in structuring a just political order:  
 
people all have the same value and same rights because they themselves represent unique and 
unrepeatable identities for those with whom they are in personal relationship. Therefore, the law is obligated to 
respect and protect everyone, regardless of one’s characteristics, because every man bears a relational identity, 
and with that, is a unique and unrepeatable person.
265
  
 
Having said this, Zizioulas draws a clear distinction between the political community 
which relies on and exercises coercion against non-obeying individuals, and the Church which 
is built on the communion of persons in freedom, mutual respect and recognition, and love. 
As far as the law and the legal and political system respect human dignity and reflect a 
concept of justice, they remain legitimate. Neither just law, nor legitimate political 
community could be equated with the relations and the nature of the ecclesial and Eucharistic 
community which remain voluntary and non-coercive, built on love, not on the fear from 
coercion.
266
 The political-theological application of Zizioulas’ system emphasizes the values 
of equality of all human beings, respect for human dignity, personal uniqueness, and 
participation. 
Nevertheless, emphasizing freedom, communion and participation, personal 
worthiness, Zizioulas frames significant principles and criteria that might be used by the 
Orthodox Christians in order to determine the quality of a legal system and political 
community. Projected to the public sphere, these principles and values could frame a political 
order that corresponds to some basic liberal principles. In elaborating such correspondence 
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between the theological and the political, one may find similarities between forms of 
democracy with enhanced civic participation (participatory democracy) and the qualities of 
the Christian community assembled around the church and the Eucharist.  
 
2.2. Christos Yannaras and Christian communitarianism 
  Among the first Orthodox scholars to engage openly with political-theological issues, 
defending rather conservative and traditionalist views, is the Greek religious philosopher 
Christos Yannaras. He views political theology in the Western context as representing a 
synthesis between contemporary progressive theological thinking and the neo-Marxist 
ideology (e.g. liberation theology). This kind of political theology uses the Bible as a 
blueprint of social and political activism, discovering in the text sociopolitical symbols and 
messages.
267
 This politization of the Bible results in a constant tension between the 
transcendent and the immanent understanding of the faith and reveals the process of 
secularization of faith: ‘Therefore, being a Christian today means above all else to engage in 
an active opposition to social injustice and political oppression. A demonstration is a 
“cultural” [cultic] act, a revolutionary poster is a symbol of the faith, and unity in political 
action is the new form of ecclesial communion’.268   
To this understanding, Yannaras counter-poses his conservative views and attempts to 
reconstruct a distinct meaning of political theology in Eastern Orthodox context. In doing so, 
he imagines an idealized past, and uses this utopian image to evaluate and judge present 
socio-political realities. Yannaras also grounds his political-theological ideas on the Christian 
teaching of the human nature created in the image of God, and considers the God-human 
relations through the Trinitarian perspective.  
Yannaras recognizes the public character of the church which has to be interpreted in 
relation to the idea of divine city. The true polis and politics, he argues, need to be found on 
the ‘power of love’ and the communion of people. The Church has to be understood in terms 
of being both a city of divine-human interaction as well as a community of persons.  
 
Politics can be considered as a chapter of theology - a true “political theology” - when it takes upon 
itself serving man according to his nature and his truth; and consequently serving the political nature of humanity 
- i.e., the power of love, which is at the heart of existence and which is the condition of the true communion of 
persons, the true city, the true polis. 
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The image of the Church is a city, a polis, ‘the holy city, new Jerusalem, which descends from heaven’ 
(Rv 21:2), an icon of the Trinity, a communion of persons and city of saints, an organic unity of the body of the 
faithful, where the first and the last, the sinners and the saints, are united to one another in a “co-inherence of 
love,” a fullness where they are mutually surrounded in love.269 
 
In his understanding of a Christian political theology, Yannaras emphasizes both the 
importance of communion and participation modelled after the relations between divine 
persons in the Holy Trinity. The public function of political theology is also defined: ‘Political 
theology may then play the part played by prophecy - to incarnate the critical and radical 
irruption of truth in actual periods of historical life’.270   
Though this understanding of the Church and the importance of personal communion 
and participation is in line with the core Orthodox teachings, it remains unclear how it could 
be transplanted into the public sphere of modern pluralist societies. At best, it could be 
practiced at the parochial level of the church, within communities with deep cohesion and 
common understanding of faith and values. Thus, Yannaras’ political-theological approach 
remains overtly conservative and communitarian, challenging and criticizing the Western 
values and socio-political models.   
Another dimension of Yannaras’ concept of political theology is the overemphasis on 
the distinction and contradiction between the Western Christian and the Eastern Orthodox 
perspectives. To his idealized version of Orthodox Christian communitarianism Yannaras 
counter-poses the hierarchical formalist class structures of the Western societies. On the 
Orthodox side, he only sees the dynamic life and freedom of the Eucharistic community 
which values the personal freedom of its members. On the Western side, he only sees 
determinism, dominance and materialism. Both pictures, however, are incorrect and do not 
correspond to the socio-political realities.  
 The positive image of the Orthodox community Yannaras discovers in the social 
dynamism of the Byzantine tradition and oikoumene. The negative Western image, he relates 
to the medieval feudal system of the Western societies. He develops a rather ideological view 
emphasizing the Eastern Orthodox developments in terms of ideas and social forms. He 
favors the predominance of interpersonal communal relations over the formal and juridical 
ones that had been preserved by the Orthodox population under the Ottoman rule. All local 
communal institutions as well as the liturgical community have been sensitive to personal 
uniqueness and fellowship. This contributed to the preservation of a distinctive Orthodox 
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social life centered on personal relations and shared common values and experience. The 
spiritual center of this whole participatory ethos has been the local parish church and 
community.
271
  
As have been noted recently, such constructions of the distinctions between the 
Christian East and the Christian West have been misleadingly exaggerated.
272
 The historical 
processes leading to the separation between the Christian East and the Christian West have 
been too complex to be simplified in clear-cut models and distinctions. Their relations could 
not be presented exclusively in terms of opposition, mutual exclusion and hostility. It is well-
documented that along with periods of struggle and conflict, there have been periods of 
rediscovering similarities, intensive cultural exchange and attempts of reunification.      
Another problematic aspect of Yannaras’s political-theological view is his criticism of 
human rights and political liberalism. In his approach, both rights and liberalism are based 
upon false notions of individual autonomy and secularism. He grounds both concepts in the 
rationalism, relativism and agnosticism of the Enlightenment, understood as rejecting the 
Christian roots of the ideas of personal dignity and freedom. Yannaras justifies his opposition 
and criticism of human rights with the fundamental distinction between the theology of the 
Greek Cappadocian Fathers of the Eastern Church who emphasized the notion of deification 
and divine-human communion (theosis) and the Western Christian tradition from Augustine 
onwards which accentuates difference and autonomy from God. Against the egocentrism of 
the western tradition Yannaras counter-poses the community-oriented ethos found in the 
Orthodox understanding of the person as relational being and in the communal nature of 
Christian ecclesia.
273
 He parallels Christian ecclesia to the ancient Greek polis where a true 
community is constituted:  
 
In the ancient Greek “assembly of people”, Greek citizens did not assemble primarily to discuss, judge 
and take decisions, but mainly to constitute, concretize and reveal the city (the way of life “according to the 
truth”). In the same way, Christians would not assemble primarily to pray, worship, and be catechized but mainly 
to constitute, concretize and reveal, in the Eucharistic dinner, the way of life “according to the truth”, 
incorruptibility and immortality: not the imitation of the secular “logic”, but of the Trinitarian Society of 
Persons, the society which constitutes the true existence and life, because “He is Life” (1 John 4:16)…Being a 
participant and a member of the body of the Church means that one exist only in order to love and be loved – a 
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situation far from any need for, or expectation of, self-protection through legislation would be “mandatory for 
all”.274    
 
Yannaras continues to draw easy distinctions between the Eastern Christian and the 
Western understanding of the person, church and democracy. In his understanding, Eastern 
Orthodoxy views the person as ‘an existence with an active creative otherness, which is the 
fruit of relations of communion, love and freedom from the ego.’ This is contrasted to the 
Western Christian concept of an individual focused on ‘his or her justification and salvation, 
the safeguarding of their egocentric metaphysical protection, through virtues and good 
actions.’ To the difference of anthropologies he attributes difference in political organization. 
Thus representative democracy with its insistence on the legal protection of rights and 
representation of particular interests corresponds to the Western understanding of the 
individual, while the ancient Greek democracy is closer to the Eastern Orthodox personalist, 
relational and communal understanding.
275
  
In opposing the Western understanding, Yannaras insists that ‘the Church is an event 
and a way of communion between persons, a way of love: that is, freedom from the existence 
of nature, freedom from the physical limitations of time, attrition and death.’ Thus, politics 
becomes ‘a common exercise of life “according to the truth”, and is ‘constituted around the 
axis of ontology (and not self-interested objectives)’. While remaining critical of modern 
human rights concept, Yannaras does not fully reject their value. Rather he aspires to a higher 
ontological understanding of human dignity that presupposes the presence of the divine and 
the communion of persons in ecclesia.
276
  
Yannaras’ defense of religious communitarianism and conservatism, his idealizations 
of the Eastern Orthodox historical models and open hostility to the Western socio-political 
forms distance his scholarship from the present study. Yannaras’ political theology fails to 
provide a universal perspective and to accept the other as she is. It is also too much centered 
on the Byzantine and ancient Greek models used as a ground for his Orthodox communitarian 
idealizations. Some of his ideas – of the public and participatory nature of Christian ecclesia 
as well as of the Trinitarian perspective of the human nature (modelled after the Trinitarian 
God) – are of relevance for this study.         
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2.3. Aristotle Papanikolaou and political theology of divine-human communion  
One of the contemporary scholars to engage directly with the political-theological 
implications of Eastern Orthodox doctrines is Aristotle Papanikolaou. In his most recent 
study, Papanikolaou develops a political-theological system that favors liberal-democratic 
values and political community.
277
 His political-theological approach is centered on the 
principle of divine-human communion (‘deification’, ‘theosis’) which is characteristic for the 
Orthodox understanding of relations between God and humans.
278
 
Papanikolaou seeks to understand and to reveal the political consequences from 
embracing the principle of divine-human communion as paramount in Orthodox theology. He 
also engages with Orthodox theologians who embrace the principle of divine-human 
communion, but in a way that challenges the compatibility between Eastern Orthodoxy and 
liberal democracy. An important aspect of his approach is the emphasis on the compatibility 
between Orthodoxy and liberal democracy understood broadly, without endorsing a secular 
individualist anthropology that underlies modern liberalism.  
Papanikolaou advocates ‘a political theology grounded in principle of divine-human 
communion … one that unequivocally endorses a political community that is democratic in a 
way that structures itself around the modern liberal principles of freedom of choice, religious 
freedom… the protection of human rights … and church-state separation.’279 He does not 
endorse a particular form of a democratic state, nor does he support a nation-state as the most 
suitable form of realizing his political-theological views.  
Further, he challenges the traditional narrative of an existing radical opposition 
between the Orthodox East and the Catholic and Protestant West. He also rejects the 
possibility of returning to pre-modern models (e.g. Byzantine) of church-state relations as not 
suitable and adaptable to the context of contemporary secular and pluralist western 
societies.
280
   
In elaborating his political theology, Papanikolaou does not follow the Schmittian 
methodology of a genealogical inquiry of a concept, analogy between the religious and 
political concepts and construction (architecture) of a systematic political-theological model. 
In the whole study, there is even no mention of Schmitt and his approach. One possible 
explanation for this absence is his focus on the theological debates and notions, rather than on 
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political and legal concepts. Papanikolaou does not challenge the meaning of political and 
legal concepts (liberal democracy, political community, common good, human rights) rather 
he accepts their core meaning and relates them to theological doctrines.  
In his comprehensive study, Papanikolaou engages with core Orthodox doctrines 
(Trinity, divine-human communion, Eucharist, ecclesia) and relates them to political concepts 
(liberal democracy, political community, common good, human rights). In doing this, he 
reinterprets creatively traditional Orthodox doctrines in a way that reconciles them to the 
liberal democratic political context. One possible objection to his approach could be the easy 
acceptance of an unspecified liberal political perspective, not discerning between different 
liberalisms: for instance, classical liberalism and libertarianism centered on the private 
individual with his pre-political natural rights which are threatened by the hostile state and the 
majority rule (thus emphasizing the value of the rule of law, negative rights, constitutional 
and limited government);
281
 contractarian liberalism which focuses on the original position, 
achieving by means of the social contract of an overlapping consensus around political 
principles of justice and the common good that protect the human dignity, basic human rights 
and equality, as well as pluralism in a society;
282
 and human rights-oriented participatory 
liberalism which values human dignity and equality, emphasizes the right of equal respect and 
concern, as well as solidarity and active participation in a communal life.
283
  
This general acceptance of the liberal tradition without differentiating among liberal 
conceptions and paradigms is what distinguishes Papanikolaou’s approach from the present 
study. This research is primarily focused on the participatory dimension of the Orthodox 
doctrines not on the general liberal political framework. Though Papanikolaou clearly 
emphasizes divine-human communion as the basis of his political theology, he only partially 
draws the normative conclusions from this concept for the kind of liberal democracy he 
endorses. If considered in the light of divine-human communion, the democratic model 
should be inclusive, engaging, and participatory, with a strong sense of community and 
identity. However, Papanikolaou does not discuss these features in detail, only occasionally 
refers to them.  
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Papanikolaou’s political theology corresponds to the kind of liberal democracy that 
exists in the United States, which is far from inclusive, consensual and participatory. The 
degree of struggle, contestation and competitiveness that is found within the American 
democracy is far greater than the Orthodox concepts of divine-human communion, or 
synergy, or conciliarity presuppose. In terms of correspondence between his political-
theological model and the liberal democracy, some similarities could be found with regards to 
the values endorsing human dignity, personal freedom and human rights.  
Further, one could find a contradiction between Papanikolaou’s initial claim that ‘a 
liberal democratic political community may be realized under multiple state structures’284 and 
his particular focus on the American political context and the liberal democratic regime 
exercised there. In this way, more participatory and deliberative political models that are 
found within the European context are not explored.          
With respect to the historical forms of Eastern Christian political theology, 
Papanikolaou directly challenges the Byzantine doctrine of symphonia as not suitable for 
modern pluralist liberal society.
285
 The traditional symphonia model presupposes religious, 
political and cultural unity and harmony which is impossible to achieve in the Western 
societies. The Orthodox Church is able to accept diversity and pluralism in society, and yet 
remaining faithful to its defining doctrines - the divine-human communion and the 
participation in ecclesia and the Eucharist.  
 
The important point here is that the existence of a politically diverse community in which the church is 
one voice among others is not a betrayal of church’s nature but, rather, the necessary result of the church as an 
eschatological community. Insofar as the church has not fulfilled its mission to persuade others to become part of 
its Eucharistic worship of God, then it must accept the existence of political and religious diversity. The state as 
politically diverse community is not contrary to but, rather, inherent in the very notion of the church as an 
eschatological community.
286
    
 
Papanikolaou defends the difference between church and state which opens a space for 
a free answer to the God’s call for communion: ‘the understanding of the church as 
eucharistic participation in the life of God leads to the natural law-like conclusion for a 
political community as a space with a telos distinct though not separate from that of divine-
                                                          
284
 Papanikolaou, The Mystical as Political, 12. 
285
 Ibid., 70-71. 
286
 Ibid., 77. 
142 
 
human communion.’287 In a Christian perspective, political communities need to support and 
promote values of human dignity and respect, recognizing the uniqueness of every human 
being who is created in the image and likeness of God. 
  In political-theological terms, Papanikolaou emphasizes the importance of church-state 
relations. There should be neither overlapping between the two, nor complete separation and 
estrangement. Christians and the church have to preserve an eschatological and prophetic 
distance from every political regime, and yet exercise their mission in transfiguring the world 
through evangelization and witness to the divine truths.        
 
As Christians progress to realize the divine in their lives, then the inevitable result would be a liberal 
democratic form of political community. Otherwise put, the church is meant to perfect the political community 
not to abolish it, which means that the political community exists in an analogical relationship to the church, not 
one of diametrical opposition. Theoretically, once all have become part of the eucharistic community, the 
community of praise, worship, and offering to God, the existence of the state is no longer necessary.
288
  
 
Without supporting a specific form of a liberal political regime, Papanikolaou is 
endorsing a concept of human rights that is in many ways progressive. He emphasizes the 
right to moral equality, freedom of religion, as well as advocates for some basic social rights: 
the right to healthcare, to food and shelter, to employment, to environmental rights. He 
strongly supports social rights as creating ‘relations in a political community such that human 
beings are treated as irreducibly unique’289 and thus enhancing the perspective of divine-
human communion. His defense of social rights shapes in a specific way the liberal 
democratic regime he favors. At this point, it becomes clear that he endorses a social-liberal, 
not a classical liberal or libertarian form of democratic regime.   
In engaging with contemporary Western Catholic and Protestant theologians who 
work in the political-theological field, Papanikolaou distinguishes views that are supportive of 
liberal democracy (Graham Ward, Eric Gregory, Charles Mathewes) from views critical of 
liberal democracy (Stanley Hauerwas, John Milbank, William Cavanaugh). The first group of 
scholars tends to relate the concept of divine-human communion and Christian practices to 
modern liberal democracy and reconcile both the Christian and the liberal tradition. The 
second group tends to focus on the Church as an ideal polity vis-a-vis the state and as an 
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eschatological community transcending secular politics.
290
 In expressing his own position, 
Papanikolaou emphasizes the need of a transcendent perspective within the liberal democratic 
polity in a way that counters individualism, materialism and consumerism.
291
  
Following Mathewes’ ideas, Papanikolaou emphasizes a particular dimension of 
politics that should be viewed in the perspective of achieving communion with others and 
with God. Christian attitude to politics and the public sphere is that of an ‘ascetical 
citizenship’ (Mathewes’ term) requiring that others are to be trusted and fully respected.292 
Civic republicanism, as elaborated by Mathewes, enhances a committed engagement and 
participation of Christians, which is important for the perspective of divine-human 
communion offered by Papanikolaou.  
In his study, Papanikolaou engages with the notion of the public good. He contends 
that ‘democracy itself implies a particular notion of the common good including freedom, 
equality, justice, fairness, inclusivity, participation, diversity, and otherness.’293 In his view, 
the participatory perspective in understanding the common good is truly important. The 
common good ‘emerges through civic-engagement-as-dialogue…such engagement is the 
common good, which means that the common good entails the unequivocal equality among 
all citizens as co-participants in the dialogue or the “community of dispute”.’294 
He contends that ‘Christians can positively shape the content of the common good in a 
way that would reinforce a democratic ethos of engagement.’ He further argues that 
Christians could endorse ‘a communal notion of democracy without being communitarian’. 
This, in turn, would require ‘a societal set of norms that would hold people and corporations 
accountable for the welfare of its citizens and not simply for maximizing self-interest.’295 For 
Papanikolaou notions of participation and engagement relate to the social and progressive 
view of politics.  
Engaging with contemporary Western political theology, Papanikolaou emphasizes the 
theological perspectives, not the political theory. This is a possible explanation for the lack of 
reference to Schmitt and his methodology (of discovering structural analogy between political 
and theological concepts). His study of Eastern Orthodox political theology in relation to the 
pluralist liberal society and political system is a significant contribution in the field. His 
valuable scholarship lies in the scope of his research ranging from Christian personalism, 
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divine-human communion and Eucharistic ecclesiology to human dignity and human rights, 
liberal democracy and the common good. He is pioneering in the field as creatively and 
positively engages with current political-theological paradigms, in order to discover the place 
and significance of Eastern Orthodoxy in liberal democratic context. Certainly, his work will 
stimulate further debates and ideas that may be enriching both the political and the theological 
fields.   
The present study differs from Papanikolaou’s both in its scope (it is focused on 
political-theological models in a more specific context, with a particular emphasis on the 
participatory dimension) and methodology (it uses the analogy between political and 
theological concepts, and engages with their historical development and interaction). 
Nevertheless, this research shares similar values, interpretations and intuitions. What would 
be further highlighted here is the participatory character of Eastern Orthodox concepts that 
could form a distinct participatory political theology that may exist and be practiced within a 
modern liberal democracy. This perspective also requires active civic engagement and 
participation in terms of values, principles and procedures, thus enriching the liberal 
constitutional model, and yet, moving beyond the negative rights and limited government.  
 
2.4. Pantelis Kalaitzidis and progressive political theology 
Issues of political theology in the Eastern Orthodox context continue to receive 
increased attention. Pantelis Kalaitzidis, working mostly in European context, also approaches 
political-theological themes.
296
 Kalaitzidis directly enters into a critical dialogue with Schmitt, 
recognizing and using his political-theological methodology, while rejecting his authoritarian 
and far-right extremist political convictions.
297
  
Kalaitzidis grounds his approach to political theology on two basic Christian doctrines 
- of the Trinity and Incarnation. He evaluates critically some political-theological models, 
experienced in the Eastern Christian context. Kalaitzidis rejects the Byzantine political 
eschatology as well as the nationalist political theology. Turning to the recent Greek history, 
he renounces the neo-Orthodox movement in the 1960s that was supportive of the 
authoritarian policies of the Greek junta (1967-1974).  
Kalaitzidis also admits that the authoritarian elements that appear in the political 
theology of the Christian East and West alike are due to the ‘sacralization of the mechanisms 
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of authority and dominance … the authoritarian version of a mingling of the religious and the 
cultural/political’, and ‘a particular understanding of a sacred narrative, a sacred text, law, or 
even sacred tradition’.298 Kalaitzidis is critical of both Christian traditions (East and West) 
that followed the way leading to a ‘theology of authority’ which served the sacralization of 
political power. In this process, the challenge to the world which is present in the doctrines of 
Trinity and Incarnation have been obscured and gradually substituted with political theologies 
defending the political establishment.  
In his criticism, Kalaitzitis follows John Zizioulas’ theology of ‘being as communion’, 
with its emphasis on Christian personalism, on free, loving and engaging relation with God, 
excluding any sort of coercion and external authority in this relationship. He emphasizes the 
kenosis of the Incarnation of the Son of God who has revealed to humans the Trinitarian mode 
of life in communion, love, and mutual respect and honor. He also insists on the antinomic 
character of Christian theology that prevents from fully identifying any political regime with 
the Church and Christianity.
299
  
Kalaitzidis remains skeptical about the possibility of a direct transfer of theological 
doctrines, as developed and progressive they may be, into the social and political reality, even 
less into concrete policies and political regimes. He contends that ‘textual truth does not 
necessarily result in social renewal, which means that all facile attempts to move, on the basis 
of certain texts, from theology/ecclesiology and worship to the realm of culture/politics and 
state should be treated with suspicion, both methodologically and in terms of their 
substance.’300 He exemplifies this conclusion by referring to Yannaras, with his theology of 
personhood and communion, who is remaining rather skeptical of the notions of human 
dignity, human rights, progressive social engagement, and even hostile to the Western 
political models and philosophical concepts. Kalaitzidis is sharply critical of the kind of 
ontological perspective developed by Yannaras which fails to provide a ground for positive 
action and social commitment in this world in service of the needed, of the fellow men, of the 
oppressed.
301
                
     Engaging further with Western political theologians (Carl Schmitt, Jacob Taubes, 
Jurgen Moltman, Johann Baptist Metz, Gustavo Gutierrez), Kalaitzidis addresses his key 
research question: ‘Why has Orthodoxy not developed a political or liberation theology?’302 
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To answer this question, he examines the Orthodox theological tradition and finds rather 
ambivalent experience. Counter-posing two paradigms – of authoritarian political theology 
and liberation theology, he argues that in the Orthodox tradition both paradigms could be 
found. On the one side, Eastern Orthodoxy enjoys a continuous conciliar tradition (the church 
council or synod being the supreme authority, not a single person as the patriarch), 
presupposing active engagement and open debate; on the other, there is no fully developed 
democratic ethos of deliberation in both the church and the societies. He highlights that for 
the most part of its history Eastern Christianity coexisted with empires and monarchies, rather 
than with democratic regimes. Moreover, Eastern Orthodoxy in its particular realization of the 
national state-oriented churches had often provided a political-theological legitimation of the 
ruling regime (imperial, monarchist, authoritarian), as well as had to accommodate itself to 
the existing political and social conditions. In this process, Orthodox churches have often 
forgotten their prophetic and eschatological role to make visible and actualize the 
transcendent presence and the Kingdom of God.  
One of the particular reasons for not developing a comprehensive liberation theology 
could be found in the preoccupation of the autocephalous Orthodox churches with the ideas of 
ethno-nationalism and their confinement within and dependence on the nation-states. Thus, 
they have substituted the history of the national awakening, liberation and mythology for the 
history of divine economy and salvation.
303
       
With his sharp criticism of authoritarian and nationalist political theologies, Kalaitzidis 
is much relevant for the present study. His progressivist approach to political theology 
emphasizes the values of engagement, personalism and recognition of the human dignity of 
all persons. He also considers the social justice dimensions of the Christian political theology, 
as well as its transformative political potential.  
 
2.5. Political-theological perspectives in the first half of the twentieth century 
The first modern political-theological engagements of Eastern Orthodox theologians 
and religious philosophers could be traced back to the beginning of the 20
th
 century. These 
accounts belong to the prominent scholars from the Russian religious-philosophical 
community. In their studies, they have emphasized the social concern and engagement with 
the world, remaining receptive of the values of personal freedom and liberal democracy. 
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  Among the first to engage with modernity and political concepts, Vladimir Solovyov 
offers a specific interpretation of the principle of divine-human communion.  According to 
him, all created world, including the political order, has to be perfected and moved closer to 
the union with the divine.
304
 In his view, a genuine Christian approach to power and politics 
excludes both the absolutism of the empire and the extreme secularization of society and 
politics. He endorsed a political system of ‘free theocracy’, which presupposes a liberal 
political order with separation of church and state, protection of human rights, and limited 
government.
305
 In his system freedom of belief remains a fundamental value – there is no 
official state-sanctioned religion and religious pluralism is a viable reality.  
An important dimension of Solovyov’s ideas is his insistence on the transcendental 
perspective of the political order. At first, his system may be classified as liberal, but it should 
not be mistaken with the secular and rationalistic liberalism found in the nineteenth century 
Europe. Rather he offers an account of a particular Christian personalist liberalism open to the 
divine, which goes along with a sharp criticism of materialistic political experiments. The 
originality of his approach could be traced to the principle of divine-human communion 
which is fundamental in the Eastern Christian thought as well as to the necessity to answer the 
challenges of his epoch of rapid social and political transformation. Solovyov’s ideas are 
further developed and transmitted to the West through the works of Russian émigré 
intellectuals in the first decades of 20
th
 century.
306
          
Russian religious philosopher Sergius Bulgakov develops a political-theological view 
that is compatible with the liberal values and structures in the western socio-political context. 
In his book The Orthodox Church he emphasized the role of liberal principles such as 
separation between church and state and individual freedom for building a society that truly 
corresponds to Christian beliefs and values.
307
  Separation of church and state, observes 
Bulgakov,  
 
has been accepted by the Orthodox Church also, for it corresponds with its dignity and its vocation … 
The liberty we find in the United States is now the regime most favorable to the Church, most normal for it; it 
frees the Church from the temptations of clericalism and assures it development without hindrance... The 
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ultimate influence of the Church on life, and especially on the state, will be only increased by separation of 
Church and state.
308
  
 
An important consequence of this principle is the existence of a church that is not 
engaging with party politics and preaching a particular political ideology. The only way 
available to the church to convince or influence people is by respecting their personal liberty 
and human dignity. In Bulgakov’s view, the form of political organization that is compatible 
with the Orthodox beliefs is a liberal democracy, though not in its extreme secular form. It is 
also important, that Bulgakov’s endorsement of liberal democracy is grounded on the 
principle of divine-human communion, which relies on personal freedom and participation 
without coercion.
309
 Bulgakov opposes any form of a centralized autocratic state and supports 
a ‘federative democratic republic’ that is based on self-government, self-determination and 
personal freedom.
310
  
In his political-theological system, Bulgakov engages with the rights of the oppressed, 
supporting the cause of social engagement and social justice, to the extent of elaborating a 
specific understanding of a Christian politics. He sees Christian politics in terms of 
‘emancipation of all humanity, universal freedom, for which there can be no distinction 
among nationalities, religions, or denominations.’311 This is an inclusive, universal and 
ecumenical approach to politics.  
Bulgakov also focuses on the importance of participation and social engagement of 
Christians, who are able to organize themselves into a civic Christian community that will 
oppose both the atheist humanism of totalitarian socialism and the state-controlled official 
Church with its empty formalism and ritualism. For the fulfillment of this goal, he proposes 
the establishment of a Union of Christian Politics which would act as a civic organization at 
grassroots level, but also as a policy institute. The primary tasks of the Union would be 
dissemination of ideas and knowledge and civic mobilization. In doing this, the Union could 
cooperate with democratic parties without becoming a party itself.
312
  
Most importantly, Bulgakov’s ideas with their personalist, liberal and ecumenical 
dimensions, should be viewed as an alternative to the official state-centered Russian Orthodox 
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Church with its ultraconservative tendencies. His views have been developed in opposition to 
the influential religious-philosophical Slavophile and Eurasian movements which 
overemphasized the distinction between Russia and the West and justified Russian 
exceptionalism and nationalism. To the rationalism, individualism and legalism of the West, 
as they perceived it, Slavophiles counter-posed the traditionalism of the Orthodox community, 
its ethos of communion, wholeness and interdependence, expressed in the term ‘sobornost’. 
This community-centered approach later evolved in a reactionary nationalist direction to the 
point of endorsing authoritarian regimes.
313
                                 
In his religious philosophy, Nikolay Berdyaev also emphasizes the importance of 
human participation in the divine life and the active and creative involvement in community’s 
life. His understanding is grounded in the idea of personhood as a relational concept 
presupposing communion with God and with others. In his view, God invites persons to 
participate in his divine life, which is described with the term ‘theosis’ (divinization or 
deification). Participation in divine life of the Triune God and with other persons is presented 
with the concepts of divine humanity (God-manhood) and sobornost. The latter concept 
denotes both the fullness of communion between the three divine persons as well as the spirit 
and practice of the Christian Church. In his works, Berdyaev systematically followed the 
premise that the existence of true humanity presupposes communion with and participation in 
God.
314
    
Berdyaev highlights the role and importance of personal freedom, human dignity and 
spiritual awakening as a precondition of a significant social transformation. On Kalaitzidis’ 
account, Berdyaev’s ‘whole life and nearly all of his rich collection of written works was, as 
is well known, nothing but advocacy for a social and revolutionary Christianity, a Christian 
voice in defense of the disadvantaged and the oppressed, and an apology for a Christian 
socialism and anarchism, all based on the dominant themes of spiritual and personal 
freedom.’315  
Berdyaev’s views emphasizing free personality and participation in communion and 
love, affected his understanding of the law and its function in society. The human being which 
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is destined for communion with God could not be reduced to formal and coercive relations 
that are legally regulated. The origin of law is not the divine grace and love to humans, but 
rather the sinful nature of men, which necessitates restrictions, limitations and direction found 
in the positive law. Regulation of social relations through law is a sign of lost communion and 
lack of love of God and the neighbor. In this respect, God should not be understood neither as 
a source of law, nor as a judge or enforcer of the law. Consequently, the uniqueness of human 
personality which reflects the divine personality is defined by love and communion, not by 
law. Law relates to abstract concepts, rules and typical situations and does not take into 
account personal uniqueness and the iconic nature of the person with respect to the divine. 
Yet, given that the human nature and the world are fallen and exposed to sin, law may still 
have a positive role in reducing violence, coercion and arbitrariness in human relations and 
thus securing a sphere of personal freedom and security. However, the realization of this 
freedom in love and communion transcends law and regulation.
316
 
The political-theological interpretation of Eastern Orthodox doctrines presented in this 
section exemplifies some major differences and tendencies that could be found among the 
Orthodox scholars. Some more conservative and highly critical of the West views (Yannaras) 
are developed along with more moderate (Zizioulas) and social-liberal ones (Papanikolaou 
and Kalaitzidis). It is important that these scholars try to relate core Orthodox concepts to 
contemporary philosophical, political and legal doctrines thus paving the road for an intensive 
interaction between the formerly isolated and provincial Orthodox churches and communities 
and the vibrant and pluralist societies in the West. This intellectual exchange is a vital 
precondition for developing fully-fledged social and political integrative processes with 
Western countries and societies on an equal basis.  
Emphasizing the values of engagement and participation, Eastern Christian scholars 
could be instrumental in cultivating a culture of independence and civic involvement that is 
decisive for building democratic polities. In their attempt to place Eastern Orthodoxy in the 
Western context they can rely on a tradition which started a century ago with the exiled 
Russian religious intellectuals (Bulgakov, Berdyaev, Florovsky) and their intellectual legacy 
in the West, generations of scholars from St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Seminary in New York and 
St. Sergius Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris (among them Alexander Schmemann and 
John Meyendorf).  
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In the following section, the institutional ecclesiastic engagements with the issues of 
democracy, democratic values, and political theology will be highlighted. The emphasis will 
be on the participatory, personalist and universal dimensions of the emerging contemporary 
political theology.             
 
3. Eastern Orthodox churches on democracy and political theology 
Presenting a variety of interpretations of political theology in the Eastern Christian 
scholarship, it is now important to turn to the institutional views with respect to democracy. 
There is no a single approach on democracy among Eastern Orthodox churches. Clearly, 
views on democracy are influenced by the overall cultural and political context in which they 
have been elaborated. Thus it is more common for Orthodox churches, communities and 
individual scholars situated in the western liberal societies to endorse positive views on liberal 
democracy with its core elements of human rights, constitutional government and the rule of 
law, active civic participation. They are also supportive of interdenominational ecumenical 
dialogue and universal values. In contrast, national Orthodox churches and the majority of 
scholars in traditional Orthodox countries tend to be more critical of liberal democracy or 
hold at least ambivalent views in relation to different aspects of the liberal order. For these 
communities it is more common to endorse traditionalist political views, focused on ideas of 
the nation-state and nationalist political theology.  
Nonetheless, these are only general observations. It is not easy to draw clear-cut 
distinctions due to the fact Orthodox churches and communities are not monolith groupings. 
For instance, many representatives of the clergy, prominent scholars and intellectuals, as well 
as lay members and organizations share views which are different from those of the official 
church authorities or the majority of population. It would be more realistic to suppose that a 
plurality of views and approaches to the issues of democracy, human rights and politics, exist 
in traditional Orthodox societies as well as in the Orthodox communities in the West. Current 
situation is even more complex due to the process of intense secularization in the last decades 
in both eastern and western societies.  
The plurality of views is further enhanced by the absence of an authoritative and 
recognized by all Orthodox churches statement on the issues of democracy and politics. Thus, 
the space for country-specific and contextual approaches remains open.
317
 Meanwhile, it is 
noteworthy that the statements of the Ecumenical Patriarchate are exemplary of a public 
                                                          
317
 The Orthodox Church and Society: The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
available at: https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/ (last viewed 20.09.2014)  
152 
 
engagement with universal and humanist themes (respect for freedom, human rights and 
human dignity, peace, toleration, communion and cooperation between nations and 
denominations).
318
 This could be justified with the logic and the function of the patriarchal 
office – to testify on the universal scale for the core teachings of the Orthodox Church as an 
undivided communion of autocephalous churches. It should be noted, however, that on some 
internal Orthodox jurisdictional issues the Ecumenical Patriarchate acts in a conservative way, 
relying heavily on his authority and prerogatives ensured by the Byzantine tradition and 
recognized by the church councils. Its authority is often contested by the autocephalous 
churches which results in tensions and jurisdictional arguments.   
   In the subsequent paragraphs the institutional ecclesiastic views of democracy will be 
presented. The emphasis here will be on engagement with contemporary issues (democracy 
and human rights) rather than on the more conceptual political-theological analysis that will 
follow in the subsequent chapters. For now deeper theological discussions and concepts will 
be set aside, to open space for the current debates, documents and problems of interaction 
between Eastern Orthodoxy and democracy.   
 
3.1. Ecumenical Orthodoxy 
Universal engagements of the Eastern Orthodoxy with values of human dignity, 
human rights and democracy are usually transmitted by official statements and declarations of 
pan-Orthodox councils and encyclicals of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In his institutional 
role, the Patriarchate is also responsible for convening and presiding pan-Orthodox meetings 
and councils, in the spirit of the conciliar tradition of the Eastern Orthodox Church.  
The planned convocation of a pan-Orthodox council in 2016 is expected to be a 
remarkable event not only for the Orthodox Christianity, but for the wider international 
community. Given that Orthodox believers are spread across the world and the Orthodox 
Church is becoming globalized in the last century, decisions and declarations of the council 
will have an international impact. It is expected that the council will promulgate an important 
document that is directly related to the place and mission of the Church in the contemporary 
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world. In the draft document, published in January 2016, the Church openly engages with and 
endorses the values of human dignity, freedom, peace and justice, tolerance.
319
 These values 
are shared and explained in the light of the fundamental teachings of the Orthodoxy: doctrines 
of the Trinity, creation, and Christian personalism, as well as taking into account 
ecclesiological teachings and eschatological dimension. Human dignity, freedom and rights 
are justified in the light of the teaching of the creation of all humans ‘in the image and 
likeness of God’ and the relational nature of the Trinity. An intrinsic relation between 
freedom and responsibility is also underlined (‘Faced with this situation, which has led to a 
degradation of the notion of the human person, the duty of the Orthodox Church today is, by 
means of preaching, theology, worship and pastoral activity, to reveal the truth of freedom in 
Christ … Freedom without responsibility and love leads eventually to the loss of freedom.’). 
The document is universalist in spirit, emphasizing the necessity for dialogue and cooperation 
between Christians, other religions and peoples.  
 
[Section 1] 2. It is on this basis that it is essential to develop in all directions inter-Christian co-
operation for the protection of human dignity and the preservation of peace so that the peace-keeping efforts of 
all Christians may become more relevant and effective. 
3. The general recognition of the lofty value of the human person may become the cause for wider co-
operation in the field of peace-keeping. The Orthodox Churches are called upon to help in religious dialogue and 
co-operation, and as a result of this to overcome all manifestations of fanaticism for the strengthening of 
friendship between peoples, the triumph of freedom and peace throughout the world for the good of each human 
person, regardless of their race and religion. Of course, this co-operation excludes both syncretism and the 
attempt of one religion to dominate over all the others. 
4. We are convinced that as laborers together with God (I Cor. 3:9) we can develop on local, national 
and international levels joint service for the good of humanity with all peoples of good will that strive for a peace 
that is pleasing to God. This ministry is a commandment of God (Matt. 5:9).
320
 
The theological understanding of Christian peace lies at the center of the document. 
Peace in the world is for the Orthodox Church an absolute value which should not be 
compromised. 
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[Section 3] 1. The Orthodox Church has since time immemorial recognized and proclaimed that peace 
and justice occupy a central place in the life of peoples. Christ’s revelation is characterized as the gospel of 
peace (Eph. 6:5). [...] For Christ’s peace is the ripe fruit of all things united in Christ: the revelation of the 
dignity and majesty of the human person as the image of God, the manifestation of the organic unity of the 
human race and the world in Him, the commonality of the principles of peace, freedom and social justice and, 
ultimately, the offering of the fruits of Christian love among people and the nations of the world. True peace is 
the fruit of the triumph on earth of all these Christian principles. It is the peace that is from above, of which the 
Orthodox Church constantly prays every day, beseeching it of almighty God Who hears the prayers of those who 
approach Him in faith… 
5. At the same time the Orthodox Church believes it her duty to encourage all those who genuinely 
serve the cause of peace (Rom. 14:19) and show the way to justice, fraternity, true freedom and mutual love 
between all the children of the one heavenly Father as between all peoples who make up the one human family. 
She suffers with all people who in various parts of the world are denied the benefits of peace and justice. 
 
The Church also rejects all forms of unequal treatment of persons and discrimination 
based on different criteria (‘The Church, in respecting, the principles of human rights and 
equal treatment of people, values the application of these principles in the light of her 
teaching on the sacraments, the family, the position of both genders in the Church and the 
value of Church Tradition as a whole. The Church has the right to bear witness and does bear 
witness to her teaching in the public sphere.’). 
The statement offers critical reflexes towards contemporary problems found in modern 
societies: materialism and consumerism, value relativism, fanaticism, discrimination, social 
injustice, military, ethnic and social conflicts, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons (Sections 2, 4, and 6).  
The draft of the document is criticized for not engaging more profoundly with these 
crucial issues. Improvements are proposed in the sections on human rights, antidiscrimination, 
and renewed commitment to public witness and mission.
321
 
One of the important pan-Orthodox declarations, engaged with the values of 
democracy, human dignity and human rights, could be found in the public statement of the 
pre-conciliar meeting
322
 held in Constantinople in March 2014:  
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The Church is called to articulate its prophetic word. We express our genuine concern about local and 
global trends that undermine and erode the principles of faith, the dignity of the human person, the institution of 
marriage, and the gift of creation. 
We live in a world where multiculturalism and pluralism are inevitable realities, which are constantly 
changing. We are conscious of the fact that no issue in our time can be considered or resolved without reference 
to the global, that any polarization between the local and the ecumenical only leads to distortion of the Orthodox 
way of thinking. 
Therefore, even in the face of voices of dissension, segregation, and division, we are determined to 
proclaim the message of Orthodoxy. We acknowledge that dialogue is always better than conflict. Withdrawal 
and isolationism are never options. We reaffirm our obligation at all times to be open in our contact with “the 
other”: with other people and other cultures, as well as with other Christians and people of other faiths.323 
 
Beyond its historical and jurisdictional constraints, the Patriarchate is active in 
international and interdenominational relations. Though, very often contested by the national 
Orthodox churches, the ecumenical initiatives of the Patriarchate create a rather positive 
image of the Orthodoxy in the international context. Themes of freedom, justice and solidarity 
are often at the center of its official statements.     
 
… If human institutions are afraid of human freedom, either dispelling, or disregarding, or even 
abolishing it, the institution of the Church, generates free persons in the Holy Spirit... The indefinable nature of 
freedom is the rock of our faith.
 
 
… The Orthodox Church always – and particularly in the recent years of global changes within the last 
tragic century – foresees and discerns in its entirety the “prevalence in the world of peace, righteousness, 
freedom, fraternity and love among all peoples, and the elimination of all racial and other distinctions,” as would 
be decided by the coming Holy and Great Synod.
 324
  
    
Being the only pan-Orthodox authority, the core function of the Patriarchate is to 
ensure the unity in doctrine, worship and organization of the Orthodox Church. Though not 
having jurisdictional primacy over the autocephalous churches, the Patriarch, as primus inter 
pares, sees himself as primarily engaged with the universal massage of Eastern Orthodoxy.  
 
The universal engagement of the statements of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, when 
addressing the wider international community, is transformed into more institutional and 
traditionalist message when the prerogatives of the Patriarchate are at stake in the inter-
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Orthodox relations. On the other side, the official statements of the national Orthodox 
churches are often oriented to national themes and concerns, as illustrated in Chapter Two of 
this study.  
In principle, there is а common understanding among the Orthodox churches of the 
importance of the basic concepts of democracy and human rights. In some of the official 
statements, however, concerns are raised with regards to some of their aspects (e.g. value 
relativism, consumerism, proliferation of specific minority rights).  
It is also important to note that Orthodox churches and communities present in the 
Western democracies are generally supportive to the human rights and liberal political values. 
They are reflective and active in both church and civic life. Public engagement and 
participation shapes their organizational ethos. Social and charity activities form a significant 
part of their daily practice.
325
  
 
3.2. Autocephalous Orthodox churches          
Contemporary official statements of the Orthodox churches in the SEE region 
concerning democracy and human rights were presented in Chapter Two. For   reasons of 
coherence, some major points will be rehearsed here.  
 After the fall of the communist regime in the SEE countries and the end of the state 
policy of atheism, the opportunities for active participation in the church life have been 
revived. Autocephalous Orthodox churches have increased their public presence and 
reinstated their basic freedom to preach. Democratization of society was accompanied by the 
public expectation for church engagement with social, educational and cultural activities. In 
line with the newly established democratic systems several autocephalous churches have been 
active and vocal in their support for democratic values and principles.  
One major exception from the prevailing pro-democratic spirit of the Orthodox 
churches in the region was the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1990s. During the 
Western Balkan conflicts the Serbian Church took a nationalist stance. This position was 
supported by influential high clerics of the Holy Synod. By the end of the 1990s the Serbian 
Church switched sides and started to support the pro-democratic opposition and to oppose the 
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authoritarian ultranationalist polices of the Milošević regime. With the change of the political 
system in the 2000s, the church has openly endorsed democratic values and principles.
326
  
One of the most influential voices in support of democracy and human rights in the 
Eastern Orthodox context is Anastasios Yannoulatos, the Archbishop of the Albanian 
Orthodox Church. In his writings Yannoulatos focuses on the perspectives of community and 
participation that define the Orthodox approach to others and society. Emphasizing freedom 
and uniqueness of each person, he calls further for ‘a communion of love, a society of love 
(koinonia agapes)’. The archetype of this relation is the Christian God as a personal God and 
Trinity, ‘a sharing between persons; a unity in three and a trinity in one’.327  This participatory 
spirit is represented as having universal dimension: ‘The truly Christian thing is to live with 
the certainty that a global communion of love between free persons is an ideal that deserves to 
be struggled for. The truly Christian thing is to be active and productive at the local level by 
maintaining a perspective that is global, and to fulfill our own obligations responsibly by 
orienting ourselves toward the infinite – the God of Love – as the purpose and goal of life.’328  
Developing the Christian idea of community understood as ‘a koinonia of free persons 
in love’, Yannoulatos emphasizes the value and importance of active participation in the life 
of the world. Christians, bear responsibility for the global community, they ‘must participate 
in order to exist.’ ‘It is a contradiction for someone to be a Christian and at the same time to 
be indifferent to the world as a whole and its historical course… Christianity compels us to 
respond to life with action and stresses the responsibility that each of us bears for the world’s 
development.’329      
In respect to human rights, Yannoulatos recognizes difference in sources, methods and 
inspiration between the secular tradition, and the Christian notions of the person and human-
divine relations. The common nexus between two traditions could be found in the respect to 
human dignity, and the participation in and service to the community. In Yannoulatos’ 
perspective, human rights concepts should not be understood as hyper-individualistic, rather 
as oriented to the others and the community. The transcendental model of this participation is 
the image of Holy Trinity. He argues that ‘Orthodoxy nurtures a willingness to accept people 
as they are, with deep respect for their freedom and without requiring them to adopt Christian 
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views… It also instills a deep respect for human rights and an eagerness to work with others 
to attain universal acceptance for human rights and to defend them’.330  
Yannoulatos emphasizes the explicitly Christian origin of some fundamental values 
(equality, freedom, justice, brotherhood) which are at the center of democracy and human 
rights ideas. In so far as secular movements and regimes employ human rights concepts for 
their own purposes, this should not lead to hostility and negation towards them. He rather 
views these secular forces ‘as collaborators in the struggle to realize our universal spiritual 
goals of world understanding and rapprochement.’331 
The views on democracy expressed by the Orthodox churches and their leaders in the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century mark an important evolution: from a traditionally national-
oriented political theology they have developed a public theology enhancing democratic 
values and institutions without rejecting the concern for the national culture and traditional 
values. This development is not straightforward: occasional statements or campaigns in 
support of specific national cultural or social policies continue to shape the public image of 
the churches.  
Eastern Orthodox engagement with democracy is not without specific challenges. 
Some public claims to specific group rights continue to face critical reactions on behalf of the 
Orthodox churches. Church leaders consider some of these claims to be contrary to the 
Christian tradition and doctrine. Some church statements on contested issues (e.g. abortion, 
euthanasia, bio-ethics) often provoke negative public comments. In a democratic society, 
however, churches are not required to accept the majority views on specific issues which fall 
in contradiction with their basic doctrines. In fact, the respect for the freedom of religion 
protects the churches to maintain their un-popular beliefs. This is a direct consequence from 
recognizing value pluralism in democratic societies. Moreover, in the SEE societies there is 
no popularly negotiated and accepted compromise on some of these issues, and the public 
space remains open to challenging views represented by different civic, political, or religious 
groups.        
 In the recent years, there is an attempt on behalf of the autocephalous churches to 
systematize the Orthodox teaching on some social and political issues. One of the documents 
engaging systematically with the concepts and principles of modern democratic state and 
society (human rights, democracy, rule of law, politics, civic participation) is the official 
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statement The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church.
332
 Given the fact 
the Russian Church constitutes the largest Orthodox community among the autocephalous 
churches, also having traditionally strong relations with the churches from the SEE region 
(especially with the Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek), its teachings on contemporary issues are 
publicly visible beyond its jurisdictional borders. This document also influences conversation 
and debate within other Orthodox churches as well.   
 The main ideas and statements of The Social Concept could be summarized in the 
following theses: 
(1) According to the document, the church accepts the contemporary democratic 
principles and pluralism in society. The church has to be concerned with the unity 
and peace in society and with strengthening mutual understanding and cooperation 
among citizens and church members. The church supports the active participation 
of her lay members in the institutions of government as well as in civic and 
political organizations. In that case, these lay persons should be mindful of the 
Christian spirituality, morality and justice, and defend the public good (Chapter V. 
Church and politics).  
(2) According to the document, the power of the state is not divinely instituted, but is 
grounded in the free will of the human beings and the necessity to counteract 
disorder. The proper function of the state authorities is defined in terms of 
administering justice, maintaining order, restricting evil actions. The document 
also warns against the absolute and limitless power as contrary to the Christian 
teaching. Meanwhile, the meaning and importance of the traditional doctrine of 
symphonia is recognized in the current conditions. The document emphasizes that 
the church should stay fundamentally free from the state, though remaining loyal 
to the legitimate state authorities. Only in cases when secular governments require 
actions which contradict the church doctrine and mission, then its loyalty ends, and 
peaceful civil disobedience is possible (Chapter III. Church and state). 
(3) The document maintains that belonging to the church does not exclude belonging 
to specific nation (defined in ethnic or political terms), defending and preserving 
national traditions and culture. It is accepted without criticism that the national 
dimension is reflected in the organization of the autocephalous churches. The 
document endorses ‘Christian patriotism’, the imperative for a Christian ‘to love 
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his fatherland … and his brothers by blood who live everywhere in the world...’ 
The mission of the Orthodox Church is seen as facilitating reconciliation and 
mutual understanding among nations, strengthening tolerant and peaceful 
coexistence between different ethnic and religious groups (Chapter II. Church and 
nation).  
(4) The church recognizes the role and importance of the law for maintaining peace 
and order in society. It also requires that the secular laws be in conformity with the 
divine laws. However, secular laws are by their nature limited and imperfect, their 
origin reflects social condition and historical development, and their force is not 
universal. In this part the document emphasizes that secular law contains a certain 
minimum of moral standards compulsory for all members of society and that 
conformity to the fundamental principles of divine law is a precondition for the 
legitimacy and validity of the secular law (IV. Christian ethics and secular law).  
In the document there is a clear recognition of the significance of the human rights as 
grounded in the biblical principles. The socio-political projection of these principles 
necessitates due respect for the free will of the person and appropriate conditions for the 
exercise of fundamental rights. The document requires guarantees against encroachment of 
these rights and freedoms as well as institutional protections against arbitrary rule and 
oppression. In a Christian perspective, however, the idea of human rights needs to be 
connected to the higher standards and commitments to serve God, the Church, fellow humans, 
as well as family, state, and nation.
333
  
  The Social Concept as an official document of the Russian Church has received 
critical evaluation. It is important that the Eastern Orthodoxy, through the life and experience 
of the autocephalous churches, addresses in a systematic way the most important questions, 
relations and problems in the modern democratic context. All different social actors and 
stakeholders could benefit from the clear-cut approach and formulations on many vital issues 
found in the document. In the sensitive sphere of church-state relations, for instance, there is 
an attempt to draw clear lines and limits of cooperation, which exclude overstepping spheres 
and competences. This could be healthful for both the church and the state, and will play a 
preventive role against violations of religious freedom. Some of the ideas in the document are 
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attempting to balance Christian doctrines with modern liberal and secular values and 
principles (human rights, democracy, civil society).  
Along with the positive interpretation of the document, some more critical 
observations could be raised. One of the problematic dimensions of the document is its 
traditionalist and communitarian perspective, especially when the church’s influence over the 
culture and the formation of the nation is concerned.
334
  
Another challenging view in the document is the insistence on counterbalancing the 
modern individualist notion of human rights with an understanding that reflects 
communitarian ideas. It is problematic, that the church requires the implementation of the 
human rights to be harmonized with the norms of morality.
335
 Moreover, it is stated that the 
exercise of human rights should not contradict one’s commitments and obligations to the 
nation, state, and communities. In seeking social harmony and national unity, the Russian 
Church allows interpretations that are socially conservative and accommodationist. Not 
remaining vigilant and critical of the political status quo, the Russian Church in fact 
legitimizes authoritarian political practices.  
 Nonetheless, the ambivalent position of the Russian Church in regard to democracy 
and human rights should not be overstated. One possible interpretation of its public position is 
that operating in an authoritarian system the Russian Church takes a moderate stance in order 
to guarantee relatively free exercise of religion, to remain publicly present and to influence 
the social processes from within. In that context, there are also a number of Orthodox 
scholars, intellectuals and clergy, who oppose the collaborationist position of the church on 
the domestic political affairs. It should not be underestimated that Russian Orthodox 
communities exist in the western liberal societies where they are well integrated and are not 
hostile to democratic values and principles. On the other side, in the international and pan-
Orthodox relations, the representatives of the Russian Church support official statements of 
all Orthodox churches which endorse the values of human dignity and human rights, 
solidarity and international cooperation.   
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 Conclusion 
 This chapter has outlined the trends and tendencies within the field of the Christian 
Orthodox political theology by placing them in the wider context of Western political-
theological thought. It is noteworthy that the political-theological themes have become 
increasingly popular in the last decades. This may be due to the foretasting of a crisis of the 
post-modern societies losing the perspectives of positivist progressivism and lapsing into 
value relativism. After the collapse of political religions of the 20
th
 century, the re-emerging 
political theology offers a variety of approaches, paradigms and methodologies that provide 
meaning and purpose of political and social processes, either in the form of secularized 
theological concepts, or by revealing the political potential of theological doctrines.  In this 
context, Orthodox Christianity has started to develop a comprehensive social teaching that 
relates to the current problems of modern democratic societies. In doing this, Eastern 
Orthodoxy moves beyond its classic notion of symphonia or nationalist political theology. 
In their works Orthodox scholars have argued for an understanding of the Christian 
Church as universal and participatory, a community of free persons, engaged with 
transforming the society, not a conservative institution preserving traditional hierarchies and 
social orders. The potential of the Orthodoxy for engaging with the world, democracy, human 
rights and social injustice is also visible in the official statements of the Orthodox churches. In 
these documents and the social practices they inspire, the endorsement of democracy and 
human rights is derived from the inner commitment to its own doctrines and spiritual 
traditions. 
 To have a comprehensive presentation of the Orthodox political theology and its basic 
features one needs to consider the development of political-theological ideas beginning with 
their scriptural foundations, evolving through the Byzantine period (thought and political 
practice) and modified with the creation of modern nation-states. The next chapter will 
provide a synthesis of the development of political-theological doctrines and models in the 
history of the Orthodox Church. Only after understanding these traditional models and 
conceptualizations, the participatory political theology, advocated here, may properly be 
understood. Consecutively, the next chapter will focus on the biblical foundations, the 
Byzantine political theology of symphonia and the political theology of the Christian nation.  
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Chapter Four.  Between Symphonia and ‘Dynamic Polarity’: historical 
political-theological models in Eastern Orthodoxy 
 
Introduction 
The relations between Christianity and secular authorities have always been as 
complex as challenging. For centuries, there have been struggles for dominance and influence 
between the two realms, on both doctrinal and institutional levels. In different historical 
contexts, these relations have been shaped by the predominant social, religious and cultural 
beliefs as well as by the practices of exercising political and ecclesiastical authority. The 
outcomes of this mutual influence and challenge could be found in different teachings which 
the major Christian churches (Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and Protestant) hold in 
relation to the exercise of temporal power as well as to church-state relations. While this 
interaction is well studied within the Western theological and constitutional tradition,
336
 
within the Eastern Christian tradition, systematic and conceptual studies of political-
theological models have not been undertaken until recently. The academic and institutional 
interest in relation to these models and concepts has been developed, due to the revived 
interaction between the Christian churches through the ecumenical dialogue and the increased 
migration of traditionally Orthodox communities to the Western countries. In the last decades, 
these changes resulted in the increasing number of studies of the interaction of Eastern 
Orthodoxy with the political and legal spheres in both historical and contemporary 
perspectives.
337
   
In its long history of interaction with different political and cultural institutions, the 
Eastern Orthodox Church has elaborated different political-theological models. Depending on 
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the historical, political and social contexts, these models differed significantly. A common 
perspective in these models is the interaction and engagement with the world, the state, and 
the society, summarized in the principle: ‘the Church is not of the world, but is in the world’. 
The development of different political-theological models could be analyzed in relation to the 
degrees of engagement with the state and society. In different historical periods the degree 
varied significantly. This chapter shares a specific intuition on church-state relations 
developed by the prominent Orthodox scholar and theologian John Meyendorff. As his 
profound observation goes, there is ‘an unstable and dynamic polarity’ between the secular 
powers and the Church. It means that the Church should be prevented ‘from being fully 
identified with an institution defined in terms of politics, or sociology.’338 This position, while 
admitting the salvific engagement with the world, emphasizes the eschatological nature of the 
Church: hence, it may participate actively in the world, the state, the society, but is impossible 
to be reduced to any of these entities.     
Chapter Four begins with a section on the scriptural foundations of the Christian 
political-theological doctrines. They had been definitive in terms of basic concepts and 
models for the first three centuries. They had been distinctively suspicious of the absolute 
power, while remaining sober and ascetic. Then, the chapter continues with a critical study of 
the Byzantine doctrine of ‘symphonia’, representing a powerful synthesis between the 
doctrines of the Church and the empire. It is emphasized that this doctrine is widely regarded 
as a genuine Orthodox standard of church-state relations, though very often being interpreted 
in a wrong direction. Next, the political-theological concept of the ‘Christian nation’ is 
analyzed. It emerged as a political-theological model based on the synthesis between Eastern 
Orthodoxy and modern nationalisms in South East Europe in the 19
th
 century. During the 
period, national liberation movements coincided with movements for church independence, 
thus producing a political-theological amalgam which was employed in the process of nation- 
and state-building in the region.  
This analysis will present a specific analogy between the political-theological models 
that have been developed in different epochs and the political regimes and forms of state. To 
the pagan empire of the first three centuries corresponds the ascetic, early Christian model of 
political theology, thus emphasizing the distinction between the political and the spiritual/ 
ecclesiastic realms, as well as revealing primarily the eschatological nature of the church. To 
the Byzantine imperial period, when the state and the society have been Christianized, 
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corresponding political theology has been that of symphonia, thus emphasizing the 
collaboration and integration between the church and the state. The political theology of the 
‘Christian nation’ characterizes the period of the foundation of modern nation-states in the 
SEE region, synthesizing the movements for ecclesial independence from the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate with the emerging political nationalism. Further in the study it is defended, the 
model of the participatory political theology corresponds to the modern pluralist, 
constitutional and democratic state and society.  
It should be noted, these models are ideal-typical, presenting concepts and trends in 
particular historical periods, they are not exhausting all forms of church-state relations 
practiced in SEE societies. Moreover, there is often fusion and overlap between them in terms 
of their practical implementation (as had been between symphonia and Christian nation 
models in the 19
th
 century nation-states).      
 
1. The New Testament foundations: power, law and order 
In the recent Orthodox Christian scholarship it has been pointed out that there is no 
unified and coherent religious-political theory of the relations between the secular authorities 
and the Christian Church embodied either in the Scriptures or in the canons, adopted by the 
church councils.
339
 Different circumstances, contexts and periods have contributed to the 
absence of an officially proclaimed and adopted political-theological doctrine. The primary 
concern of the Church and of leading theologians had been to find ad hoc spiritual and 
pastoral answers to concrete struggles and controversies, instead of elaborating a 
comprehensive political theology. This position, however, does not reject the fact that some 
theologians or high clerics as well as secular authorities have always aspired to elaborate 
political-theological doctrines compatible with the prevailing political regime.  
Looking back to the first century of Christianity, one could find in the New Testament 
rather contradictory statements regarding the secular powers. One of the famous statements of 
the Christian teaching regarding the authorities could be found in the Gospel according to 
Matthew: when asked by the Pharisees about the obligation to pay taxes to the government, an 
imminently political question, Christ answered with doubtless clarity: ‘Render therefore unto 
Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's’ (Mt. 22:21).340 
One possible interpretation of this verse implies the division and separation between the 
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divine and the secular powers. Another interpretation of the text focuses on a reading that 
allows for a different perspective: it is up to the person questioned to decide what belongs to 
the divine and what to the temporal realms. Thus, for the faithful the Kingdom of God will 
always have precedence over the earthly kingdom.
341
 Though this statement remains open to 
multiple interpretations, the notion of difference and division between the heavenly and the 
earthly things is nonetheless there.  
Furthermore, the relations between the two kingdoms are not formulated in a 
straightforward way. Certainly, there is an important eschatological dimension in the teaching 
of the coming Kingdom of God. It is a powerful and liberating message insofar the divine 
kingdom is not invested with the attributes of the secular power: ‘My kingdom is not of this 
world. If My kingdom were of this world, My servants would fight, so that should not be 
delivered to the Jews; but now My kingdom is not from here’ (Jn. 18:36). There might be 
different interpretations of these verses. Neither of them, however, can serve as mandating or 
providing legitimacy either to the claims of divine institution and superiority of the secular 
powers, or to any kind of a theocratic rule. Relying on the scriptural texts, the Orthodox 
Christianity does not consider either form of government as divinely ordained and instituted 
per se. An important perspective, however, is that the secular rule should not contradict the 
core of the Christian teachings, in order to be able to require allegiance from the faithful. Only 
then, different forms of government could be recognized and considered legitimate by the 
Church. 
 A closer look to the New Testament readings may suggest that the secular power 
derives from or relies on the divine will and approval. In a well-known verse, Jesus 
questioned the source of the Pilate’s secular power, thus leaving the impression that the 
existence and the exercise of the secular power are dependent on the divine origin and will: 
‘You would have no power over me, if it had not been given to you from above’ (Jn. 19:11). 
This statement, however, should not be considered as giving authorization to a secular ruler to 
decide what she or he pleases, irrespectively of the divine law. Neither this is a mandate to the 
particular ruler to pursue her or his own political agenda, relying on the divine sanction and 
legitimacy. This verse could be regarded as a recognition of God’s omnipotence and related to 
the initial and the closing verses from the Lord’s Prayer: ‘Your kingdom come, Your will be 
                                                          
341
 John A. McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law. Patristic and Byzantine Formulations of a New Civilization 
(New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2012), 137, ft. 17: ‘It is a saying that has often been “de-
eschatologically” rendered as an advocacy of disestablishment, but which, if understood as part of Jesus’ own 
Kingdom of God eschatology, is explosively different from that. Jesus does not clarify what actually does  
belong to Caesar in this world. He deliberately left that to the wit of his correspondent, as he does to us today.’ 
167 
 
done, on earth as it is in heaven…For Yours is the kingdom and the power and the glory 
forever’ (Mt. 6:13). Hence, the divine will, law and presence are paramount and every earthly 
ruler has to take this into account.       
Subsequently, there are inherent limits to the legitimate exercise of power within the 
Christian context. There are certain actions that secular governments cannot legislate or 
sanction without overstepping the Christian conscience and beliefs. For instance, compulsory 
participation of all citizens in the pagan rituals of the political religion of the late Roman 
Empire was considered unacceptable by the Christian Church. Under such circumstances, 
every Christian had moral and religious duty to disobey imperial orders and abstain from 
participation in these mandatory practices (as many did and were martyred), though many 
defected and were excommunicated. Similarly, during communist regimes, Christian faith 
was challenged by official anti-religious propaganda and many believers defected (though 
many remained faithful facing severe persecution). Therefore, the Christian Church very early 
in its history had to face the challenges of the secular authorities and to develop its teachings 
in relation to the exercise of a governmental power. To these challenges, the Orthodox Church 
has responded not with providing easy justification, sanctification or legitimacy to a particular 
political regime, but through elaborating limits, criteria and requirements with respect to all 
different political forms of government. Taking into consideration the differing practices of 
government in various political and cultural contexts, the voice of the Christian Church has 
not been uniform, but rather ‘polyphonic’.  
Examples of such pluralist Christian views regarding secular powers and the duties of 
the Christians can be found in the New Testament. There are few verses in the Paul’s epistles 
where peaceful and obedient attitude towards the authorities prevails:  
 
Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and 
authorities that exist are appointed by God. Therefore whoever resists the authority resists the ordinance of God, 
and those who resist will bring judgment on themselves.
342
  
Therefore I exhort first of all that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for 
all men, for kings and all who are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and 
reverence.
343
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Remind them to be subject to rulers and authorities, to obey, to be ready for every good work, to speak 
evil of no one, to be peaceable, gentle, showing all humility to all men.
344
 
 
Paying reverence to the secular authorities is considered a pre-condition for a good life 
of a Christian. However, one needs to remember that Paul, being a Roman citizen himself, 
was sentenced and executed by the same government to which he paid respect in the epistles. 
Consequently, after a number of severe persecutions of the Christians by the Roman 
authorities, Paul’s words have been understood not literally, but conditionally, referring only 
to just and righteous authorities.
345
  
To present the polyphony of the Christian teachings in relation to the secular powers, 
it is necessary to mention the most prophetic New Testament book - the Revelation of St. 
John. Notably enough, most of the images and metaphors referring to the earthly governments 
have connotations of the evil forces (e.g. the images of the beast and the dragon). Even though 
this book has never been used in liturgical rites of the Eastern Orthodox Church, its powerful 
message and apocalyptic images have never been forgotten. Framing the Christian 
eschatology, consisting of visions of the ‘last days’, this book is always challenging for the 
earthly authorities and hierarchies. It also nurtures Christian consciousness and vigilance 
questioning the legitimacy of any unjust authority.  
Similarly, in the Old Testament there are number of statements which challenge the 
established authorities. Some of these verses have been quoted in the New Testament, thus 
emphasizing both continuity in understanding and ambivalence in addressing the earthly 
authority: 
 
Do not put your trust in princes, Nor in a son of man, in whom there is no help. His spirit departs, he 
returns to his earth; In that very day his plans perish.
346
 
Your throne, O God, is forever and ever; A scepter of righteousness is the scepter of Your kingdom. 
You have loved righteousness and hated lawlessness; Therefore God, Your God, has anointed You with the oil 
of gladness more than Your companions.
347
 
 
 These scriptural verses render a straightforward massage to the believers and the 
secular authorities – that God alone should be the source of and the end of all power and due 
respect: ‘I am the Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End,…who is and who was 
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and who is to come, the  Almighty’ (Rev. 1:8). In the eschatological Christian perspective, the 
earthly authorities will perish, their sense of justice is limited and conditional, they will face 
the final victory of the omnipotent God. Earthly kingdoms are finally transcended by the 
Kingdom of God, the New Jerusalem descending full of glory, justice and mercy (Rev. 21:1-
7). In the light of these images the earthly authorities should evaluate their governance in 
order to be considered legitimate and worthy of respect by the Christians.   
 An important dimension of the relations between the divine and the earthly kingdoms 
is the development of a particular understanding of the law that binds the faithful. Different 
meanings attributed to the concept of law could be found in the New Testament. In Paul’s 
epistles the tension and contradistinction between the Law of the Jewish people and the mercy 
and grace received in Christ’s name is a predominant theme:  
 
Therefore by the deeds of the law no flesh will be justified in His sight, for by the law is the knowledge 
of sin. But now the righteousness of God apart from the law is revealed, being witnessed by the Law and the 
Prophets, even the righteousness of God, through faith in Jesus Christ, to all and on all who believe. For there is 
no difference;  for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God,  being justified freely by His grace through 
the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.
348  
For Christ is the end of the law, that everyone who has faith may be justified.
349
 
 
This teaching is interpreted not only in spiritual, but also in political-theological terms 
as challenging the established socio-political order.
350
  
Another important notion relates to Jesus as a Law-giver himself who is not bound by 
the old Jewish law, but rather fulfills or transcends it: ‘The Sabbath was made for man, and 
not man for the Sabbath. Therefore the Son of Man is also Lord of the Sabbath’ (Mk. 3:27-
28); ‘For the law was given through Moses, but grace and truth came through Jesus Christ’ 
(Jn. 1:17). Breaching strict Jewish laws Jesus heals suffering people during Shabbat, allows 
transgressions of purification rituals, thus emphasizing the spiritual, not the formal 
interpretation of the law (Mk. 3:1-6, 7:1-10). To the formalist interpretation of the Jewish 
laws defended by the Pharisees, Jesus counter-poses a substantive understanding of the law - 
the love to God and the neighbor as the fulfillment of the law (Mt. 22:37-40).
351
  
It is also noteworthy, that the early Christian community had been organized in 
accordance to clear and strong moral and spiritual principles binding for every single member. 
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This could be interpreted as a form of emerging new Christian law shaping the structure and 
organization of the church as a community of believers, with its governance and the authority 
of the church leaders (the episkopoi and the presbyteroi), procedures of decision-making and 
moral code of behavior for the clergy and the believers.
352
 This early development of the 
principles and rules of the new Christian social order allows John McGuckin to conclude that 
the Christian community from its very beginning started to reflect on the role of law in its 
organizational life. He interprets this as a form of acceptance and endorsement of the concept 
of the ‘rule of law’ understood as ‘a philosophical notion involving theories of community 
responsibility and representation, agreed standards, and systems of maintenance for those 
standards: in other words, a politeia governed and protected by laws’.353  
The foundations of this emerging Christian law could be discovered in the synthesis of 
biblical themes and concepts, in the Greco-Roman legal philosophy and the practical needs of 
governing distinct communities in a broader social and political context of the Roman 
Empire. In McGuckin’s account, Christianity emerges as a religion that ‘wishes to build a 
civilization, not one that is simply running to hide itself.’354 This view emphasizes the public 
character of the Christian Church as well as its engagement with the world.  
In the first three centuries of its development, the Christian Church had experienced a 
process of synthesizing and elaborating collections of the canon law. Notwithstanding 
numerous persecutions and dissident movements, the Church had assembled its rules, rituals, 
concepts and practices in authoritative collections which had been widely accepted and 
applied among Christian communities. Among these collections The Clementine Letters (late 
1
st
 c.), The Didache (2
nd
 c.), The Didascalia Apostolorum (early 3
rd
 c.) deserve attention.
355
 
They present the Christian Church as a community with distinct identity and self-reflection 
that could not be dissolved in the state.  
Moreover, the Church forms a community that is not only spiritual and eschatological, 
but also social, with specific internal structure, order and regulations. This is even more 
important, in the light of the subsequent official political and legal recognition of the Church 
by the state in the 4
th
 century. In this respect, the political-theological reflection of the church-
state relations should take into account the distinct institutional and legal order of the Church. 
It had been formed during the first centuries of the Church’s existence – times of intense 
persecution and opposition to the pagan empire. This context contributed to the predominantly 
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ascetic and eschatological character of the Christian political theology of the first three 
centuries. In the next section, the period of Christianization of the empire and of elaboration 
of the imperial Byzantine political theology with its political and legal implications for the 
Church will be analyzed.     
    
2. Byzantine political theology of ‘Symphonia’: concept, model and misconceptions 
2.1. Byzantine legal culture and context  
Having presented the biblical grounds of the Christian doctrines related to the exercise 
of political power and the concepts of law, it is also important to analyze the formulation of 
the Byzantine political-theological doctrines. The overarching doctrine in the Byzantine 
context is ‘symphonia’. It has religious, political and legal implications developing throughout 
the centuries. Their systematic treatment could be found in the canon and civil law of the 
Byzantine church and empire. 
With the Edict of Milan in 313, officially granting toleration to the exercise of the 
Christian faith, a new form of church-state relations had been gradually developed.
356
 With its 
raising popularity within the Imperial court and the subsequent conversion of the emperors 
and the vast majority of the population, Christianity was recognized as an official religion of 
the empire in the end of 4
th
 century (380 AD). With this major political and institutional 
change of its status in society, Christianity had to reflect and accommodate to this complex, 
challenging and contradictory co-existence with the state. One of the direct consequences to 
the public role and status of the Church had been its further institutionalization and 
legalization. The maxim ‘Ecclesia vivit lege Romana’ (‘The Church lives by Roman law’)357 
summarizes the synthesis between the Roman institutional and legal order and the Christian 
values, principles and canons that had taken place since the 4th century onwards. The 
interdependence of canon and civil law is evident in both eastern and western Christian 
traditions. Moreover, elaborate codes of the Roman law (Codex Theodosianus and Codex 
Justinianus) include ecclesiastical rules along with civil law regulations.
358
  
With respect to the connection between the canon law and the civil law, Martin 
Loughlin observes the following: ‘The shape that early church government took was 
profoundly influenced by the ideology of the authority structure of the Roman Empire. Since 
law was a primary means of shaping the authority structure of the Empire, it is not surprising 
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to find that, after having been adopted as the official religion of the Empire, Christian doctrine 
also came to be expressed in juristic terms.’359 The imperial ideology and the Christian 
theology had been reflected in one of the greatest legal sources of the Western law – Corpus 
Iuris Civilis, composed between 529 and 534. The fusion between the two was expressed in 
the political-theological maxim gaining significance during this period: ‘One God, one 
Empire, one Church’.360      
The later development of the legal system of the Byzantine state had also emphasized 
the relations between the secular and the ecclesiastic law. The Nomokanons (7
th
 and 9
th
 c.), the 
Eisagoge (9
th
 c.), the Basilika (10
th
 c.), Hexabiblos (14
th
 c.), Syntagma (14
th
 c.) being 
collations and codifications of both civil and ecclesiastic law were instrumental in cultivating 
legal consciousness and respect for the law in the Byzantine state and the surrounding Eastern 
Orthodox countries. Some of these legal codes continued to shape the life of the Christian 
societies in the region under the Ottoman rule, thus ensuring continuity with the preceding 
Christian tradition of respect to the law – divine, canon and civil.  
One of the defining features of the Eastern Church, in McGuckin’s view, has been its 
commitment to the rule of law, as a principle of social organization and a fundamental value. 
In this respect, ‘the Church can never give its assent to random governance, tyranny, or a self-
congratulatory governmental system that does not elevate the rights of the needy alongside the 
privileges of the rich, seeking a balance in polity according to its fundamentally “synodical 
mind”. Moreover, it has been noted that the Byzantine society ‘had a legal system that 
protected civic and corporate values, that guarded both the state and Church from burdensome 
encroachment on the other’s legitimate zones according to a viable system of subsidiarity, one 
that elevated communal wisdom alongside the divine right to rule, and which advocated 
pastoral discretion (mercy) as a core value in legal adjudication.’361  
In the Byzantine concept of symphonia that emerged, directed at social cohesion and 
close cooperation between the Church and the state for the benefit of the Christian society, 
one can find endorsement of ‘the principle of political association and deal-making as an 
integral part of good order; compact, alignment, and alliance (between all the significant 
agents of social rule) thus being elevated as essential safeguards to the principle of the rule of 
law.’362 According to this perspective, the Byzantine law and legal imagination, both civil and 
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canon, emphasized the Christian ethos and morals as its foundational sources, it turned to the 
values of divine justice, mercy, compassion and reconciliation for inspiration and guidance.           
Beyond the similarity between the Eastern and the Western legal and canonic 
traditions in the first centuries, discrepancies in the political and ecclesiastical models had 
developed. The absence of an effective imperial power in the West along with the prominence 
of the city of Rome and the bishop of Rome claiming a direct succession from Apostle Peter 
led to the growing recognition of the ecclesiastical and political role of the pope. Claims of 
superiority and supremacy of the sacramental and jurisdictional powers of the pope, as being 
above other church and secular authorities, were supported by elaborate legal doctrines 
following the concepts of the Roman law. Thus, it was defended that the pope alone has 
plenitudo potestatis, that he needs to concentrate the imperium, auctoritas and potestas in the 
Church considered as a distinct visible organization – a corporation with its structure of 
governance, principles of representation and procedures of decision-making.
363
  
Moreover, in the late 11
th
 and 12
th
 centuries a significant process of reorganization of 
the Roman Church as a powerful centralized institution was taking place along with the 
process of systematization and rationalization of the western ecclesiastic law. In this period, it 
was the system of law that emerged as a strong organizing principle of the Western Church.
364
 
Compared to the Church in the East, which also recognized imperial legal instruments and 
developed an ecclesiastic and canon law of its own, the juridification of the theology of the 
Roman Church is truly significant. In political-theological terms this tendency was 
emphasized by the shift of the focus from the mysticism of the Kingdom of God and the 
Resurrection of Christ towards his earthly suffering on the Cross and the duties toward the 
terrestrial kingdom that had to be performed. Furthermore, the development of the doctrines 
of atonement (Anselm of Canterbury) and the purgatory emphasized the legal concepts of 
judgment and personal responsibility for committed transgressions of the laws of the 
Church.
365
  
It has been emphasized, that the legalistic turn of the theology of the Western Church 
after the 11
th
 century, had affected the western legal science that took the form of ‘a secular 
theology.’ It is well recognized, that  ‘basic institutions, concepts, and values of Western legal 
systems have their sources in religious rituals, liturgies, and doctrines of the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, reflecting new attitudes toward death, sin, punishment, forgiveness, and 
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salvation, as well as new assumptions concerning the relationship of the divine to the human 
and of faith to reason.’366 Thus, the alienation between the Eastern and Western Christian 
theologies and canon law systems, which started centuries earlier, resulted in the Great 
Schism (1054) and the subsequent tensions and contradictions in the following centuries.  
From a contemporary perspective, the elaboration of the systematized and rationalized 
Western canon law, as well as the Investiture Struggle and controversy between the realms of 
regnum and sacerdotium gradually led to the emergence of the concept of church-state 
separation, the legitimation of sovereign secular state and the recognition of modern public 
law.
367
 In the Christian East, however, the political and legal tradition, as well as the 
theological doctrines provided a context in which a more complex balance, rather than 
constant struggle, between the secular and the ecclesiastic powers had been practiced.          
 
2.2. Symphonia: concept and model 
Unlike the western political theology, the Byzantine political-theological doctrine did 
not embrace ‘the two swords theory’368 and was not framed by the ongoing struggle and 
competing claims of superiority between the Church and the empire. According to the 
prominent Orthodox scholar Alexander Schmemann, the Byzantine doctrine of symphonia 
rejected the legalistic ideas of having a concordat or a juridical limitation and division of 
powers, while relating the Church and the state in the recognition and defense of the Christian 
faith.
369
  
The doctrine of symphonia is a form of synthesis between the imperial ideology and 
the institutionalized Eastern Christianity. It ensures a conditional blessing of the exercise of 
political power for the common welfare of the Christian society (church and state) to the 
extent the ruler remains faithful to the Scriptures and the Christian dogma.
370
 This blessing is 
mediated through the Church and its higher clergy. This doctrine remained for centuries a 
paradigmatic one and was continuously reinterpreted and reproduced in the political and 
institutional orders of other predominantly Orthodox states (Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia). 
 In its classical form, the doctrine of symphonia was developed under the reign of 
Emperor Justinian. Consequently, it was formulated and enacted in the new imperial 
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legislation in 535. The core purpose of this promulgation was to define the proper spheres of 
the imperial power (imperium) and the ecclesiastical authority (sacerdotium): 
 
There are two greatest gifts which God, in his love for man, has granted from on high: the priesthood 
and the imperial dignity. The first serves divine things, the second directs and administers human affairs; both 
however proceed from the same origin and adorn the life of mankind. Hence, nothing should be such a source of 
care to the emperors as the dignity of the priests, since it is for the [imperial] welfare that they constantly implore 
God. For if the priesthood is in every way free from blame and possesses access to God, and if the emperors 
administer equitably and judiciously the state entrusted to their care, general harmony (symphonia) will result, 
and whatever is beneficial will be bestowed upon the human race.
371
 
 
Relying heavily on the Eusebius’ model of the unified and centralized Christian 
empire and on the role of the emperor as a divinely instituted guardian of the faith and the 
Church, mediating the presence of the divine Word into the world,
372
 the doctrine of 
symphonia goes even further. Enacted in the imperial legislation, symphonia becomes an 
established political-theological model for the centuries to come. This doctrine could be seen 
as a systematization of earlier theological understandings on the relation between the 
Kingdom of God and the earthly kingdom. In the writings of the fourth century Church 
Fathers (Basil the Great, John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus), the 
existence of the political order of the state was seen in an eschatological perspective. The 
institutions of government were considered necessary for the good ordering of the human 
society. Among the most important tasks of the government were the distribution of justice 
and the education of people to follow the divine law. Though remaining distinct, the Church 
and the state were expected to cooperate in the movement towards salvation of the people and 
the realization of the eschatological vision of communion with God.
373
            
This elaborate understanding of the interaction between ecclesiastical and political 
authorities had developed in the successive periods. In a legal corpus of late 9
th
 century, 
Eisagoge (Epanagoge), the concept was further elaborated. The concept of symphonia was 
taken to include the idea of the emperor of the universal Christian empire as being responsible 
for the defense of the faith, doing good and being witness of God’s grace and mercy for the 
humans. Though there existed a certain degree of polarity and differentiation between ‘divine 
things’ and ‘human affairs’, this neither evolved into a sharp dichotomy between the secular 
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and the spiritual, nor led to extreme separation between the Church and the empire. Between 
the two realms, a degree of symphonia had to be implemented, thus ensuring cooperation and 
collaboration in the mission of defending the faith and introducing Christian values in the 
society. Moreover, in support of this close cooperation, a theological argument had been 
found in the doctrine of Incarnation emphasizing the divine-human communion in Christ. 
This emphasis on the communion, interpersonal relationship with God, the notion of theosis 
(deification) of the whole human being, the absence of ecclesiastic claims to exercise political 
power, had resulted in a distinct Eastern Orthodox understanding of the nature of the Church - 
focused on its mystical, eschatological, sacramental dimensions. This is quite different from 
the Western Christian understanding (until very recently) of the predominantly institutional 
and corporate structure of the Church ruled by the legal principles and the canon law, united 
under the single and supreme authority of the pope. Though the Eastern Church was also 
organized according to the ecclesiastic and canon law, it was first and foremost understood as 
‘a sacramental communion with God in Christ and the Spirit, whose membership — the entire 
Body of Christ — is not limited to the earthly oikoumene (‘inhabited earth’) where law 
governs society but includes the host of angels and saints as well as the divine head.’374 This 
predominantly mystical understanding of the Eastern Church explains why it has not 
developed systematic doctrines of power, sovereignty, succession, limitation of powers, 
representation. Thus, the political imagination of the Orthodox Church has been focused on 
communion, on relational, interpersonal exercise of its divine and social mission, understood 
more in terms of charismatic ministry and witness, instead in terms of representation, 
legitimation or sovereignty.
375
                                                                     
In Meyendorff’s view, the doctrine of symphonia had also a negative side. It assumed 
that the empire was essentially Christianized, that, in reality, Pax Romana had become Pax 
Christiana. In that sense, symphonia could be viewed as an expression of a larger socio-
political program, combining both Roman and Christian universalisms. The vital core of this 
program was equated with the ‘great dream’ of the Byzantine civilization: to have a universal 
Christian society relying on the collaboration between the emperor and the Church. This 
‘dream’ was directed, first and foremost, to preserving and defending the faith and structuring 
a society based on fundamental human values – dignity, charity, and compassion. Even 
though the doctrine of symphonia was based on the understanding of the Incarnation, uniting 
in the personhood of Christ both the divine and the human natures, it was wrong to relate this 
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mystical reality to the factual existence of both civil and ecclesiastical hierarchies in a 
particular state. Nonetheless, the doctrine continued to define the political imaginary of the 
late Byzantine Empire. Even in the times of significant decline, few decades before the 
Conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans, when the imperial power was critically eroded, 
Patriarch Anthony IV restated the ultimate meaning of the doctrine of symphonia: ‘It is not 
possible for Christians to have the Church and not to have the Empire; for Church and Empire 
form a great unity and community; it is not possible for them to be separated from one 
another.’376 
The critical analysis of the doctrine of symphonia and of its role in the Byzantine 
political model is focused on its utopian assumptions: identifying the empire with the 
Kingdom of God, ‘Roman’ people with God’s people.377 In Schmemann’s view, the doctrine 
allowed an overlap between the two realms, thus leaving no free place for the Church in 
Byzantine society. The Church has always considered itself a new eschatological community, 
being ‘not of this world, but in this world’, born by the baptismal water and the Spirit, the 
mystique Body of Christ in which God dwells and communes with human persons. In this 
perspective, it is impossible to reduce the richness of this spiritual and existential reality of the 
Church to any form of natural or social organization. For Schmemann, the challenge of the 
doctrine and model of symphonia is present in the attempt to instrumentalize the Church for 
the welfare and the benefit of the empire, to reduce the Church to the forms and conditions of 
the Christian society, to deny its ontological independence from the state and the world and to 
overshadow its eschatological perspective. This process of convergence between the Church 
and the state is even more visible in the later Byzantine ideology describing the role of the 
Church as the soul of the empire, while the political community is understood as the body. 
However, this perception contradicts the genuine Christian reflection according to which the 
Church is considered to be the true body of Christ and a living divine-human communion. 
Hence, the fallacy of the imperial doctrine of symphonia lies in the reduction of the Church to 
a mere spiritual authority, though respected and honored, having to serve the well-being of the 
empire.
378
  
Political-theological insights found in the doctrine of symphonia as a paradigmatic 
model in the Eastern Christian context should not eclipse the existing tensions and 
ambivalence. For Christian scholars, it is impossible to reduce the Church to any form of 
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social organization. Even though Christianity has never rejected the benefits of statehood and 
society, in its core teachings it has revealed the limitations of any social or political order. 
Hence, claims to absolute sovereignty, allegiance or exceptionality by the social structures 
remain open to substantive critique on the basis of the Christian beliefs. The immediate results 
from the acceptance of Christianity as an eschatological faith could be seen in the 
desacralization of the imperial political religion and the recognition of fundamental 
limitations to all secular powers. For Schmemann, the only absolute and sacred objects in the 
beliefs of the Church have remained the God and the person:  
 
the true postulate for a Christian world was not a merging of the Church with the state but, on the 
contrary, a distinction between them. For the state is only Christian to the extent that it does not claim to be 
everything for man - to define his whole life - but enables him to be a member as well of another community, 
another reality, which is alien to the state although not hostile to it.
 379
   
 
Being a sharp critic of the Byzantine autocracy, Schmemann interprets the doctrine of 
symphonia as rooted in the theocratic ideology of the pre-Christian state. In the value system 
of the Roman pagan ideology, the state is sacred and absolute, the emperor is divine, and the 
public exercise of the imperial cult is considered one of the most important state functions.  
Moreover, this form of political-religious ideology had its final goal in the well-being of the 
state and functioned as a sign of allegiance to the emperor and the empire. With the adoption 
of Christianity, the form of the imperial ceremonial and the imperial ideology had changed, 
however, their content and internal logic remained without significant revisions. Thus, in the 
Justinian’s synthesis of symphonia, argues Schmemann, the Church was instrumentalized to 
serve the goals of the empire, while its otherworldly nature was not respected. Schmemann 
concludes his account expressing sharp criticism: ‘the first chapter in the history of the 
Christian world ends with the victorious return of pagan absolutism.’380 In his understanding, 
the doctrine of symphonia had emerged as only a particular and contextual expression of the 
Byzantine church-state relations and political-theological imaginary, affected by the long-
lasting pagan traditions. In the end, this doctrine lacked the universalism and the 
eschatological perspective of the Orthodox Christianity, and overshadowed the true mission 
and message of the Church. 
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Other Orthodox scholars share more nuanced views. According to McGuckin, the 
political-theological ideal, which had found its expression in simphonia, was about the 
balanced harmony between the secular and the ecclesiastical domain achieved by paying 
mutual respect and collaboration in the name of Christ.
381
 According to Metropolitan Kallistos 
(Timothy Ware), a leading contemporary Orthodox theologian, each of the two elements – the 
imperial power and the priesthood – had its specific sphere of operation, remaining 
autonomous, excluding the absolute control of one over the other.
382
 This more positive 
evaluation of the symphonia model is a significant change over the last decades, given the 
critical views that prevailed in authoritative Byzantine studies until recently.
383
  
In presenting the complexity of church-state relations and political theology in 
Byzantine context, it is of crucial importance to distinguish the authentic Christian attitude to 
the imperial authority. This Christian perception should not be confused with the official 
imperial ideology expressed in the authoritative legal sources or political documents. 
According to the Orthodox Church, one of the most important limitations of the imperial 
authority was its subordination to the Christian doctrine and the church law. The absolute 
power, beyond and above the law, was considered a characteristic of the pagan times of the 
empire, while Christianity had endorsed the rule of law, not the arbitrary will of the ruler.  
To the extent the emperor and the government remained faithful to the Christian 
beliefs they were considered legitimate, hence deserving support on behalf of the Church and 
the people. In a case they adopted heterodox views the Church withdrew its support, often at 
the expense of facing intensive struggles and persecutions. In the history of the Church, it was 
the heterodox imperial authority that persecuted a number of Orthodox clerics and saints - 
Athanasios, John Chrysostom, Euphemius, Macedonius, Maximus the Confessor. Hence, the 
symphonia model should not be interpreted as requiring submission to the imperial authority 
when it acted unjustly or violated the Orthodox beliefs and the canon law. The right of dissent 
in defense of the Church against heretic emperors had often been exercised leading to civil 
disobedience and political confrontation, to deposition of the emperor and ultimately to the 
restoration of the Orthodox faith.    
Regardless of the rigidity of the political regime, the Church remained committed to 
its internal freedom and religious doctrine vis-à-vis the attempts of the imperial or state 
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authorities to exercise control. For instance, in Byzantium, all negotiated unions with the 
Papacy, supported and orchestrated by the emperor and some members of the higher clergy, 
were resisted by the Church as a community of believers and the majority of the clergy. Some 
of the ecumenical councils (of Nicaea, of Chalcedon) explaining and codifying the Christian 
Orthodoxy were defended by the Church against the imperial endorsement of heterodox 
doctrines. Thus, during the period of Iconoclasm in the 8
th
 century, the empire once again 
attempted to establish a state-controlled church that will support the imperial policies, but this 
was rejected by the majority of the Orthodox faithful. From these facts, a consistent 
conclusion could be drawn that portrays the Church as upholding its own freedom and 
resisting the authorities, in cases when the fundamental Christian beliefs were questioned by 
the government. 
Requiring complex balances and cooperation, yet functioning in a context of 
continuous struggles and tensions between the church and the state, the doctrine of symphonia 
with its political-theological underpinnings should not be regarded as endorsing absolutism 
and arbitrary rule.
384
 It provided limitations to the legitimate involvement of the imperial 
authority in the religious sphere and set standards for the exercises of political power. 
Allocating the proper spheres of influence and competence, the doctrine of symphonia served 
also as a form, though imperfect in many ways, of church-state co-existence and 
accommodation to social realities, which allowed the Church to play a significant role in the 
public space of the empire. 
Originating in Byzantium, the symphonia model played a significant role in the 
political history of the SEE states and Russia, although being accepted in a modified form. In 
the case of the SEE states, the symphonia was first practiced in their medieval polities (before 
the Ottoman Conquest), as well as in the emerging nation-states in 19
th
 century. The relations 
between the reigning monarchs and the national autocephalous churches were designed after 
the symphonia model in order to strengthen the unity and centralization of the states and to 
provide legitimacy and popular acceptance of the monarchical office. In this late contextual 
development, however, the model lost its universalist and imperial underpinnings.    
The Byzantine model was also employed by Tsarist Russia as a means of harnessing 
the Orthodox Church in legitimation of the official imperial ideology. In this Russian imperial 
interpretation of the Orthodoxy a special emphasis was placed on the ideas of sacralization of 
Russia (‘Holy Russia’), viewed as a legitimate successor of Byzantium, attributed with 
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messianic and eschatological role in the world history. Accordingly, Moscow was regarded as 
the ‘Third Rome’, having the prestige and preeminence even higher than Rome and 
Constantinople, being purified and saved from the vices of the two previous imperial and 
spiritual centers.
385
 This kind of post-Byzantine political theology was used to justify a 
centralized and absolute monarchical government as well as to provide an ideological basis 
for territorial expansion and domination in both Eastern Europe and Asia.  
Notwithstanding the critical reflections of contemporary scholars, the doctrine of 
symphonia has been widely regarded as representing the traditional Orthodox view on church-
state relations. In its moderate interpretation, it could be seen as a distinct concept between the 
complete separation and secularization (secular state), on the one side, and the full fusion and 
overlapping between the spiritual and the political realms (theocracy), on the other. It 
maintains that the political and the ecclesiastic spheres remain mutually dependent, but not 
the same, interacting with one another, but never collapsing into or consuming one another: 
neither complete separation, nor theocracy. The sustainability and continuity of the symphonia 
model throughout the centuries, in different social and political contexts, as well as its gradual 
reception in other societies in the European South East, emphasizes the importance and reality 
of interaction, negotiation and inclusion between the religious and the political spheres. 
Rejecting any form of idealization of the concept and of its traditional and modern 
implementation, the doctrine of symphonia could be interpreted as referring to the importance 
of engagement with and participation in the society as a distinct form of Christian 
responsibility for the human persons, their political order and the world. Though not 
applicable in a democratic pluralist state, the symphonia model had been a historically valid 
and legitimate expression of church-state relations. With all its limitations and shortcomings, 
the symphonia model had been limited and contextual implementation of the inclusive ethos 
dominating the Eastern Christian theology.  
    
2.3. Symphonia is not caeseropapism 
Traditional western historiography have developed a rather critical interpretation of 
church-state relations in the classical Byzantine period. They usually point at the subordinate 
position of the Orthodox Church under the authority of the emperor and label this condition 
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with the term caeseropapism.
386
 This imprecise representation is correctly criticized by 
Dagron, as ‘meant to stigmatize a typically Byzantine perversion of the relation between the 
state and Church, but …can easily be shown to have been a product of the most contradictory 
religious movements of modern Europe.’387   
The elaboration of the concept of caeseropapism is grounded in the interpretation of 
the emperors’ claim to exercise both ruling and sacral function (described as ‘priestly 
kingship’) during the early Byzantine period until the Iconoclastic period. These claims were 
initially grounded on the Old Testament readings and tradition referring to either the biblical 
personality of Melchizedek or to the sacred Davidic (kingship) and Levitic (priesthood) 
heritage.
388
 In the light of the Christian revelation, however, these references rather had 
metaphorical and rhetorical meaning. Due to the fact that the Jewish law and tradition had 
been overcome and transformed by the grace and love of Jesus Christ, the Old Testament 
model of relating the ruling and the sacral function of the king had no longer been applicable 
for the Christian community. In that context, the rhetorical use of the Jewish royal and priestly 
images and symbols could not be regarded a representation of either ‘theocratic’ or 
‘caeseropapist’ elements in the imperial office in Byzantium. 
The contemporary Byzantine studies criticize and denounce the doctrine of 
caeseropapism as ideological and insufficient in explaining church–state relations in the 
Eastern Christian context. This doctrine is regarded as historically inaccurate. These studies 
reveal that the developments in the imperial ideology and the political thought in the late 
empire (13
th – 14th century) are concerned with quite different tendencies. After reconquering 
and reestablishing Constantinople as the Byzantine imperial capital, following the fall of the 
Latin Empire, a distinct understanding of the imperial office had emerged. It placed a great 
emphasis on the limits of the imperial power, making the emperor responsible before the 
Church, for defending and upholding the Orthodoxy. This development could be observed in 
the changes in the ritual of coronation – the inclusion of the rite of anointing of the emperor 
with Holy Chrism by the patriarch as well as the public confession of the Orthodox faith as 
part of the investiture ceremony. These may be considered visible signs of the ideological 
shift.
389
 Not only was the Church not subordinate and obedient to the empire, but quite the 
opposite: receiving the blessing by the patriarch and the Church was considered a prerequisite 
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of the legitimacy of the emperor. In this later period, the emperor, in the words of Dagron, 
was ‘no more as a lay man on whom was conferred only a purely formal grade of half-
cleric’.390  
Thus, in the beginning of the 14
th
 century, it was common for the higher Orthodox 
clergy to emphasize the freedom of the Church from the empire and any other political 
authority. To some extent, this ideological development could be explained with the 
experience of the visible fall of the empire in 1204, while the Church had survived the Latin 
Conquest of Constantinople. For the contemporaries, the Church became the only living and 
everlasting community that could survive dramatic political disturbances and institutional 
crisis, while the earthly kingdom was regarded as obviously perishable.
391
  
Moreover, this shift in the imperial political theology was supported by documentary 
sources emphasizing the primacy of the Church over the secular authorities. Recent studies 
suggest that the Western doctrine of papal and ecclesiastical primacy grounded in the 8
th
 
century forged document the Donation of Constantine (Constitutum Constantini) had entered 
the Byzantine political and legal thought, though in a modified version, as early as 12
th
 
century. Consequently, it was instrumentalized by the Byzantine ecclesiastics to justify their 
claim for an increased influence over the political authority in the late Byzantine Empire.
392
 
Thus, in the 14
th
 century, the ecclesiastics assumed even more significant roles in the imperial 
institutions, being included as members of the supreme judicial authority (the General Judges 
of the Romans) and the regional imperial courts.
393
      
In Byzantine studies, the doctrine of caeseropapism is criticized as inaccurate and 
misleading on different grounds. For instance, Henri Gregoire maintained that the Byzantine 
society accepted as legitimate certain acts of opposition to the imperial authority with regard 
to the religious matters. This was true, indeed, in many cases when the emperors supported 
non-Orthodox doctrines. In the end, the Christian Orthodoxy, supported by the Church and 
the majority of the population prevailed over the heterodox who were forced to leave the 
imperial office.
394
 Another critical assessment highlights the following: ‘At no time in its 
history had Orthodoxy regarded itself as subordinate to the State, but neither had there been a 
distinct separation of Church and State. At the level of theory at least, the one had not sought 
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to gain absolute control over the other. This is generally known as the principle of 
“synergy”.’395  
In the history of the Orthodox churches, however, there are certain periods when the 
Orthodox churches had been placed under the authority of the government regardless their 
claims for independence and autonomy. Thus, during the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) 
in Russia some elements of caeseropapism were effectively introduced by means of the 
synodal government of the Russian Orthodox Church which lasted until the fall of the Russian 
Empire. The new forms of church organization led to the abolishment of the office of the 
patriarch and appointment of a lay state official (ober-procurator) to oversee the meetings and 
the functioning of the Apostolic Governing Synod. Thus, the post-Byzantine symphonia 
model was effectively dismantled. It is noteworthy, however, that this novelty in the Orthodox 
ecclesiastic governance – a synodic government chaired by a lay person appointed by the 
monarch - was transplanted from organizational structures of state-supported Lutheran 
churches where it first emerged. In that sense, the synodic government should not be regarded 
an authentic Orthodox ecclesiastic practice.
396
  
Caeseropapist tendencies could be evaluated with respect to the recent history of the 
Orthodox churches in the 20
th
 century. For the most part of this period the churches had to 
survive under powerful authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (during the inter-war period and 
communist dictatorship). In many cases, facing harsh political conditions and severe 
oppression policies, the churches were made to some extent subordinate and subservient to 
the powerful authoritarian states.
397
 However, there also existed dissident Christian 
movements opposing the collaboration of the official church hierarchy with the dictatorial 
regimes. These periods of almost inevitable subservience with the regimes should not be 
considered a proof of inherent caeseropapist tendencies in the Eastern Orthodoxy. They 
should be more properly evaluated as regrettable compromises and concessions due to the 
hostile political context in which Orthodox churches had to survive often at the expense of 
limiting their independence and activities.    
In contemporary Orthodox studies, the doctrine of caeseropapism is not regarded as 
applicable neither to the church-state relations in Byzantium, nor to the current form of 
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church-state relations in the constitutional states in the SEE region, in which the Eastern 
Orthodoxy continues to be practiced by the majority of the population. As far as the church 
remains distinct and separate from the state, its clergy is not considered part of the state 
apparatus, and its structure and organization is not placed under the jurisdiction of the state 
administrative bodies, the caeseropapist model is not a proper description of church-state 
relations in Eastern Orthodox context.  
The meaning of symphonia (as a model and a concept) points at the notion of 
engagement with the world and the state as a paradigmatic characteristic of the Eastern 
Orthodox political theology. It is often regarded as a distinctly Orthodox representation of 
church-state relations in the political context of SEE societies. This model underlies the 
political-theological synthesis of the last two centuries. In the next section this synthesis 
between the symphonia model and the emerging nationalism in the region will be highlighted. 
Having already presented in Chapter Two the overall socio-political context which facilitated 
the turn of autocephalous Orthodox churches to nationalism, here only the conceptual frame 
of the political-theological concept of the ‘Christian nation’ will be discussed.         
  
3. The political theology of the ‘Christian Nation’ 
The political theology of the ‘Christian Nation’ emerges from several different 
sources. It blends modern nationalist ideas with the traditional doctrine of symphonia.
398
 It is 
well-known that in their medieval kingdoms, Bulgarians and Serbs struggling for recognition 
among the Christian states, had accepted the political models, cultural trends, legal sources, 
religious rites of the Byzantine empire thus becoming part of the ‘Byzantine 
commonwealth’.399 With the Ottoman Conquest of the region, the rich political and cultural 
development of the Byzantines, Bulgarians and Serbs was eclipsed and overshadowed for 
centuries. Once being applied in the context of medieval empires, in the 19
th
 century 
symphonia model was confined within the borders of the nation-states, thus being 
provincialized and nationalized.    
After the successful liberation movements, the formation of modern nations and 
nation-states, the model of symphonia being preserved as a political-theological ideal of the 
Eastern Orthodox peoples, had to be accommodated to the new political realities. The doctrine 
of the ‘Christian nation’ emerged as a synthesis between the political and religious legacy and 
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the new political realities.
400
 This development was taking place along with the religious-
political movements for independence of the Orthodox churches from the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate. These movements were infused with a nationalist spirit and revolutionary 
political imaginary from the beginning. Church independence was conceived as a pre-
condition for achieving political independence from the Ottoman Empire. Once the new 
nation-states had been established, they relied on the national autocephalous churches to 
support their political agendas of pursuing national unity and effective governing 
centralization. For the newly emancipated national churches the generous support on behalf of 
the state was vital for ensuring their effective and sustainable organization and resources, as 
well as for increasing their public presence and recognition. Hence, the alliance between the 
nation-states and the autocephalous national churches was seen as a symbiosis beneficial to 
both sides – mutual legitimation, recognition and reinforcement in the service of the Christian 
nation.  
This development, however, is not to be evaluated only positively. Through the 
process of nationalization and compartmentalization of the Orthodox Church its universal 
mission was in fact weakened. These isolationist and nationalist tendencies overshadowed the 
ecumenical and eschatological dimension of the Orthodoxy which was visible, at least in 
principle, in the Byzantine political-theological model. The political and cultural boundaries 
of the nations coincided with those of the national Orthodox churches.
401
 The sacramental 
body of the Church overlapped with the national political body thus infusing politics in the 
religious sphere, and sacralizing the national political realm. This in turn contributed to the 
emergence of political religions (national exceptionalism and messianism) which were 
ideologically instrumentalized in the military conflicts of the last century.  
It is important to note that the concepts of symphony, autocephaly, or ethno-nationalist 
political theology (religious nationalism) are not part of the church dogma, of its core 
doctrinal beliefs, properly speaking. In no way their implementation is a proof of an authentic 
Orthodox practice and belonging. Moreover, they could be presented as particular 
accommodations to the political and cultural circumstances (as the ethnarchy model during 
the Ottoman domination). One of these concepts, ethnophiletism, representing religious 
nationalism in its extreme form, been declared heretical, contradicting the core of the 
ecumenical Orthodox Christian teaching. This was decided by the church council in 1872 
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convened by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople to excommunicate the newly 
founded autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate which served the nationalist and liberation cause of 
the Bulgarian population in the Ottoman Empire. It is remarkable in this case, that the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate itself was a powerful exponent of ethnocentric policies, defending 
the superiority of the Greek ecclesiastic and secular establishment within the empire as well 
as its dominance over other ethnic groups.
402
 The outcome of the process of nationalization of 
the Orthodoxy could be seen in the wide-spread traditional equation and overlap between the 
religious self-identification as an Orthodox believer and the ethno-national identity - to be 
Bulgarian, Serbian, or Greek almost always means describing oneself as Orthodox and vice 
versa.
403
 
Continuing absence of a centralized and universal church governance very often leads 
to dependency on local political and social forces and conditions. To that extent, the 
traditional understanding of symphonia (in its reception in the form of ethno-nationalist 
political theology) is instrumentalized by the national churches, in order to secure their 
privileged positions in SEE societies in times of social and political change, of intensified 
secularization and democratization. In its current nationalist form the symphonia model 
should not be understood as an expression of authentic Orthodox doctrines. Instead, it is 
employed in order to secure support and protection on behalf of the state. Moreover, the 
continuing structural weakness of the church as a social organization preconditions its turn 
towards the state – seeking special protection and privilege, offering legitimation and 
ideological support for the political establishment and the governmental policies.
404
  
The visible signs of this nationalization of the Orthodox churches could be seen in the 
changed understanding of the concept of autocephaly. In the first centuries, the leading 
principle of organization was territorial, where the bishops presiding over the local churches 
in the larger cities and imperial centers of the province (metropolis) enjoyed higher prestige 
and honor. Nevertheless, they remained ‘first among equals’ among other bishops of 
neighboring regions. The regional church governance emerged as conciliar, whereas bishops 
from the provinces met regularly in regional councils (synodoi) to decide on organizational 
and doctrinal issues. The territorial church organization followed the administrative divisions 
of the state, while the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was exercised regardless of the ethnic identity 
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of the population. With the emergence of the modern nations and nation-states, however, the 
territorial model of ecclesiastic organization was to a larger extent replaced by the ethno-
national - the limits of ecclesiastic jurisdiction coincided with the ethno-national borders 
extending even beyond the political borders of the state. The recognition of autocephaly 
started to depend on the nationalistic goals of the newly founded nation-states.
405
                
This logic of the historical process in the SEE societies – of almost simultaneous 
emergence of the autocephalous national churches and the nation-states, facilitated the 
instrumentalization of the Church for religious-nationalistic causes in several ways: the 
autocephalous churches had been made subservient to the nationalist policies of authoritarian 
political regimes (including ethnic or linguistic assimilation of minorities); had been used to 
facilitate the process of sacralization of the idea of the glorious nation, and in elaborating 
expansionist messianic mythology (e. g. the idea of ‘Greater Serbia’). Although these policies 
have always been contrary to the Orthodox theology and the authentic mission of the Church, 
national churches have been widely receptive in developing quasi-theological doctrines which 
justify their implementation. Even more problematic, these religious-nationalistic teachings 
have received their public recognition and official sanction in statements and documents 
issued by higher ecclesiastic authorities.       
To illustrate this questionable religious-political synthesis one does not need to look in 
the distant past. In 2015 two statements – of a high cleric of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
and of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church - highlighted the tensions within the 
Orthodox tradition in relation to contemporary liberal democracy. In April 2015, then 
archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, chairman of the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of 
Church and Society of the Moscow Patriarchate,
406
 stated that according to the Orthodox 
perspective the desired form of government is a synthesis between centralized monarchy and 
socialism. This synthesis should be based on the values of strong statehood, solidarity, 
sobornost (conciliarity) and justice. Moreover, in this new political system the unity of faith 
will secure the unity between the people and the power.
407
 In another public statement 
Chaplin urges predominantly Orthodox countries in Eastern Europe not to adopt Western 
liberal democratic model, instead they need to rely on their specific traditional political 
models (which, in fact, include forms of authoritarianism, oligarchy and traditional non-
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democratic social hierarchies).
408
 Chaplin is also a representative of the apocalyptic thinking 
among contemporary Russian Orthodox circles who see Moscow as the Third Rome, called to 
defend the Christian civilization, surrounded and attacked by the aggressive forces of Western 
liberalism and materialism, Islamism, and gay-rights movements.
409
 Undoubtedly, this official 
ecclesiastic representative expresses public opinions widely shared among influential 
members of the higher clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. These statements do not 
represent a form of engagement with the society in line with the personalist and participatory 
Christian concepts. In fact, his positions, taking into account existing secular and church 
hierarchies, express an ideological synthesis that does not correspond to the values of human 
dignity, personal freedom, social and political pluralism. These positions provide support and 
legitimation of the current authoritarian regime in the country.  
The recent case illustrating the engagement of the autocephalous Orthodox churches 
with both the symphonia and the ‘Christian nation’ model refers to a decision of the Synod of 
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. In April 2015, the church decided to include in the text of the 
religious services an invocation of the name of the former Bulgarian king (1943-1946) – 
Simeon II (Saxe-Coburg-Gotha) with the styling – ‘the devout and Christ-loving Tsar of the 
Bulgarians Simeon’. Moreover, this formula was included in the liturgical text before the 
traditional blessing prayer for the government and the people, thus receiving precedence.
410
 
This decision provoked immediate critical reaction among active groups of lay members of 
the church and some members of the clergy, being interpreted as a sign of church’s 
involvement into politics and as an act in collision with the established republican 
constitutional order. It is noteworthy, that there was no proper and adequate justification of 
this synodal decision. It would have been more appropriate if Bulgaria was still a monarchy in 
which Orthodoxy enjoyed the status of an official state religion. It is completely unacceptable, 
however, in a constitutional republic which does not recognize monarchic and aristocratic 
ranks and where the church is separated from the state and officially accepts the democratic 
constitutional order. Thus, after the active public opposition to the decision, it was not 
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implemented in practice. This case also indicates that some members of the high clergy still 
endorse the traditional symphonia model intertwined with the nationalist ideology and fail to 
fully appreciate the contemporary democratic and republican model. There is also a positive 
sign: the immediate critical reflection on behalf of the laity and civil society shows that within 
the church there are communities who openly endorse modern democratic constitutional 
order.      
In a broader perspective, due to the nationalization of the churches in the last two 
centuries, the organizational unity of the ecumenical Orthodoxy is also affected. Very often 
tensions and disputes arise in regard to ecclesiastic jurisdictional matters sometimes causing a 
temporary loss of communion between some autocephalous Orthodox churches. The very 
slow process of convening the highest canonical body of the Church in matters of faith and 
doctrine – the ecumenical council of bishops – is also indicative of the challenges which the 
Orthodox churches face. Though the first steps of the process were initiated decades ago and 
many preparatory pre-conciliar meetings were held, the final decision was to convene the 
Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church in June 2016.
411
 Beyond the continuing 
tensions with regards to organizational issues, the council is expected to be a remarkable 
event, at an ecumenical scale, that will send a message of Christian engagement and universal 
witness of the Orthodoxy, expressing concerns for the protection of human dignity, 
fundamental rights and freedoms, justice and peaceful international cooperation.   
Political-theological dimensions of the ‘Christian nation’ model continue to attract 
interest on behalf of contemporary Orthodox scholars and to inspire different ideological 
speculations. Eclipsing the demarcation between the political, cultural and religious spheres, 
this model could be used by non-democratic forces in some of the countries in Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe. It is very often combined with other concepts and ideas (Slavophile or 
Eurasian in Russia) which are used to support an anti-Western political agenda, opposing 
liberalism, constitutional government and pluralism in the Western societies. In this ultra-
conservative and reactionary interpretation of the model, there is no place for human rights 
and diversity (viewed as symbols of dangerous subjectivism, value relativism and atomization 
of society), neither for the rule of law and limited government (symbols of a liberal, 
individualist and secular order).
412
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When interpreted and practiced as requiring a form of organic unity between the 
church, the state and the nation, the Christian nation (symphonia) model may nonetheless 
challenge the process of democratic consolidation in Southeastern Europe. Moreover, the 
authoritarian political theology currently practiced in Russia creates some risks and challenges 
to the fragile SEE democracies, given their historically established cultural, religious and 
political ties with Russia. Under the guise of a religious and cultural exchange, masking non-
democratic practices as common (Slavic-) Orthodox heritage, Russia can easily export them 
to the SEE societies (under the expansionist form of pan-Slavism, pan-Orthodoxism or 
Eurasianism). Certain aspects of this authoritarian political theology may be directed at 
questioning the geopolitical orientation of the SEE region (currently towards the Western 
alliances – EU and NATO) and proposing an alternative to the ‘Western hegemony’ (the 
emerging Eurasian Economic Union as an alternative), as the intellectual propagandist of the 
Putin’s regime Alexander Dugin suggests.413 
In this context, the Schmitt–Peterson debate about the possibility of an authoritarian 
political theology based on Christian concepts becomes relevant again and could inform the 
ideological and political choices of the SEE societies. The purpose of the present study is to 
advocate for and elaborate an alternative to the non-democratic political theology. This 
alternative should be based on the core Christian concepts and practices, and will endorse a 
political theology that respects human dignity and personal freedom, that is participatory, 
personalist and universalist in its claims. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presents political-theological models developed in Eastern Christian 
context as corresponding to the general political and ideological frame of a specific period. In 
the first centuries of the Christian history, eschatological and ascetic perspectives 
predominated. The political authorities and the legal order had been supported to the extent 
they remained just and respectful of the freedom, dignity and autonomy the Christians and 
their eschatological community.  
During the imperial Byzantine period, the political theology of symphonia emerged 
focused on the cooperation and collaboration between the spiritual and the political realms for 
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the benefit of the state and the society. Symphonia model included proper allocation of 
responsibilities and competences between the church and the state, and more concretely 
between the offices of the patriarch and the emperor without collapsing into forms of 
theocracy, caesaro-papism or complete church-state separation. This model had been largely 
practiced in the emerging medieval states in the SEE region thus becoming a paradigmatic 
model of church-state relations in the Christian East.  
During the period of the national liberation movements and the foundation of nation-
states, the fusion and overlapping between the traditional symphonia model and the religious 
nationalism produced the concept of the Christian nation and the corresponding political-
theological model. This model had been defended by both the autocephalous national 
churches and the reigning monarchs. Hence, the national church legitimated the nation-state 
and vice versa. This political-theological development affected negatively the Christian 
witness and mission in a more ecumenical sense. This is mainly due to the fact that in its more 
radical forms this political-theological model has triggered exceptionalism, expansionism, 
ultra-conservatism and anti-Westernism which challenged the process of democratic 
consolidation and European integration of some of the Western Balkan states.          
It should be noted that the explanation of the emergence of these models is contextual. 
Until very recently, Orthodox churches have developed in political contexts that have been 
non-democratic. This, in turn, affected their organizational structures and capacity. The 
negative effects from this contextual development have been the dependency on the state, a 
predominantly conservative hierarchy and absence of an initiative from below.
414
 Under these 
conditions, the inherent Orthodox values of personality, human dignity and freedom, 
conciliarity, participation, synergy have often been obscured. This study aims at 
reconstructing the meaning and importance of these core values and concepts by connecting 
them in a political-theological model that endorses democracy, human dignity and human 
rights.   
In this evaluation, however, it is important to approach with critical distance either of 
these models (symphonia and Christian nation models). Their ideal-typical representations 
and implementation collide with the universal, personalist and participatory dimensions of the 
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Orthodox theological concepts. Neither of these models follows strictly the conceptual and 
dogmatic meaning of the Orthodox doctrines, even less are they adequate and applicable to 
the contemporary democratic development. In contrast, the participatory political theology 
that will be advocated in the last chapter faces the challenges of democratic society and 
answers with civic engagement, and commitment to personalism, community and 
universalism. It will be demonstrated that the new political-theological model better 
corresponds to the values, ethos and principles of the democratic society.                                                 
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Chapter Five. Participatory political theology: concepts and perspectives 
 
Introduction 
In this last chapter a synthesis of the key elements and concepts of participatory 
political theology will be elaborated. On the basis of the historical contexts and experiences, 
considering traditional political theologies (symphonia and Christian nation) and analyzing 
the development of ideas in the previous chapters, the structure of the new participatory 
political theology will be constructed. Focused on the inherent Orthodox values of 
personalism, participation and universalism, engaging with core concepts and doctrines in the 
Christian theology (theosis and synergy, ecclesia and Eucharist, conciliarity and catholicity, 
economy and eschatology) the new political-theological model will be presented as 
overcoming both symphonia and Christian nation models. It will be emphasized that the new 
political-theological model better corresponds to the contemporary democratic political 
framework and it could enhance and support the democratic ethos and consolidation of 
democracy in the region of Southeastern Europe. Moreover, if it is accepted in the public 
sphere, it may prevent the political instrumentalization of religion and its use in legitimization 
of authoritarian politics (as it was the case in Serbia during Milosevic’s regime, or as it is 
happening now in Russia under Putin’s authoritarian regime).    
  It should be noted that despite its undemocratic legacies in a historical perspective, in 
terms of its theological system Eastern Orthodoxy has maintained and developed a 
comprehensive teaching without compromising its core beliefs. Notwithstanding some 
instances of accommodationist policies at ecclesiastic institutional level under different 
political and social conditions, theological doctrines of the Orthodox Church have been 
preserved largely uncorrupted by the quest for political power or domination. Namely these 
core teachings with their ecumenical and universalist, personalist and participatory 
dimensions will play the central role in constructing the participatory political theology.   
This chapter will engage with and analyze core Christian concepts which represent the 
major themes of the Orthodox Christian belief: the nature of divine-human communion in the 
light of the Trinitarian doctrine and Incarnation (theosis and synergy); the Christian 
communion as an assembly (ecclesia) and spiritual communion (Eucharist); principles of a 
Christian polity (conciliarity and catholicity); Christian engagement with the world 
(economy) and the foretasting of the world to come (eschatology). Each of these concepts, 
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with its theological meaning and political potential, contributes to the core values and 
principles of the participatory political theology.
415
    
 
1. Theosis and synergy  
One of the fundamental concepts which expresses the Orthodox view of achieving 
communion with God is theosis (θέωσɩς). Literally, it means divinization, or deification of the 
human being entering in communion with God and thus becoming God-like. The origin of 
this concept is scriptural – human persons are created in the image and likeness of God 
(Genesis 1:26), are invited to be ‘partakers of the divine nature’ (2 Peter 1:4), are able to 
become ‘God’s temple’ (1 Corinthians 3:16), and allow Christ to live in them (Philippians 
1:21). In the eschatological perspective, in the Kingdom of God, persons will ‘be like Him … 
shall see Him as he is’ (1John 3:2). The predominant theme and notion here is that of 
participation, of openness to the divine life, of dynamic relationship and of active 
engagement, whereas human freedom becomes an unalterable precondition for the 
communion with God.
416
 Even more importantly, according to the prevailing Eastern 
Orthodox views, human freedom is not limited by God, but depends on active participation in 
divine energies and openness to divine life:  
Thus, there is no opposition between freedom and grace in the Byzantine tradition: the presence in man 
of divine qualities, of a "grace," which is part of his nature and makes him fully man, neither destroys his 
freedom nor limits the necessity for him to become fully himself by his own effort; rather, it secures that 
cooperation, or synergy, between the divine will and human choice, which makes possible the progress "from 
glory to glory" and the assimilation of man to the divine dignity for which he was created.
417
 
The Eastern Christian doctrine of theosis presupposes synergy (cooperation) between 
God and humans, thus revealing the essentially human ability to ‘participate’ in God, to 
cooperate with God in the process of salvation and deification. In the Orthodox theology the 
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human person is not in a passive state of total corruption and deprivation only awaiting the 
divine grace. The human person is not excluded from the process of acquiring the ‘image and 
likeness’ of God, thus actively participating in one’s salvific process. Moreover, it is 
maintained that human persons attain their full humanity as long as they are in communion 
with God. The only way of deification (theosis) is through remaining open to God along with 
preserving both human freedom and consciousness. 
The opposite understanding, that of complete separation and disunion between the 
divine and the human, faces the risk of exploiting non-Orthodox concepts which either erode 
or improperly elevate human nature. The opportunity of theosis and communion with God is 
fundamental for the Orthodox understanding and it is inherently linked to the Christian belief 
in the Holy Trinity. Given that the relations in the Trinity are penetrated by love and 
communion, the creation of the human person in the ‘image and likeness’ of God the Trinity 
means that communion and participation are defining features of the human nature as well.
418
  
Being created in the ‘image and likeness’ of God has an ontological meaning for 
humans which shapes their further spiritual development. ‘While “image” emphasizes the 
ontological beginning of humanity, theosis emphasizes the ontological end or telos of man. 
Both say that “authentic humanity”, “true humanity”, “perfect and complete humanity” are 
realized only in relationship with the divine prototype of humanness.’419 
In this respect, it is also significant that relations in the Trinity are truly interpersonal 
(between the persons of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit) and existential, not 
abstract or functional. The Christian God is a communion of divine persons sharing one 
divine essence, who could not be represented as an abstract philosophical absolute.
420
 First 
and foremost, God is a person in communion, not an absolute monadic substance. The 
Orthodox Christian concept of God the Father is personalist, emphasizing his personal 
relations with the Son and the Spirit, who emanate from him. In the Orthodoxy (unlike the 
Catholic theology), the Father is perceived in terms of love and engagement, not in terms of 
power and dominance. This difference is visible in the use of the Greek term pantokrator 
(παντοκράτωρ) in the Nicene Creed,421 which has the meaning of all-embracing and 
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containing-all-things, it is relational, while the Latin translation of the same word is 
‘omnipotens’, thus accentuating the dimension of power and dominance (potestas). In 
conceptual terms, there is truly a difference between having a divinity who establishes 
relations of communion and love, and the one who is primarily seen as а sovereign 
omnipotent ruler. Having referred to these aspects, Zizioulas concludes, that in the Orthodox 
understanding ‘creation becomes mainly an act not of divine power (omnipotence) but of 
divine communion, that is, of an involvement of created existence in the Father-Son (and 
Spirit) relationship.’422 
  Hence, the event of communion and participation between the persons of the Triune 
God and the human being entails a personalist experience: human person enters in 
communion with each of the divine persons, not with an abstract essence of God the 
Absolute.
423
 This personalist approach takes an important place in constructing the 
participatory political theology. Moreover, it is intrinsically linked to the freedom of the 
person, both divine and human. Freeing oneself from the necessity and limits of the nature 
and relating to the person of God, is the way of theosis, of ‘becoming God-like’. Thus, the 
Orthodox theology accepts freedom, communion, uniqueness, and irreducibility as defining 
qualities of the personhood: 
 
…the person is not a secondary but a primary and absolute notion of existence. Noting is more sacred 
than the person since it constitutes the ‘way of being’ of God himself. The person cannot be sacrificed or 
subjected to any ideal, to any moral or natural order, or to any expediency or objective, even of the most sacred 
kind. In order to be truly and be yourself, you must be a person, that is, you must be free from and higher than 
any necessity or objective – natural, moral, religious or ideological. What gives meaning and value to existence 
is the person as absolute freedom. 
…The person cannot exist in isolation. God is not alone; he is communion. Love is not a feeling … 
Love is a relationship… Personal identity can emerge only from love as freedom and from freedom as love. 
…The person is something unique and unrepeatable… 424 
 
  The relational concept of the human person developed by the Orthodox theology is 
also rooted in the understanding of the human and divine natures in the personality of the 
God-man Jesus Christ. The Eastern Orthodoxy remains committed to the teaching of the 
Council of Chalcedon (451) holding that in the one hypostasis of the divine Logos the two 
natures – one fully human and the other fully divine - co-exist and interact. They are related in 
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a unique, though antinomian, way: ‘inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably.’ 
Certainly, due to its antinomian features, the notion of god-manhood is impossible to be 
reduced to simple secular categories. The divine-human communion expresses the reality of 
communion without collapsing or reducing the two distinct natures into one another.  
In the Orthodox view, it is important to distinguish between the Creator and the 
creation, thus emphasizing the transcendence of God. On the other side, it is also crucial to 
maintain the ontology of their communion, interaction, participation, thus, focusing on the 
God’s immanence to the created human beings. This understanding is eloquently expressed by 
Meyendorff in the following passage:  
   Moreover, the fact of the Incarnation implies that the bond between God and man, which has been 
expressed in the Biblical concept of "image and likeness," is unbreakable. The restoration of creation is a "new 
creation," but it does not establish a new pattern, so far as man is concerned; it reinstates man in his original 
divine glory among creatures and in his original responsibility for the world. It reaffirms that man is truly man 
when he participates in the life of God; that he is not autonomous either in relation to God nor in relation to the 
world; that true human life can never be "secular." In Jesus Christ, God and man are one; in Him, therefore, God 
becomes accessible not by superseding or eliminating the humanum, but by realizing and manifesting humanity 
in its purest and most authentic form.
425
 
The doctrines of theosis and synergy, or cooperation, expressing the relationship 
between God and the human, could be interpreted in political-theological terms. The image of 
active human-divine engagement and participation is typically paralleled to the church-state 
relations. In this line of thought, the contemporary Orthodox theologian Stanley Harakas 
defines synergy (συνεργία) in the following way:  
  As a general principle, the Orthodox Church has held a position on the ideal of Church and State 
relations which may be called "the principle of synergy." It is to be distinguished from a sharp division of 
Church and State on the one hand, and a total fusion of Church and State, on the other hand. It recognizes and 
espouses a clear demarcation between Church and State, while calling for a cooperative relationship between the 
two.
426
 
It seems that this definition of synergy in political-theological terms refers to the 
doctrine of symphonia presented in Chapter Four. In the contemporary conditions, however, 
the two doctrines should not be confused as far as symphonia is context-bound and limited to 
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the imperial political theology or to its implications in the predominantly Christian nation-
states (the fusion between the symphonia and Christian nation models). In its political-
theological interpretation, the doctrine of synergy entails the impossibility of any sharp 
division between the spiritual and the temporal, the divine and the human, as far as the 
creation exists in order to take part in the divine. 
It is defended here that the doctrines of theosis and synergy should not be used to 
describe the existing relations between the church and the state, neither should the church and 
the state be paralleled to the divine and the human natures, respectively. Notwithstanding that 
the political theology of symphonia grounds its notions in the mystery of Incarnation
427
 this is 
neither scripturally, nor theologically justified. From a theological point of view, such 
reductionism is deeply problematic. It is not correct to equate the idea of harmonious 
cooperation and collaboration between imperium and sacerdotium, between the state and the 
church, with the relations between perfect humanity and perfect divinity in the Christ’s 
personhood. Neither the state corresponds to the perfect humanity of Christ, nor is the church 
a fully divine institution. Since there is no necessary doctrinal link between the theological 
concepts of theosis and synergy and the symphonia model, the Orthodoxy should remain open 
for an alternative political-theological synthesis. This new synthesis shall correspond to the 
core theological doctrines and shall take into account the surrounding socio-political context 
shaped by the recognition of the values of human dignity and human rights, constitutional 
democracy and the rule of law.
428
 
For the purpose of constructing a participatory political theology, it is crucial that the 
basic theological concepts explaining the interaction between the human and the divine 
(theosis and synergy) reveal the personalist and participatory dimension (human person enters 
into communion with the personal God and other persons) along with underlining the 
universality of the process of divine-human communion (in the person of Christ, the Son of 
God, the human and divine natures enter into communion). Thus the doctrine of theosis 
(divine-human communion) as a relational, participatory and personalist concept becomes a 
starting and yet defining point in constructing the contemporary political theology in an 
Eastern Orthodox context.
429
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2. Ecclesia and Eucharist  
For the task of outlining the participatory political theology, the theological concepts 
of ecclesia and Eucharist have a pivotal importance. They frame the complex relations 
between the person and the community engaged in a spiritual experience, encountering the 
divine presence and entering in communion with God the Trinity. Participation and 
engagement of persons who transcend their own limitations (social, historic, natural, and 
spiritual) in order to commune with others and all together with God is a profound experience 
for Christians. 
  In Orthodox Christianity the concepts of ecclesia and Eucharist are mutually 
constitutive. This is defined in the contemporary theological studies with the term ‘Eucharistic 
ecclesiology’.430 In Schmemann’s words, it is ‘the Eucharist, understood and lived as the 
Sacrament of the Church, as the act, which ever makes the Church to be what she is - the 
People of God, the Temple of the Holy Spirit, the Body of Christ, the gift and manifestation 
of the new life of the new age’.431 In its original understanding a church, ecclesia (ἐκκλησία) 
‘means “a gathering” or “an assembly”, and “to assemble as a church” meant … to constitute 
a gathering whose purpose is to reveal, to realize, the Church. This gathering is Еucharistic – 
its end and fulfillment lies in its being the setting wherein the “Lord’s supper” is 
accomplished, wherein the eucharistic “breaking of bread” takes place’.432  
The church as a eucharistic assembly being a concrete and local assembly of people 
transcends its own limits and boundaries reflecting the universal orientation of the Christian 
experience. The ecclesia as Eucharistic assembly reveals ‘not part of Christ, but the whole 
Christ and not a partial unity but the full eschatological unity of all in Christ. It was a 
concretisation and localisation of the general’.433 Thus Christian universalism is practiced 
within the boundaries of the local Eucharistic community, it does not contradict or threaten 
the local church, rather it reinforces its universal dimension, its organic unity with the Body of 
Christ.   
The Eucharist is a constitutive event of the church to the extent it is a true act of 
assembly (σύναξις) and communion of the Christians. The Eucharist requires also synergy 
(συνεργία) between the cleric who presides the Eucharistic assembly and the participating 
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People of God (λαός).434 Thus the issue of personal presence and participation in the assembly 
is emphasized as a pre-requisite for celebrating the Eucharist and as a constitutive element of 
ecclesia. Moreover, the image of the church as the Body of Christ (1 Cor. 12:27) of which 
every Christian is a member, further accentuates the relational and participatory nature of 
ecclesia. This unique and salvific membership is fully realized in the Eucharist through the 
participation in the communion of the Body and Blood of Christ.
435
 These relations could be 
presented with the following equations: ecclesia = Eucharist = communion.  
The political-theological meaning of the concept of ecclesia defined in Eastern 
Orthodox terms is already analyzed in the literature.
436
 A special consideration is given to the 
different aspects of ecclesia. First, the church should not be interpreted as a purely earthly 
institution, instead, it is the Body of Christ in which God-human communion is made 
possible. The church is a new community born by the baptismal water and the Spirit, based on 
freedom (from all kinds of determinism) and love (of God and fellow humans). Being a 
community, the church is neither an ordinary social organization, nor a self-sufficient and 
autonomous organism beyond and outside the persons. Its substance is visible in the 
communion of Christians, in their transformation as the elevated People of God. This 
understanding emphasizes a profound dynamic and transforming dimension of ecclesia, being 
a communal enterprise, and yet respecting the uniqueness of the human persons and, 
certainly, it is not an organic unity that assimilates persons in an undivided totalizing whole. 
Yet, the key understanding of theosis as divine-humane communion, requires a particular 
view of the church ‘primarily as a communion of free sons of God and only secondarily as an 
institution endowed with authority to govern and to judge.’437       
Second, the church is ‘not of this world, but is in this world’, having a unique position 
that liberates it from being fully identified with temporal powers, institutions, traditions, 
ideologies and nations. The church is eschatological in nature, awaiting the Second Coming of 
the Son of God, the resurrection of the dead and the life everlasting within the New 
Jerusalem. In this sense, ‘the Body of Christ can never be “part” of this world, for Christ has 
ascended into heaven and his Kingdom is Heaven’.438 This further emphasizes the 
impossibility of the complete immanence of the church and of its full engagement with this 
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world. It should preserve its own eschatological nature. In this sense, when the church speaks 
to society or the state, it should remain aware of the challenges of this secular publicity. Very 
often ecclesial statements on social and moral issues sound particularistic, expressing not its 
prophetic and ecumenical voice, but rather limited and contextual positions among many 
others.
439
 Overcoming provincialism and parochialism, elevating the Christian massage to the 
universal level and yet remaining relevant and responsive to the concrete persons, 
communities and societies, will contribute to the public witness of the church.  
Third, the essence of the church is the communion and community found within the 
Eucharist, the liturgy. As it was pointed above, the Eucharist is the Sacrament of the Church, 
as such it is constitutive of ecclesia. ‘In the Eucharist, the Church transcends the dimensions 
of “institution” and becomes the Body of Christ. It is the “eschaton” of the Church, her 
manifestation as the world to come. … It is not the Church that exists for, or “generates,” the 
liturgy, it is the Eucharist which, in a very real sense, “generates” the Church, makes her to be 
what she is.’440  
Understanding the church in the light of the communion and Eucharist is also evident 
in the use of another term, which underlies the public, communal nature of the Christian 
worshiping assembly. In its original Greek meaning, the word leitourgia (λειτουργία), used 
interchangeably with ‘Eucharist’ (εὐχαριστία), denotes ‘an action by which a group of people 
become something corporately which they had not been as a mere collection of individuals – a 
whole greater than the sum of its parts,…function or “ministry” of a man or of a group on 
behalf of and in the interest of the whole community’.441 Hence, the church should be 
regarded as a leitourgia, as a testimony of God and the Kingdom. The only relation of the 
church to this world is to restore its initial beauty and goodness, to transform the world into a 
place where humans could commune freely with God and fellow humans, to return the 
creation to God in a form of thanksgiving (the Eucharist). Hence, the role of the church is to 
transform the world and the creation not to legitimize any temporal authority or 
domination.
442
          
The participatory and universalist perspectives connected to ecclesia are also revealed 
with the term which defines the subject constituting the church as assembly – the People of 
God (λαὸς τοῦ Θεού). In the Scriptures, there is a clear differentiation between the 
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community constituted as the People of God, which is also an universalist concept, embracing 
anyone who hears and choses the divine vocation, and the historic and particularistic ‘people 
or peoples’ (ἔθνος, έθνη), connected to the specific region and society, sharing origin, 
traditions, language. The former is a universal and inclusive concept; the latter is localized 
and exclusive in its nature. Ecclesia is indeed constituted or inhabited by laos – a universalist 
and participatory eschatological community, transcending the limits of ‘this world’, not by 
ethos as an organic pre-political whole.
443
  
According to the Scriptures, this new People of God (laos) is above and beyond the 
ethno-nationalist and socio-political determinants: ‘There can be neither Jew nor Greek, there 
can be neither slave nor freeman, there can be neither male nor female - for you are all one 
in Christ Jesus’ (Gal. 3:28). The differentiation between laos and ethnos illustrates a particular 
challenge to any political theology – the ever present risk of reducing the universalist and 
eschatological reality to the immanent and contingent political and social realities. The 
political-theological project, advocated here, is aware of this challenge. Similar awareness is 
visible in the contemporary Western Christian tradition which openly engages with the 
political-theological meaning of ecclesia, laos and the celestial citizenship starting with 
Augustine and continuing with the debates in the last century (including the Schmitt–Peterson 
debate, the liberation theology and the Second Vatican Council constitutions and declarations) 
presented in Chapter three.
444
 
In the meantime, the close review of the ecclesiastic history suggests, that this 
eschatological spirit of witness and prophesy does not depend on the organizational capacity 
of the church or its close cooperation with the state, but on the living experience of the 
Kingdom of God within the church as a Body of Christ, as a community of free persons, 
united in the Eucharist. Therefore, it remains of pivotal importance for the church to uphold 
the powerful distinction of being present in this world, but belonging not to this world. In a 
political-theological perspective, and recalling the Schmitt – Peterson debate, the Orthodox 
Church follows neither Peterson with his complete church-state separation thesis, nor Schmitt 
with his authoritarian political theology actively involved in legitimizing the existing power 
structures. In this sense, the political-theological account developed here, remains antinomian 
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– to some extent immanent and engaging with the world (society, state, nation) in order to 
witness and disseminate the Christian message, and yet, eschatological and transcendental, 
remaining ‘not of this world’, testifying for a reality beyond this world. Thus, despite the 
changing political conditions and compromises in its relations with the state, Eastern 
Christianity as a whole has never abandoned its prophetic, eschatological nature. In different 
periods some national Orthodox churches may have subordinate to the political regimes, but 
even then Orthodox communities in the specific country or the ecumenical Orthodoxy have 
remained faithful to the eschatological commitments. First and foremost, holds the Eastern 
Christian theology, the church should remain a living communion with God, not a cultural or 
ideological department of the state.  
Meanwhile, notions of participation, cooperation and engagement define the internal 
ecclesial ethos and relate to the broader social context. The internal logic of theosis (divine-
human communion) and the doctrines of Eucharistic ecclesiology when projected and 
extended to the public sphere would require a political community that is democratic in its 
form and endorses values of personal freedom, human dignity, participation, inclusion, 
equality.
445
 As Papanikolaou affirms, ‘as Christians progress to realize the divine in their 
lives, then the inevitable result would be a liberal democratic form of political community. 
Otherwise put, the church is meant to perfect the political community not abolish it, which 
means that the political community exists in an analogical relationship to the church, not one 
of diametrical opposition’ and concluding that the church ‘lends support to democratic forms 
of government as most consistent with its own theological principles.’446   
In the context of well-established or emerging democratic polities, Christian concepts 
of ecclesia and Eucharist, of theosis and synergy, of laos and synaxis have the potential of 
revealing the personalist, communal and participatory dimensions of ecclesial relations which, 
if projected to the public sphere, cultivate civic and democratic ethos. Next turning to the 
concepts of conciliarity and catholicity in the light of the Eucharistic ecclesiology will further 
emphasize this participatory dimension.           
 
3. Conciliarity and catholicity  
Political-theological aspects of core Eastern Orthodox doctrines and concepts are also 
evident in the concepts of conciliarity and catholicity. Traditionally, they are interpreted as 
organizational principles of the church, expressing the way the ecclesia structures and governs 
                                                          
445
 Papanikolaou, The Mystical as Political, 77-79,160-161. 
446
 Ibid., 80. 
205 
 
itself. However, this would be a form of reductionism. First and foremost, their meaning is 
intrinsically related to the understanding of ecclesia as a Eucharistic assembly, not an 
institution or social organization.  
The concept of conciliarity is an integral part of the dogmatic beliefs of the church, it 
determines its self-identity and self-understanding. It is also expressly mentioned in the 
Nicene Creed, where the church is defined with the Greek word ‘Καθολικὴν’, translated as 
‘catholic’ in English, ‘cathólicam’ in Latin or ‘soborna’ (conciliar) in Church Slavonic. This 
term has, however, been subjected to rival interpretations. It could be interpreted in the sense 
of ‘universal, ecumenical’ (with an emphasis on the spatial dimension, the territorial 
jurisdiction or the scope of the ecclesial organization). It could be understood in ontological 
terms as ‘bearing the fullness of truth’, hence, related to the divine-human communion and 
the process of salvation and sanctification. Yet, it could be interpreted as ‘conciliar’ in a 
structural and organizational sense, thus representing the organizational principle of the 
Eastern Orthodox Church where the church council (or synod), not a single spiritual head 
(patriarch, archbishop), holds the supreme authority and makes the ultimate decisions in the 
church. All these meanings are closely related and interwoven in the Eastern Orthodox 
perspective. 
These different aspects of conciliarity are studied by Orthodox scholars, who highlight 
their implications in terms of being an organizational principle, but also considered as a way 
of achieving full Christian communion with others.
447
 As it was pointed above, the 
conciliarity is one of the defining concepts of the church, along with its unity, holiness and 
apostolicity (the Nicene Creed proclaims: ‘We believe in one holy catholic and apostolic 
Church’). Conciliarity as a concept touches the very essence of the Orthodox faith to the 
extent that it refers not only to the organizational dimension of the church, but also to the 
nature of the Holy Trinity (divine persons in communion, in council).
448
 It is also connected to 
the understanding of the church as the Body of Christ, as a Eucharistic communion (synaxis).  
In the light of the Eucharistic ecclesiology conciliarity and catholicity acquire an 
ontological dimension: ‘the local church is catholic not because of her relationship with the 
“universal” church, but because of the presence within her of the whole Christ in the one 
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Eucharist’.449 This primacy of the Eucharistic understanding predefines and precedes the  
organizational aspect: ‘This suggests an ecclesiology in which the one Church is constituted 
as many local churches of full “catholic” ecclesial integrity, with no one of them being subject 
to another as “part” of another or of a whole, but each being ‘whole of the whole’.450 
Before turning to conciliarity as an organizational principle of the Orthodox Church 
one needs to acknowledge the importance of the Schmemann’s approach: ‘Before we 
understand the place and the function of the council in the Church, we must, therefore, see the 
Church herself as a council’.451 This understanding is truly in line with the Scriptural 
foundations: ‘For where two or three are gathered together in My name, I am there in the 
midst of them’ (Matt. 18:20); ‘When the Day of Pentecost had fully come, they were all with 
one accord
 in one place’ (Acts 2:1); ‘And they continued steadfastly in the apostles’ doctrine 
and fellowship, in the breaking of bread, and in prayers. Now all who believed were together, 
and had all things in common’ (Acts 2:42, 44). Specifically, in regard to the conciliar 
decision-making procedures evident during the first apostolic Council of Jerusalem, there is 
also a scriptural basis and testimony: ‘Now the apostles and elders came together to consider 
this matter… then it pleased the apostles and elders, with the whole church, to send chosen 
men of their own company… it seemed good to us, being assembled with one accord, to send 
chosen men to you … For it seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us…’ (Acts 15:6, 22, 25, 
28). 
In the writings of the Church Fathers it was emphasized that the Church is ‘a collegial 
assembly’, that all members form ‘one body’, that the people should be consulted in the 
process of decision-making and some decisions are taken with their expressive consent, 
including the right to elect bishops or priests  (John Chrysostom, Cyprian of Carthage).
452
 
Currently, it is accepted that the decision-making of the church and the various tasks 
that have to be performed (educational and missionary, organizational and social activities) at 
the local (parish), regional (eparchy), or national levels should involve active participation of 
the lay members. It is recognized that the active ministry of the faithful is an important 
dimension of the conciliar nature of church life: ‘The hierarchy should respect the ministry of 
the laity, accept their correct suggestions, and enable free initiatives and actions for the 
general benefit of the Church…Orthodox ecclesiology demands that nothing in the Church 
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should be decided without broad agreement and cooperation of the entirety of the God’s 
people. This means that the presbyter’s ministry must be collaborative.’453    
Viewing conciliarity as a foundational and organizational principle of the church one 
should acknowledge the variety of its interpretation in different Orthodox jurisdictions. In the 
Slavic-speaking Orthodox churches the term is often translated as sobornost (the root being 
‘sobor’ – ‘gathering’). Some of the nuances in the meaning of this term, however, emphasize 
not the organizational aspects of conciliarity, rather presuppose that the church constitutes and 
expresses an organic unity of the people (in the traditions of the Russian Orthodoxy and 
Slavophiles movement). In this collectivist interpretation, the concept of sobornost expresses 
a fusion between religion and nationalism leading to traditionalist communalism which is 
contrary to the values of personalism, universalism and participation.
454
  
Nonetheless, conciliarity as the organizational principle of the Orthodox Church has a 
significant political-theological potential. Constituting a community that fully respects the 
dignity of the person and allows participation at all levels of government without 
discriminating against social status or functional roles of persons is a social experience that 
cultivates values of engagement and genuine solidarity.
455
 Indeed, a closer examination of the 
organizational life of the Orthodox Church would reveal that the concept of conciliarity is 
implemented at all levels of institutional organization (parish councils, eparchial council, 
autocephalous church council, pan-Orthodox councils). This participatory ethos presupposes 
lay engagement that goes beyond the local parish church. According to the statutes of 
different autocephalous churches, the laity participation in the councils (as the highest law-
making bodies of the church) at all levels is protected. It does not mean, however, that lay 
persons acquire any sacerdotal function, which, in principle, remains preserved for the 
ordained clergy. Being members of different councils, Orthodox lay members have the right 
to participate fully in the discussion and voting on an equal basis with the clergy.
456
  
Notwithstanding that the original form of the general church councils included as 
participants almost exclusively an ordained clergy (bishops having a dominant and decisive 
role), recent developments of the Orthodox ecclesiology in the last two centuries has led to 
the gradual inclusion of representatives of the laity in the church governance.
457
 Lay 
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participation in the governance of the Orthodox Church as well as in the process of election of 
candidates for priests and bishops prior to their ordination, reveals the participatory ethos that 
could be expected to cultivate a further engagement in the public sphere. This lay engagement 
in the church governance is channeled through institutional forms and procedures expressly 
provided in the church statutes at all different levels (parish councils, eparchy councils and 
general church-laity councils).
458
 Moreover, Christian engagement in the public sphere is 
authoritatively enhanced in the official statements of the Orthodox churches on social and 
political issues highlighting their engagement with the values of freedom, justice, solidarity, 
and peace (as illustrated in length in Chapter three).  
In a political-theological perspective, it is important to note that the wider social and 
political context affects church life. Under conditions where authoritarian hierarchical models 
and paternalism have been predominant in a society, the ecclesiastic ethos also suffers from 
passivity and concentration of powers in the hands of the high clerics. Where, on the other 
hand, the public sphere is constructed around more democratic practices, and accepts ideas of 
governmental accountability and the rule of law, ecclesiastic structures tend to develop a more 
participatory and inclusive ethos, to practice truly conciliar governance. This influence, 
however, goes in two directions – active participation in the church life may enhance civic 
participation and create a specific participatory ethos for the laity, and vice versa, active 
engagement in civil society may create social conditions that are favorable to the participatory 
ethos in the religious communities. The empirical aspect of this relation could be illustrated in 
the context of SEE countries where active lay members of the church (intellectuals, civic 
activists, professionals) are also active in civil society initiatives and the public sphere. This 
observation is particularly true for the parishes in the larger cities.    
The relation between the wider social context and the practices of ecclesial self-
governance could be explained through the comparison between the Orthodox churches in the 
SEE region and the Orthodox communities in the Western societies. The ecclesial life of the 
Orthodox churches in the West, relying almost exclusively on the voluntary participation and 
contribution of the lay members, is usually more intense and vibrant than in the traditional 
Orthodox countries, where churches receive official state support and enjoy public 
recognition as the majority denominations. For instance, the North American diocese of the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church allows greater lay participation in the church governance and 
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autonomy of the local parish church than the mother church in Bulgaria. This is also true for 
the organization of lay initiatives and associations (charities, religious fraternities) which 
cooperate closely with the diocese leadership in fulfilling their mission.  
With a growing number of converts, with their emphasis on lay engagement in the 
church life, with the revival of Eucharist participation, with their adaptation to the democratic 
pluralist conditions, Orthodox Christians in the West form vibrant and living communities. In 
this respect, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America of the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
presents a good example. For decades it has been involved in civic initiatives in support of 
human rights and religious freedom. In doing so it already has a remarkable legacy: in the 
1960s Archbishop Iakovos was an active supporter and collaborator of Martin Luther King Jr. 
and the Civil Rights Movement.
459
 Active lay organizations are involved in charity initiatives 
and human rights advocacy at both state and national levels (including state legislatures, the 
U.S. Congress, the President).
460
 All this has been an evidence of a high degree of adaptability 
of the Orthodoxy to the democratic conditions and their internalization in the organizational 
church life.  
The process of lay engagement is also intensified in the SEE societies where 
Orthodoxy is the predominant religion. These societies experience growing community 
involvement in recent years, a vast array of lay initiatives, and formation of voluntary 
Christian organizations with academic, educational, missionary, advocacy and charity 
purposes. In this way, Orthodox communities reinvigorate their ecclesial and community life, 
but also influence the wider civil society. The Orthodox lay organizations function as both 
religious and civic organizations where their members cultivate a distinct participatory ethos 
connected to shared beliefs and values, and experience of genuine solidarity. This 
involvement is a form of committed participation that goes beyond the temporary political and 
economic interests. It is related to a concept of community that is not a contingent outcome of 
social and economic processes, but an expression of shared values, personal engagement and 
integrity, recognition of the others. In this context, practicing the principle of conciliarity at all 
church levels necessarily leads to lay engagement in the religious and the civic sphere and 
enriches the civil society at large.  
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In addition, the concept of catholicity of the church has a specific dimension that 
emphasizes the universality of Christianity, transcending ethnic, national, cultural, linguistic 
and geographical borders. This specific Christian universalism is evident in the process of 
dissemination of Christianity worldwide. Being practiced locally, in face-to-face 
communities, the Christianity and the Orthodox Church strives to remains universal and 
ecumenical in its mission, transcending all kinds of determinism.       
The conclusion might be that the traditional forms of political theology with their 
over-reliance on monarchical and ecclesial hierarchy (symphonia model) or the ethno-
nationalist ideology (Christian nation model) do not correspond to the authentic Christian 
ethos of community and participation of free and respected persons, as understood today. On 
the other side, the contemporary participatory political theology takes into account the 
democratic conditions in which human rights and dignity are protected, and which are 
favorable for the development of an active Christian and ecclesial life. Well-established 
democratic conditions in a given country facilitate better opportunities for lay participation in 
both ecclesial and public spheres.                 
Certainly, on the basis of its own religious tradition, doctrines, and experience the 
Orthodox Church, acting through its conciliar structures and official representation, is able to 
send a clear message in support of fundamental rights and freedoms, constitutional democracy 
and the rule of law, advocating for more inclusive and participatory political and social 
framework. In the concepts of conciliarity and catholicity, values and experience of Christian 
personalism, universalism and participation intersect, thus transcending the national or 
regional limits. With their implementation in the life of the communities, these concepts foster 
mutual cooperation, solidarity and recognition at a larger scale.    
                                                                                          
4.  Economy and eschatology 
Until now, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the Christian Church is ‘in the 
world, but not of this world,’ that it is missionary and ascetic, universal and eschatological. In 
its nature and existence it cannot be reduced to a purely institutional structure, legitimating the 
state, or to an isolated and segregated spiritual community, completely withdrawing from the 
world. The experience of integration of these dimensions, not their division and separation is 
a distinctive feature of the Orthodox Christianity. This balance and synthesis, however, has 
always been hard to achieve and maintain. There is ever present risk of collapsing in to the 
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extremes, as is evident by the complex history of Orthodox Church and its traditional political 
theology.
461
 
In the political-theological perspective, concepts of economy and eschatology have an 
important function: they prevent the new political-theological synthesis advocated here 
(centered on the values of personalism, participation and universalism) to become thick, 
dogmatic and frozen at a given moment. Concepts of economy and eschatology constitute a 
constant challenge to the closed ideological and political-theological systems that often 
emerge from religious context and philosophies. These concepts require critical vigilance, 
openness, inclusivity and reflexivity when constructing the new participatory political-
theological model.  
Economy and eschatology are related in an important way. They represent the process 
of divine engagement with the world and its ultimate transformation initially through the 
Incarnation, then through the Resurrection and ‘in the end of times’ through the Second 
Coming. These concepts represent the whole process of divine involvement and communion 
with the creation, as well as express the human answer and initiative in this process.        
Economy (oikonomia, οἰκονομία) blends several ideas. It presupposes a special 
dimension of care and concern in terms of the familial relations of the home, the household 
(oἶκος). The act of creation emphasized this fraternal and communal spirit in the world and 
the human community, as well as the divine-human communion, which was lost after the Fall. 
The role of the human according to the plan of creation before the Fall had been that of a 
steward (οἰκονόμος) for the whole of creation. Stewardship is a relational and communal 
category, presupposing concern for and engagement with the world and fellow humans, not 
hedonistic consumerism and materialism. Stewardship also means responsibility before the 
‘owner’, the ‘lord’ of the household. In this sense, the concept of economy is relational on the 
horizontal (fellow humans and the world) and vertical (community with and responsibility 
before the divine) levels. The specific Orthodox engagement with environmental issues (e.g. 
in the missionary work of the Ecumenical Patriarchate) has also these biblical resonances of 
thinking the world as our home (οίκος) and of accepting the call for care, engagement and 
stewardship for the fellow humans.
462
 Hence, the concept of oikonomia conjoins the universal 
dimension of the divine-human communion as the way of salvation of the humankind with the 
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relational and inter-personal dimension of the community, consisting of free persons 
concerned with others. More specifically, the meaning of the concept of economy in the 
Christian theology is related to the process of salvation of the world and the humans through 
the act of divine Incarnation. In its theological sense, economy refers to the divine plan of 
salvation and reunification of the creation with God.  
Another well-accepted and more practical meaning is driven by the canon law, 
according to which oikonomia is explained as a principle which allows mitigation (relaxation) 
and adjustment of the application of a rule or sanction in order to make it suitable to a 
particular person in a given context. This is done in order to reconnect the person with the 
church, to reestablish communion that had been lost, not to discipline and punish for the sake 
and satisfaction of divine justice. This canon law meaning, however, should not be overstated. 
In Meyendorff’s account, ‘the term oikonomia does not belong originally to legal vocabulary; 
meaning “household management,” it designates in the New Testament the divine plan of 
salvation: “He has made known to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will 
according to his purpose which he set forth in Christ as a plan [oikonomia] for the fullness of 
time, to recapitulate all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth” (Ep 1:9-10; v. 
also 3:2-3).’463  
The concept of oikonomia receives its full meaning in the liturgical order of the 
church. The economy of salvation means the process in which the liturgical ecclesial 
community receives the gifts of the Lord and returns in the offering, in the form of 
thanksgiving (the true Eucharist) a transformed human nature and the whole of creation.
464
 
Economy could also be understood as the idea and practice of ‘the liturgy after the 
liturgy’ – the engagement with and practical service (diakonia) to the other, the society and 
the world, to the poor and the needy. The concept of diakonia highlights the social dimension 
of the Christian faith, the realization of koinonia (communion) and ecumenical solidarity.
465
  
Understanding the divine economy of salvation provides the fundamentals of the 
Christian ethics and ethos. This ethos is not established top-down, it is not set with an 
authoritarian decree by а sovereign absolute god. Neither is it an abstract utopian ideal. Given 
that humans are created ‘in the image and likeness of a Trinity of persons’ the Christian ethos 
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has become ‘a living reality which is personal, and as a consequence, relational and 
communal.’466  
Ecumenical engagement with the world should be understood in terms of an 
evangelical mission, but also as a true concern for the humans and the creation. Orthodox 
theology of Incarnation integrates both the divine and the human side in the process of 
salvation. It is not going to the extremes of either abstract spiritualism, or pessimistic dualism 
and negation of the material world, typical for the religious-philosophical doctrines of 
Gnosticism or Platonism and their contemporary counterparts. In the Orthodox perspective, 
the belief in the God-manhood (Θεάνθρωπος) of Christ requires integration and communion 
of the divine and the human, the spiritual and the physical, not their radical separation and 
alienation. These forms of communion and unity underlie the basis of the Orthodox social 
ethics.
467
   
Orthodox anthropology is neither optimistic, nor pessimistic, it is rather realistic – 
acknowledging ‘genuine human potentialities for the good, which are reflections of the 
Eternal Logos in common life…Wholeness, i.e., true and full salvation both here and for the 
eternity, means the restoration of divine likeness of the Trinity in us as persons and in our 
society. The Divinization of the human person is accomplished primarily when communion is 
achieved, if only in a measure in the triune dimensions of the person, the ecclesia and 
society.’468   
In the political-theological perspective, the concept of oikonomia means engagement 
with others and the world, recognition of the equal value, dignity and concern for the fellow 
human, taking the responsibility of transforming society and social institutions into a more 
open and inclusive space. At the same time, the internal dynamics of the concept safeguards 
against establishing rigid and hegemonic structures. This concept relates to all three 
dimensions – personalist, participatory, and universalist, thus shaping the contemporary 
political theology in the Eastern Orthodox context. 
Whereas the concept of economy represents the divine engagement with the human 
and the world, the concept of eschatology explains the human engagement with the divine. 
The event of Incarnation is followed by the glorious Resurrection and anticipation of the 
Second Coming of Christ. The eschatological perspective provides an opportunity for the 
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Christians to enter in communion with resurrected Christ ‘here and now’, in the event of the 
Eucharistic assembly. 
The concept of eschatology gives dynamism and perspective of the Christian belief 
and has a profound political-theological meaning. Christianity is primarily an eschatological 
religion, Christians anticipate the Second Coming of Christ, the resurrection of the dead and 
the eternal life in the Kingdom of God. This belief penetrates all Christian rituals, sacraments 
and ecclesial structures. For instance, the Eucharist is not only a sacrament of the unity, here 
and now, of believers and Christ, it is also a foretasting of the Kingdom of God, participation 
in an eschatological event and ascension into heaven.
469
 The constitutive sacrament of the 
Eucharist, its complete meaning and symbolism, could be fully understood only in the light of 
the eschatological perspective of the coming Kingdom of God.
470
   
Thus, the church itself with the ecclesial hierarchy is not mere an institution or 
organization, it reveals the presence of the Holy Spirit and transforms the community of 
persons into an eschatological community, anticipating the reunification with God. This is a 
community that has no permanent place in this world, but seeks the one to come (Heb 
13:14).
471
 The eschatological vision of the Christians includes the complete transformation of 
the world and the human relations symbolized by the coming of New Jerusalem (Rev 21-22) 
in which all human suffering will be healed, peace and justice will prevail, love and 
communion will be present, and ‘God will be all in all’ (1 Cor 15:28).472   
John Meyendorff eloquently presents the deep meaning of Christian eschatology in the 
following passage:  
Existing in history, the Church expects the second coming of Christ in power as the visible triumph of 
God in the world and the final transfiguration of the whole of creation. Man, as center and lord of creation, will 
then be restored to his original stature, which has been corrupted by sin and death; this restoration will imply the 
“resurrection of the flesh,” because man is not only a “soul,” but a psychosomatic whole, necessarily incomplete 
without his body. Finally, the second coming will also be a judgment, because the criterion of all righteousness - 
Christ Himself - will be present not “in faith” only, appealing for man’s free response, but in full evidence and 
power.
473
 
                                                          
469
 Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 37-44. 
470
 John Zizioulas, Luke Ben Tallon (ed.), Eucharistic Communion and the World (New York: T&T Clark 
International, 2011), 3-5, 40-44.  
471
 Schmemann, The Eucharist, 34-35. 
472
 Jürgen Moltman, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), 308-
320. 
473
 Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, 219-220. 
215 
 
 Christian eschatology is not only progressive and prospective, nor is it one-
dimensional and linear concept. There is a specific tension between experiencing the 
Kingdom of God, here and now, in the Eucharist, which transcends the place and time 
boundaries, on the one side, and the expectation and anticipation of the full realization of the 
Kingdom in the end of times, with the Second Coming, resurrection of the dead, and the 
descent of the New Holy Jerusalem, on the other. The centrality of the eschatological 
dimension for the whole Christian liturgical life is evidenced in the Eucharistic liturgy, which 
starts with an invocation of the Kingdom of God, inviting faithful to ‘remember’ past and 
future events (birth, life, death, resurrection, ascension and the Second Coming of Christ), 
awaiting the coming of the Kingdom in the Lord’s Prayer (‘hallowed be Thy name, Thy 
kingdom come’), co-celebrating the divine liturgy with angels and saints, constantly being 
invocated during the service. The whole Eucharistic liturgy is celebrated in the presence of 
God and his Holy Spirit.
474
  
The Christian eschatology could be resumed in the formulas ‘here, yet not here’, ‘in 
the world, not of the world’. This antinomian approach and constant tension prevents the 
church from being completely absorbed into the society and existing communities, but to 
preserve its otherworldly nature. The Christian eschatology is not simply linear, progressive 
and immanent, it is also transcendent, transformative, existentialist and personalist. It 
presupposes a process of moral and spiritual growth, of change, development, transformation 
and transfiguration, personal and communal.
475
 This necessary engagement with the world, 
though not dissolution and absorption in the world, opens an opportunity for a political 
theology that is transformative and participatory, rather than absolutist and authoritarian. 
Without emphasizing and retaining its eschatological dimension, the Christian Church 
abandons its prophetic mission and risks of becoming an ideological institution, being made 
subservient to the powerful of the day, becoming an ultraconservative and reactionary 
organization. Its rituals and practices would be petrified, thus becoming part of the past, of the 
religious traditionalism, antiquarianism and nationalism. Following this path, the Orthodox 
Church would isolate itself from society and would, nonetheless, be unable to support a 
positive social change.
476
  
At the center of the Christian eschatology is the Christian witness in the world and its 
transformation. It presupposes that the tension between ‘here and now’ and ‘then’ is 
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constitutive and distinctive for the Christian approach to society and politics. As Kalaitzidis
 
notes, ‘expectation of the eschaton is something active, not passive; it is transformative, not 
an escape from the world; it is located in worship and prayer, but also in action, encouraging 
brave decisions and choices vis-à-vis the world and history, in what we described above as the 
state of “in between”, a state which leads neither to a flat rejection of the world, not to 
acceptance of it in its present form; it refers to every aspect of our lives – including, therefore, 
the political and the social – and not just the “sacred” or “religious”’477  
The historical experience has proven the inconsistency and contradictory nature of the 
Christian empire and the Christian nation political-theological models. In no way can they be 
viewed as a form of already realized eschatology.
478
 The Christian eschatology opens the 
horizons of the political, orientates towards the future, maintaining a critical distance from the 
established institutions and social hierarchies.   
Nowadays, there is no a specific political-theological model that can be portrayed as a 
profound and complete revelation of Christian values and ideals. This is also true for the 
participatory model advocated here. By its nature, political theology will always remain 
fragmentary, incomplete and particularistic, one that is impossible to replace the fullness and 
value of the Christian ethos, beliefs, practices and relations. Yet, the political theology, being 
informed by eschatology, has an important function to perform in transforming the society 
and in providing visions, perspectives, values and incentives open for the wider public of 
active citizens who are not directly involved in religious practices. Thus, it makes the ethos 
and values of the predominant religious tradition accessible for the civil society at large 
without requiring institutionalization of a specific religion and conversion of all citizens. It 
also works against the foreclosure of the political, its petrification in once-for-all established 
political forms and models.                       
 
5. Participatory political theology: perspectives 
Elaborating a political theology in the context of pluralist and liberal societies faces an 
important constraint: it may aspire to be a comprehensive and holistic system, but it will 
remain one of many voices that influence the political and institutional framework. The 
political-theological model developed in this study is focused on the participatory, personalist 
and universalist dimensions that could be discovered in the traditions, doctrines and practices 
of the Eastern Orthodox Christianity which remains a majority religion in the SEE countries. 
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Moreover, after the fall of the communist regimes, Orthodox churches are gaining an 
increased public presence in the SEE societies. 
The participatory political theology endorses active civic participation and engagement 
in the sphere of civil society, while cultivating a specific ethos of community involvement and 
concern. Thus it could reinforce the democratic values and practices in the SEE societies and 
contribute to the consolidation of democratic institutions. It is expected that participatory 
political theology is practiced predominantly and primarily at the level of civil society 
accepted by the free agents of this society (citizens, churches, NGOs, Christian organizations) 
with no strictly denominational or sectarian bias. It should not be equated with the official 
positions of the Eastern Orthodox churches on social or political issues, though it is 
nonetheless related to them. It may influence official statements of the churches or being 
influenced by the predominant ecclesial views and opinions. It should not be viewed as a 
comprehensive political platform to be embraced or practiced by particular political party 
groups (e.g. Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists, etc.), though it may influence such 
platforms. Certainly, it does not mandate concrete measures, policies or legislation, though it 
could inform and shape at a more general level political choices and decision-making.  
  As a set of beliefs, values, principles and practices, participatory political theology 
remains open for interpretation and re-interpretation by different social actors. What is 
crucial, however, is the preservation of the necessary link between the values of participation, 
personalism and universalism. These, in turn, presuppose and require respect for the personal 
freedom and dignity, community engagement, recognition of differences and equal concern of 
the persons. All these are also fundamental civic values and virtues that are endorsed by the 
participatory political theology.  
With regard to the secular political models, participatory political theology requires a 
qualified form of liberal democracy, the one that is not only constitutional, but also 
participative and deliberative.
479
 Without being communitarian, it should take community and 
belonging seriously. This is particularly important in the context of SEE societies which have 
well-established national and religious majorities. In these societies more competitive and 
majoritarian democratic models will not guarantee better representation of minority positions, 
but their marginalization and stigmatization. Being oriented towards the common good, the 
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participatory political theology will require a higher degree of cooperation between different 
groups in societies, better channels of communication and inclusion in the public sphere. 
Stripped from its direct religious dimensions and connotations, but preserving the 
ethos, values and principles, found in the religious tradition, this political-theological model is 
open to be embraced by various social actors who want to achieve higher civic involvement in 
transforming political systems in the region. It is important that these systems still suffer from 
declining social trust, from the lack of accountability, political corruption, and oligarchic 
structures which capture and ‘privatize’ institutions and the public sphere in order to secure 
their private benefits and gains. 
It has been argued that Eastern Orthodox concepts of theosis and synergy, ecclesia and 
Eucharist, conciliarity and catholicity, economy and eschatology reveal the importance of 
interpersonal relations and cooperation (synergeia), communion (koinonia) and service 
(diakonia). These concepts are not abstract categories, they relate to existential acts of 
personal engagement, love and compassion. As concepts they refer to fundamental theological 
doctrines - the divine relations within the Trinity, the divine-human communion in the 
Incarnation, the eschatological community of Christians fully realized in the Second Coming 
of Christ and the Kingdom of God. All these concepts have spiritual, but also important social 
dimensions, shaping the Christian religious and social ethos. They could not be reduced to 
simplistic categories which could be neatly explained and developed in clear, logical and 
specific rules, regulating social behavior. They have, however, a potential of inspiring and 
framing social relations and rules in a way that is in conformity with higher values and 
principles.  
Inspiring a distinct participatory political theology, these concepts could shape the 
sphere of legitimacy, before influencing the sphere of legality, of elaborating particular rules, 
forms and procedures. The legitimacy of the freely taken political and legal decisions could be 
evaluated in the light of the participatory concepts and ethos advocated here. In the latter 
sphere, the free will and the moral autonomy of the persons remain fundamental values.  
The approach of the participatory political theology differs significantly from the 
Schmitt’s concepts, arguments and conclusions in support of an authoritarian political model. 
It differs also from Peterson’s conclusion of the impossibility of having a Christian political 
theology in Trinitarian perspective. The participatory political theology builds on the 
Christian existentialism and personalism, on Eucharistic ecclesiology, systematically 
developed by Zizioulas and Schmemann, on the progressive political theology presented by 
Papanikolaou and Kalaitzidis. It contributes to the field by emphasizing the necessity of a 
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participatory perspective, thus endorsing a qualified form of liberal democracy as better 
corresponding to its basic concepts and principles. 
  By stressing the participatory dimension, the political-theological model developed 
here reveals its potential for supporting and influencing the process of democracy-building 
and consolidation in the SEE region. For the countries in the region, the process of 
development of active civil societies, in which democratic institutions will be strengthened 
and democratic reforms will be implemented, remains of crucial importance. Developing 
vibrant and autonomous civil societies is the long-term guarantee of a legitimate and 
accountable constitutional government. Providing a comprehensive political-theological 
framework (the participatory political theology) which connects democratic principles to 
deeply shared values, beliefs and virtues can contribute to their wider popular acceptance. 
  The participatory political theology and the civic and political actors who embrace it 
do not necessarily need to take a stance on particular political ideologies or models such as 
secular liberalism, social progressivism, civic republicanism, communitarianism, 
conservatism or libertarianism. However, certain political values and principles shared by 
these ideological systems might be more in conformity with the participatory political-
theological model than the others. Endorsing the values of human dignity, personal freedom, 
civic engagement and involvement in decision-making, participatory political theology leaves 
a space for different political models established through voluntary cooperation on a condition 
they pay respect to these basic values. Broadly speaking, these models should be democratic, 
constitutional-liberal, engaging with the common good and the community service.  
Respecting personalism and human dignity, stimulating voluntary cooperation, 
building on Christian universalism, the participatory political theology is not limited to a 
particular ethno-nationalist or religious group in the society. Having an Orthodox Christian 
origin, it may function as a ‘civil religion’480 (one consistently endorsing democracy and civic 
engagement) which is shared by different groups in a society, not only from the national and 
religious majority. Its ethos, values and principles, informed and shaped by the doctrines and 
practices of Eastern Christianity go beyond this particular religious tradition and remain open 
for support and endorsement by different people who share its basic principles and concepts. 
If accepted as a form of civil religion, it has a potential to counterbalance the strong 
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nationalist, exclusivist and messianic ideologies that have dominated the public sphere in the 
SEE societies in the last 150 years. In the context of deepening European integration of the 
SEE region, in order to overcome nationalist mythologies and replace them with a set of 
beliefs and practices which emphasize civic commitment and engagement in the public 
sphere, this political-theological model is a valuable perspective.  
Hence, the participatory political theology could endorse and legitimize further 
integration and increased regional cooperation, moderating nationalisms in the SEE region, 
without this process being portrayed in negative terms of colonization or assimilation. This 
model reveals itself as both originating in the traditions and the cultural context of the region, 
and yet being open, inclusive and universalist. It opens perspectives of full participation in the 
European integration, while remaining faithful to the best of the SEE region traditions, beliefs 
and practices. Its significance could be immense, if it succeeds in overcoming both the 
reactionary nationalism and the ultra-globalist tendencies and in providing better justification 
for the process of integration. It preserves the sense of meaning and belonging to particular 
traditions, while translating them in the light of a more universal and complex European 
democratic identity (‘United in diversity’).481  
The necessity of elaborating a comprehensive political theology that may perform the 
function of a civil religion in a republican state, thus enhancing public engagement and 
participation, could be presented with Bellah’s words:  
 
Precisely from the point of view of republicanism civil religion is indispensable. A republic as an active 
political community of participating citizens must have a purpose and a set of values. Freedom in the republican 
tradition is a positive value that asserts the worth and dignity of political equality and popular government. A 
republic must attempt to be ethical in a positive sense and to elicit the ethical commitment of its citizens. For this 
reason it inevitably pushes toward the symbolization of an ultimate order of existence in which republican values 
and virtues make sense. Such symbolization may be nothing more than the worship of the republic itself as the 
highest good, or it may be, as in the American case, the worship of a higher reality that upholds the standards the 
republic attempts to embody.
482
   
 
At this stage of its development, the participatory political theology is more a proposal 
to be accepted and further developed by social actors, than an actual political or social 
platform or movement. Yet, its contours are already visible and some civic actors (churches, 
intellectuals, civic organizations) endorse and embrace its basic ideas and doctrines, which are 
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presented in the public sphere (in official statements, declarations, publications). Whether this 
public engagement will be successful and will be able to influence the wider public opinion 
and even the democratic decision-making process depends on various social conditions. Their 
analysis, however, lies beyond the scope of this study.  
Participatory political theology is offered to the organized civil society, public 
intellectuals and opinion-makers, to the Orthodox churches in the region to accept and 
endorse it as an approach to public engagement. If this happens, given the high public 
visibility of these actors, the process of democratic consolidation in the SEE region will be re-
enhanced and equipped with substantive legitimation and justification beyond the external 
geopolitical arguments that are often used in explaining the trajectory of democratization and 
European integration of the SEE societies. 
Possible challenges to the role and significance of the participatory political theology 
are the relatively low level of commitment to an active religious life in the post-communist 
countries (hence, the law level of knowledge and experience of the core Orthodox doctrines), 
as well as the contamination of religion with excessive nationalism and historicism. Given the 
fact, however, that the predominantly Eastern Orthodox countries in the region are 
undergoing a process of democratization and this has the support of the popular majorities in 
these countries, it is necessary that the Eastern Orthodox churches somehow reflect this socio-
political process. Hence, there are positive incentives for embracing this emerging political-
theological model that is aimed at providing better explanation of a specific religious and 
cultural tradition and its integration into the more democratic and universalist framework.  
It is also noteworthy, that in the last decades other major Christian traditions (Catholic 
and Protestant) have also developed political theologies which favor human rights and 
democracy, community spirit and the common good, justifying them in the light of the 
existing religious concepts and doctrines. Thus, the elaboration of the participatory political 
theology fills the gap in the Eastern Orthodox tradition. 
An important dimension of the participatory political theology should not be 
overshadowed by its general conformity to and endorsement of the civic participatory and 
liberal constitutional framework. It should not be conceived in terms of legitimizing the 
political status quo either in the SEE countries or in the larger European context. Due to its 
deeply religious origin, sharing the eschatological dimension of Christianity, the participatory 
political theology remains critical of and vigilant of the injustice, compromises, and 
imperfection still found in democratic societies and their political and social institutions. 
Thus, it could witnesses for the possibility of another more just, more humane, more inclusive 
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society, that is better realizing Christian ideals of human dignity, charity, compassion, 
rejecting all kinds of self-sufficiency, self-congratulation, social exclusion, segregation and 
unequal treatment of human persons. Yet, this eschatological dimension has also a 
preventative function – it counterbalances the totalizing aspects of the civic commitment and 
of the absolute allegiance to the modern nation state, which often demands a sacrifice in the 
name of the nation, especially in times of a political crisis and security threats.
483
 Being 
engaged with civil society and participation, this kind of political theology goes beyond the 
particularities of the political and institutional settings, remaining eschatological, admitting 
that its ideals and concepts could not be fully realized within the limits of politics, the nation 
and the state.
484
  
In its deep presuppositions and core concepts, the political-theological model 
advocated here is by no means conformist and accommodationist. It opens perspectives, lifts 
the veil of immanent politics and current power disposition by imagining the political in a 
way that is personalist, yet communal and participatory.
485
 In that particular sense it 
transcends the nation-state limits and boundaries, but does not simply equate with or justify 
globalization and secular universalism. Rendering its support for a liberal and participatory 
democratic model, it also explicitly shows its limits and imperfection. Being profoundly 
informed by the Eucharistic ecclesiology, the participatory political theology holds that 
persons engaging in the event of communion and public acting (liturgy) become fellow-
citizens not only with their national compatriots, but also with the people in the world as well 
as with those who already dwell in the City of God. This transcendent and eschatological 
dimension works against the closure and self-sufficiency of the modern political systems, 
remaining open and vigilant of other possibilities to emerge. Endorsing all that is positive in 
modern democracies, yet providing a critical view, the participatory political theology is open 
to transformation and change towards better realization of its personalist and democratic 
commitments. Thus, constitutional democracy is transformed without being threatened. 
In the end, the three principles of the participatory political theology – personalism, 
participation, universalism – shape and reinforce democratic social practices. Other 
alternative political theologies (e.g. the neo-imperialist model in Russia, or the nationalist 
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model in the Balkans) could be ‘tested’ for conformity with these principles and eventually 
rejected as incapable to produce the democratic political and social ethos much needed in the 
SEE region. To this extent, the participatory political theology could be accepted and 
endorsed by different civic actors, religious organizations and institutions as better 
corresponding to the democratic political framework and the perspectives of deepening 
European integration of the SEE region.         
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Conclusion 
This research advocates that Eastern Orthodoxy has the potential to develop, on the 
basis of its core concepts and doctrines, a new political-theological model that is participatory, 
personalist and universalist, thus corresponding to and supporting modern democratic models. 
This political-theological model endorses the process of regional integration and peaceful 
international cooperation. The participatory political-theological synthesis could enhance the 
democracy-building in the SEE countries through cultivating values of civic participation, 
concern and engagement with the common good among the various groups of citizens. The 
participatory political theology consistently and publicly defends these values and principles.    
  The research on the participatory political theology has engaged with several 
interconnected issues: first, the challenges to democracy-building in the SEE societies are still 
present, democratic process is incomplete, democratic institutions are fragile, the vast 
majority of citizens have been excluded from the decision-making; second, while the process 
of European integration has been a catalyst of a positive change, it is however, not powerful 
enough to transform the entire political structure and the embedded oligarchic power 
networks; third, while the process of democratic change and EU integration have been viewed 
as a part of the larger geopolitical game, they lacked a deeper cultural justification that could 
relate them to some values and traditions, originating in the region; fourth, Eastern Orthodoxy 
has been a dominant religious-cultural force, intrinsically present and active in the process of 
creation of the medieval and modern statehood of the SEE countries, hence, it cannot be 
excluded from the current process of democratization and modernization of these societies; 
fifth, in different periods Eastern Orthodoxy has been able to develop a religious-political 
explanation and justification of the political regimes experienced by these societies, thus, 
elaborating specific political-theological models corresponding to the different types of 
political regimes (the symphonia model corresponding to the medieval empire; the Christian 
nation model corresponding to the modern nation-state). The participatory political-
theological model corresponds to the constitutional democratic state with an active civil 
society, open to and participating in the process of supranational regional integration.  
These issues are analyzed in different chapters starting with more contemporary 
constitutional and political perspectives on democratic transition in the SEE region (Chapter 
one) outlining the challenges to the democratic consolidation as well as the importance of 
civic engagement for fostering this process. Then, the historical development and the current 
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issues of church-state relations in the SEE societies are presented in order to highlight the 
political-theological model corresponding to the modern nation-state, as well as the 
contemporary situation of cooperation and tension between the Orthodox churches and the 
new (semi-)democratic states in the region (Chapter two).  
The theoretical aspects of political theology in its Western and Eastern, Christian and 
secular interpretations are presented along with official statements of the Orthodox churches 
on democracy and human rights (Chapter three). In this chapter the methodological approach 
of the Orthodox political theology is outlined in the works of John Zizioulas (Eucharistic 
ecclesiology) and Aristotle Papanikolaou (divine-human communion). A comprehensive 
presentation of political-theological models operative in the Eastern Christian context from 
the Early Christian through the Byzantine to the modern nation-state periods is provided in 
the Chapter four. The last chapter of the research elaborates the principles and concepts of the 
new participatory, personalist and universalist political theology (Chapter five). This endeavor 
relies on a systematic analysis of the theological concepts of theosis and synergy, ecclesia and 
Eucharist, conciliarity and catholicity, economy and eschatology that permeate Eastern 
Orthodox theology. The overarching paradigms of organizing and revealing the political-
theological potential of these concepts are the Eucharistic ecclesiology and divine-human 
communion, emphasizing the participatory and personalist dimensions. 
This new participatory political theology is developed with respect to the theological 
studies of Eucharistic ecclesiology and the emerging civic participatory ethos in the SEE 
societies. The Eucharistic ecclesiology emphasizes the participatory nature of the church as a 
communion of persons united in Christ through the Eucharist. The ecclesia is also understood 
as a structured order with its principles and rules of organization, decision-making and 
jurisdiction (conciliarity and catholicity). The church is engaged with the world (economy), 
though remaining not of this world (eschatology) it is oriented to the City of God. The church 
is a polity that respects personhood, participation and community. With its ethos of 
participation and community, respecting the dignity and freedom of each person, the Christian 
Orthodox teaching and practice is able to support the civic democratic movements and the 
active civil society that is becoming more important social forces in the SEE societies in the 
last two decades.    
  For the political theology elaborated here, these values of personhood, participation 
and community are truly significant. They express the Christian relation to the social order 
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and structures. At the most fundamental level, the full recognition of one’s personhood in 
communion with others requires organizational structures that are conciliar, inclusionary, 
participatory, dynamic, and open to social change, not absolutist-monarchical, exclusionary, 
socially conservative, and petrified. This understanding has been developed by preeminent 
contemporary Orthodox scholars (Zizioulas, Schmemann, Meyendorff, Yannoulatos, Ware) 
and contextualized by Papanikolaou, Kalaitzidis, Vassiliadis.  
These personalist, participatory and universalist dimensions of the new political 
theology find authoritative recognition and expression in official documents (encyclicals, 
statements, declarations) adopted by different Orthodox jurisdictions and instances 
(Ecumenical Patriarchate, the synods of the autocephalous churches, pan-Orthodox meetings). 
This new political theology benefits from the global spread of the Orthodoxy in the last 
century (beyond its traditional locus in Eastern Europe and Eastern Mediterranean region), 
thus, facing valuable cultural encounters, exchange and cooperation which further contribute 
for its universal outlook and vision.  
The participatory political theology is analyzed in comparison to the traditional 
political theologies of symphonia and Christian nation that have been formed mostly under 
non-democratic conditions (the Christian empire and the authoritarian nation-state). 
Employing these models in the past, the Orthodox churches often supported political and 
cultural expansionism, national exceptionalism, often defended ultra-conservative, 
authoritarian and anti-modernist policies. This trajectory has been changed with the process of 
democratization of the SEE region in the last decades. The Orthodox churches have opened 
themselves for democratic values and practices which, in turn, also influenced their internal 
organizational life and their public image. In the organizational aspect, lay member 
participation in the ecclesial life as well as the engagement with the civil society is increasing. 
Christian lay organizations are actively involved in the civil society and are committed to 
different causes (defending the rights of the underprivileged, organizing social and charity 
activities, engaged with educational projects). In the public sphere, Orthodox churches 
consistently and openly endorse democratic values, human rights, tolerance, inter-cultural 
dialogue and cooperation.    
With its spirit of openness and engagement the participatory political theology is able 
to mobilize support for the democratic and Europeanization project in the SEE societies 
without being fully identified with it. It should not be understood in terms of accommodating 
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to and accepting the political and social establishment either in the SEE countries, or in larger 
European context. Having its roots in deeply Christian concepts and doctrines, the 
participatory political theology overcomes local particularities, divisions, tensions (socio-
economic, political, cultural, ethnic) and defends a vision of a society (community) that is 
based on mutual recognition, respect for the human dignity, inclusion and participation of all 
its members. To the extent the SEE societies are far from open and inclusive, participatory 
political theology remains critical of the current state of society, while endorsing its positive 
tendencies. Retaining this critical view has a preventative role, allowing participatory political 
theology to remain attentive to the negative sides of modern democracies – social exclusion of 
certain groups (immigrants, refugees, members of different minorities), excessive 
consumerism, concentration of power allowing abuse.  
Thus, the political theology developed here is by no means conformist, it supports 
only certain aspects of the contemporary democratic model, while challenging others as 
incompatible with its personalist, participatory and universalist values. It calls for 
transformation and change of democratic systems towards better realization of their 
personalist and participatory commitments. The eschatological dimension of the participatory 
political theology ensures that the public sphere remain open for alternative civic and political 
projects, and not be perceived as closed, already established and self-sufficient.  
The political-theological model advocated here also provides perspectives beyond the 
immanent political reality. It is aware, that from a Christian perspective, neither the state, nor 
politics (democratic politics included), could be an ultimate reality for the human person. The 
Christian ideal of personal participation and engagement in full communion with other 
persons and with God could not be realized in the imperfect social and political structures. 
They should be continuously reformed in order to be more respectful of the human dignity 
and freedom, but they would never achieve the features of the divine-human communion. 
This act of communion cannot be fully realized in the secular democratic societies, yet the 
existing societies deserve support as far as they respect the human dignity, freedom, and 
personal autonomy to a much greater extent than any other existing political model. 
In times of emerging authoritarian political-theological models across the borders of 
the European democracies (‘political Orthodoxy’ in Russia, ‘political Islam’ in Turkey), 
legitimating anti-liberal, anti-western and expansionist policies, it is important to support and 
strengthen the political-theological model that embraces the values and ethos of personalism, 
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participation and universalism, thus, endorsing democracy, the rule of law and human rights. 
In this sense, the European integration and democratic consolidation of the SEE countries 
could be successful and achieve sustainability through integrating these participatory 
political-theological values in the public space and culture of these societies, while remaining 
faithful to their deeply shared Orthodox Christian ethos and culture.      
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